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Abstract 
 
Public private partnerships [PPPs] are a product of policies and processes to 
modernise the delivery of infrastructure-based services. An examination of the 
modernisation literature establishes the broad analytical frame within which this thesis 
investigates PPPs. The macro-level overview of the recent transformation of the 
Australian public sector confirms that the dominant principles underlying 
modernisation are grounded in new institutional economics [NIE] that are 
implemented through private-sector derived accounting and management 
implementation technologies. It highlights the contextual complexities stemming from 
Australia’s federal system of government, explaining the decision to focus on 
investigating PPP experiences in Victoria. 
 
At the conceptual level, PPPs rely on risk management and modernisation of service 
delivery to achieve value for money [VFM] for governments. In Victoria, 2000 
signals a change in the modernisation role of PPPs. Thereafter, risk inherent in PPPs 
was reduced by excluding the contractor from the delivery of core social services. 
Also, the state began to develop a number of PPP policies to guide, aid, control and 
rationalise decision making in the pre-contracting stage, and to clarify objectives. 
Analysis of PPP contracts and the failure of one pre-2000 PPP hospital project are 
illustrative of the controversies identified in the literature about ‘hidden’ aims, the 
role of technologies designed provide ‘objective’ evidence of VFM inherent in PPPs 
at the time of contracting, and the ‘fallacy’ of risk transfer to private contractors. 
 
An examination of prison contracts indicates the changing nature of the management 
and control of PPPs in the execution stage. Analysis of pre-2000 prison contracts 
reveals that these projects were intended to drive significant financial and non-
financial modernisation reforms throughout the correctional services system. Despite 
problems with contractual specification of performance and payment mechanisms, 
and the failure of one of the three pre-2000 prisons, recent evidence suggests, contrary 
to conclusions in the previous literature, that sector-wide modernisation objectives are 
being achieved in PPP prisons. 
 
   xii
PPPs have been criticised on the grounds that they enable governments to avoid 
accountability for service provision. A survey of the extent, focus and characteristics 
of the performance audit of PPPs confirms that little PPP auditing has been 
undertaken in Australia per se, and also that much of the performance auditing has 
focused on examining adherence to mandated procedures in the pre-contracting stage. 
However, this thesis demonstrates that the Victorian government has undertaken 
significant evaluation of the operation of its pre-2000 PPP prisons, and that its 
thinking and policy development reflect lessons learnt. 
 
The evidence presented in this thesis challenges findings in the previous literature that 
modernisation has delivered less than promised. This thesis confirms the potency of 
longitudinal research to investigate outcomes of what is essentially an iterative 
process of reform and that ‘successful’ implementation of modernisation change is 
sensitive to the context to be reformed. In finding that the presence of goodwill trust is 
critical to the implementation of recent modernisation reform in the correctional 
services sector (including in the PPP prisons), this thesis also confirms recent 
critiques of the power of NIE theories to explain contracting practices in the PPP 
setting. 
1 
CHAPTER ONE 
 
Thesis Overview: 
Modernisation in the Australian Public Sector 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Since the 1980s, the modernisation of public services in member countries of the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD] has been 
characterised as ‘new’ public management [NPM]1 (Hood, 1991; 1995). 
Modernisation has been implemented through accounting and management 
technologies (Guthrie et al, 2005; Olson et al, 1998), which have been used to provide 
an apparently coherent and rational means to transform the public sector (Chou et al, 
2005; Lapsley, 1999; 2001a; Skaerbaek and Thorbjornsen, 2007) through making it 
more like the private sector (Olson et al, 1998). Public private partnerships [PPP(s)] 
are an example of a modern procurement technology that has been used to achieve a 
range of modernisation objectives (Broadbent and Laughlin, 2005). ‘Public private 
partnership’ is the name given to an arrangement designed to inject private-sector 
funds and management expertise into public-sector capital projects for the stated 
purpose of cost-effectively enhancing the provision of public services (Lapsley, 
1999). 
 
PPPs are time and cost-specific agreements between the state and a private 
consortium for infrastructure-based service provision. The consortium undertakes 
responsibility for financing, designing and constructing (or refurbishing) a facility, 
and for providing related services. The government (or users in the case of 
infrastructure providing user-pays services such as toll roads) pays the consortium a 
revenue stream that is used to repay debt, fund operations and provide a return for 
investors (Pollock and Price, 2004). At the rhetorical level, risks associated with 
financing and building the infrastructure and with service delivery are transferred to 
the consortium. The efficiency gains arising from the effective management of project 
                                                 
1 In other work, this reform movement has also been known as public management reform [PMR] 
Pollitt and Bouckaert (2000). Use of the term ‘modernisation’ follows Lapsley (1999, 2001a; b; c; d), 
Skaerbeak and Thorbjoernsen (2007), and Broadbent and Guthrie (2008). In all cases it is 
acknowledged as an administrative doctrine influenced by new institutional economics [NIE] and 
implemented by private-sector derived accounting and management technologies, with the intention of 
producing public services more efficiently and effectively (Boston, 1995; Hood, 1991; 1995; Pollitt and 
Bouckaert, 2000). 
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risks are alleged to result in reduced whole-of-life project costs derived from superior 
private-sector management practices (Lapsley, 2001a), providing value for money 
[VFM] savings that justify the use of costly private finance. Accordingly, VFM is 
ostensibly the primary motivation for these projects and makes these partnership 
arrangements justifiable for governments.  
 
There is no universally accepted terminology for PPPs in either the general discourse 
or in the scholarly literature. For example, in the UK, these types of arrangements are 
referred to as the Private Finance Initiative [PFI] and more recently as PPPs. In the 
Australian state of New South Wales [NSW], they are known as PPPs or Privately 
Financed Projects, and in neighbouring Victoria, PPPs are also known as Partnerships 
Victoria [PV] Projects. Prior to 2000, PPPs were variously known in Australia by 
acronyms such as Build Own Operate Transfer [BOOT] or Build Own Operate [BOO] 
(English and Guthrie, 2003). Whilst the PFI, PV Projects, BOOs and BOOTs can 
have more particular definitions attached to them, they are often used interchangeably 
with the term ‘PPP’, blurring the practical distinctions between these models. 
Hereafter, the term ‘PPP(s)’ will be used exclusively to denote the arrangements that 
are of interest to this thesis, namely, those PPPs that deliver social services (such as 
prisons and hospitals). 
 
Overall, the conclusion of Olson et al (1998) and Humphrey et al (2005) – based on a 
number of national studies undertaken over a ten-year period – is that modernisation 
has delivered less than has been promised. According to Humphrey et al (2005, p. 2), 
modernisation has resulted in fundamental changes to public-sector organisations, 
organisational behaviour and social expectations that are too important to be left to 
proceed unchecked and under-researched: 
[T]here is a need to subject such reforms, both in terms of their practical 
application and the theoretical basis on which they have spread around the 
world, to detailed empirical research and analysis in terms of the individual 
technologies applied in various nations, and the organizational contexts at 
national and international levels.  
 
The motivation for this research is Humphrey et al’s (2005) challenge, and also the 
call for longitudinal research into the outworking of modernisation in different nations 
(Lapsley, 2001b; d) and PPPs in particular (Broadbent et al, 2008). PPPs currently 
Chapter 1 Thesis Overview 3 
 
 
account for about ten percent of Australian governments’ investment in infrastructure 
(Fitzgerald, 2004). That proportion is expected to grow dramatically as significant 
investment in new infrastructure is required to underpin the nation’s future economic 
development (Crowe, 2007). However, the public perception of PPPs in Australia is 
largely sceptical owing to concerns that they transfer wealth to private consortia 
(Walker, 2003); fail to deliver VFM to governments (Quiggin, 2004; Stanley and 
Hensher, 2004); constrain future planning and expenditure (Quiggin, 2004); and that 
governments have not been held sufficiently accountable for their economic and 
social repercussions (Andrew, 2007; Walker, 2003; Watson, 2003). Suspicions have 
been confirmed by various Australian governments’ refusal to disclose information, 
even to parliaments, that could facilitate independent investigation of their outcomes 
(VPAEC, 2006), and by some spectacular failures (Andrew, 2007; English and 
Walker, 2004; Stanley and Hensher, 2004; Walker, 2003). In addition, the complexity 
and volume of the policies that guide and aid PPP decision-making in nine different 
Australian jurisdictions2 adds to the difficulty of investigating their outworking 
(English and Guthrie, 2003). These factors also limit the scope of this research and its 
conclusions. 
 
 
1.2 Thesis aims 
In light of the scepticism about PPP outcomes, the objective of this ‘by publication’ 
thesis is to analyse the use of PPPs as a modern procurement technology. Explicitly, 
the research investigates how new institutional economics [NIE] (Hood, 1991, p. 5) 
and the accounting and management technologies embedded in PPP decision-making 
processes and procedures (Olson et al, 1998), are used to manage and control 
infrastructure procurement and its oversight by auditors-general.  
 
PPPs are a product of policies and processes to modernise public services (Broadbent 
and Guthrie, 2008). The principles underlying modernisation are grounded in classical 
economic theories, which have become known as NIE when applied to the public 
sector (Barton, 2001). Modernisation is implemented through private-sector 
                                                 
2 Australia has a federal system of government comprising the Commonwealth Government, six state 
and two territory governments. See Chapter 3 for an explanation of the Australian political context and 
its relevance to PPP analysis.  
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accounting and management technologies that underpin public-sector modernisation 
in OECD nations (Guthrie et al, 2005; Olson et al, 1998). Modernisation has also 
changed the nature and characteristics of state audit, reorienting it to include the 
examination of the efficiency and effectiveness of program implementation (Pollitt et 
al, 1999). Questions remain, however, as to whether modernisation has achieved its 
intended objectives (Guthrie et al, 2005; Olson et al, 1998; Pollitt et al, 1999). Thus, 
this thesis has three aims, which are elucidated below.  
 
To provide the necessary context for the analysis of PPPs and their oversight, the first 
aim is to analyse the characteristics of modernisation in the Australian public 
sector. Focusing on the role of accounting and management technologies in 
implementing modernisation change, the thesis initially analyses the history and 
characteristics of modernisation in the Australian public sector during the period 
1998-2005. 
 
The second aim of this thesis is to analyse PPPs and their changing role as a 
modern procurement technology. As a result of Australia’s federal system of 
government, the nation effectively has nine governments, and potentially nine 
different approaches to PPP implementation (English and Guthrie, 2003). 
Accordingly, in investigating how PPPs have been used over time to modernise public 
service delivery, this study narrows its research focus to Victoria, Australia’s leading 
PPP proponent. English and Guthrie (2003) established that PPP policies are the 
primary mechanisms used to manage and control PPP decision-making, and that little 
research has been undertaken into the underlying principles and technologies 
embedded in the PPP policies that guide and aid the outworking of Australian PPPs.  
 
This thesis fills this gap by analysing Victoria’s PPP policies between 1991 and 2007. 
The purpose of this examination is twofold. First, it provides insights into the 
changing use of PPPs over time.  Second, this thesis focuses on how NIE and private-
sector derived accounting and management technologies have been deployed to 
articulate and rationalise changing PPP processes and procedures over time, and to 
control PPP decision-making at the micro or organisational level. At the project or 
organisational level (Broadbent and Laughlin, 1999) the thesis examines four PPP 
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contracts (representing nine PPP projects) to provide insights into the changing nature 
of PPP use, and how the contracts reflect stated policy objectives. 
The third aim of this thesis is to analyse the oversight of PPPs by Australian 
auditors-general. Modernisation has also affected understandings of public 
accountability and the practice of state audit. The emphasis on performance that 
characterises modernisation has given rise to performance audit, which is intended to 
provide independent assurance that government programs have been implemented 
effectively and are well managed (Gendron et al, 2001). Pollitt et al (1999) have 
confirmed the fundamental link between the implementation of modernisation and 
changing performance audit practice. Although there is general agreement about the 
origins and distinctive characteristics of modernisation and performance audit, their 
development and outworking are intertwined, contested, context-dependent and 
change over time (Guthrie and Parker, 1999). However, performance audit has also 
been judged as acting to legitimate and foster modernisation (Broadbent and 
Laughlin, 2003; Skaerbaek and Thorbjornsen, 2007) as auditors-general also strive to 
provide ‘evidence’ that their own activities embody and provide an example of ‘best 
practice’ modernisation (Pollitt et al, 1999). 
Governments’ propensity to tightly control information disclosed to the public about 
PPP arrangements has hindered their independent evaluation by the academic 
community and parliaments (Watson, 2003; 2004; VPAEC, 2006). The reluctance by 
executive government to provide information about the mechanics of pre-contracting 
decision-making, particularly as it relates to the role and calculation of the 
benchmarks used to determine the cost of public provision and PPP performance in 
the execution stage, has made the role of auditors-general in PPP oversight critical to 
the public’s understanding of PPPs, and to governments’ accountability for these 
arrangements (Heald, 2003). However, modernisation pressures on state audit to 
provide evidence of audit ‘success’ (in terms of number of recommendations acted on 
by audited bodies, for instance) may also undermine auditors-general’s ability to 
provide independent oversight of program implementation. This research provides 
evidence of the extent, focus and characteristics of auditor-general oversight of 
Australian PPPs in the period since their inception in the 1990s3. 
                                                 
3 It is difficult to establish one discrete time period that encompasses the analysis undertaken in this 
thesis because the published papers inevitably cover different periods. However, it is possible to state 
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This thesis is unique in the Australian context, and also internationally, as no previous 
research has examined (and disclosed details of) PPP contracts. Similarly, no 
Australian study has hitherto examined auditor-general oversight of extant PPPs in 
depth to determine the extent, focus and characteristics of their independent 
assessment through performance audit. 
 
 
1.3 Overview of the five published papers 
This PhD thesis contains five published papers (see Table 1.1 below) that combine to 
present the bulk of the analysis and empirical work undertaken to address the study’s 
three aims. Analysis of modernisation in the Australian public sector is included 
because it provides insights into the changing historical context within which the 
study is located, and articulates linkages between international approaches to public-
sector modernisation and the Australian experience. This macro-level modernisation 
theme is developed in the Paper 1 [English et al (2005)], which analyses and reflects 
on the role of accounting and management technologies in modernising the Australian 
public sector. Paper 2 [English (2006)] presents an overview of PPP deployment in 
Australia and introduces the PPP model of interest to this thesis. Paper 3 [English 
(2005a)] contributes to the analysis of the pre-contracting processes and procedures. 
Papers 2 and 3 focus on the use of PPPs to modernise the procurement of public 
services in the state of Victoria, the principal research site. The focus of Paper 4 
[English and Baxter (2007)] is on investigating the achievement of PPP VFM 
objectives in the execution stage. Paper 4 investigates how the 1993 introduction of 
PPP prisons in Victoria was intended to modernise the delivery of correctional 
services throughout the state. The empirical investigation in Paper 4 is based on two 
PPP prison contracts (representing five PPP arrangements). It is an exploration of how 
the examined contracts have been used to manage and control the achievement of 
modernisation objectives and the PPP relationship in the operating stage. Paper 4 also 
examines the extent to which PPP objectives have been achieved over the period 
                                                                                                                                            
that the analysis of modernisation in the Australian public sector (analysed in Chapter 3) covers the 
period 1998-2005 (2005 being the publication date of the relevant paper, Paper 1). The examination of 
PPP policies and PPP arrangements in Chapters 4 and 5 and auditor-general oversight (Chapter 6) 
covers the period 1991-2007 (representing the period from the publication of Victoria’s first PPP-
related policy document to the time of writing this dissertation).  
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1996-2007.  The final paper, Paper 5 [English (2007)], analyses the effects of 
modernisation on the changing nature of auditor-general oversight of PPPs. An 
outline of these papers is presented in Table 1.1 below.  
 
The broad objective of following six chapters is to outline findings related to the three 
research questions outlined above. These chapters draw together and analyse the 
themes and concerns of the five papers that comprise this ‘by publication’ thesis, and 
impose a consistent framework of analysis that may not be obvious from the papers 
themselves. Also, in the course of writing up this dissertation, some additional 
research has been undertaken to augment the research reported in the papers.  This 
additional research is broadly of two types. First, the analytical framework used in 
this research is augmented by a themed review of additional literature, which is 
presented in the relevant chapters. Second, additional empirical work has been 
undertaken to elucidate findings contained in some of the papers. The inclusion of 
additional material is noted as it is reported throughout this document. In writing up 
the following chapters, the intention has been to introduce the contribution of each of 
the papers and (where relevant) to elucidate additional research and related empirical 
findings.  
 
Table 1.1 (below) links the five papers with their relevant research aims and indicates 
the chapter in this thesis in which their findings are presented and their contribution is 
analysed. These papers are arranged in order at the end of this dissertation. Hereafter, 
these papers will be referred to as Paper 1, Paper 2 and so on.  References to sections 
or tables in these papers will also be italicised4.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 As required by The University of Sydney’s ‘Theses Containing Publications’ requirements, the co-
authors of three of the papers have provided a signed statement outlining and attesting to my 
contribution. 
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Table 1.1: Linkages between themes, research aims and published papers 
 
Public-sector modernisation in the Australian context 
First aim: To analyse the characteristics of modernisation in the Australian Public 
Sector 
[Chapter 3] 
Paper 1 English, L., J. Guthrie and L. Parker (2005) Recent Public Sector Financial 
Management Change in Australia: Implementing the Market Model in 
Guthrie, J., C. Humphrey, L. R. Jones and O. Olson [eds] International 
Financial Management Reform: Progress, Contradictions and Challenges, 
A Volume in Research in Public Management, Jones, L. R. and N. C. 
Roberts [series editors] (Greenwich Connecticut, USA: Information Age 
Publishing), pp. 24-55. 
Establishing modernisation objectives in the PPP pre-contracting stage 
Second aim: To analyse PPPs and their changing role as a modern procurement 
technology 
[Chapter 4] 
Paper 2 English, L. (2006) Public Private Partnerships in Australia: An Overview 
of their Nature, Purpose, Incidence and Oversight, University of New 
South Wales Law Journal, Vol. 29, No. 3, pp. 250-262. 
Paper 3 English, L. (2005a) Using Public-Private Partnerships to Deliver Social 
Infrastructure: The Australian Experience, in Hodge, G. and C. Greve 
[eds] The Challenge of Public-Private Partnerships Learning from 
International Experience (Northampton MA, USA: Edward Elgar), pp. 
290-304. 
Using contracts to manage and control the achievement of modernisation 
objectives in the PPP execution stage 
Second aim: To analyse PPPs and their changing role as a modern 
procurement technology – PPP prison case study 
[Chapter 5] 
Paper 4 English, L. and J. Baxter (2007) Using Contracts to Govern Hybrid 
Public-Private Partnership: A Case Study of Victorian PPP Prisons, Fifth 
Asia Pacific Interdisciplinary Research in Accounting Conference, 
Auckland, New Zealand, 8-10 July. Available from: 
http://www.mngt.waikato.ac.nz/ConferenceManager/report.asp?issue=5 
Modernisation and the changing nature of auditor-general oversight of PPPs 
Third aim: To analyse the oversight of PPPs by Australian auditors-general 
[Chapter 6] 
Paper 5 English, L. (2007) Performance Audit of Australian Public Private 
Partnerships: Legitimising Government Policies or Providing Independent 
Oversight, Financial Accountability and Management Special Issue on 
Performance Auditing and the Modernisation of the Public Sector, Vol. 
23, No. 3, pp. 313-336. 
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1.4 Thesis organisation and findings 
Before presenting the findings and contribution of the five papers, this dissertation 
provides an overview of the research approach in Chapter 2. The purpose of Chapter 2 
is to outline the research method, to critically review insights from the modernisation 
literature, and to establish the genesis of modernisation. This literature review is the 
first example of additional research undertaken for this thesis. It articulates the macro-
level analytical framework within which the research findings are presented and 
analysed. The Chapter 2 literature review also examines the nature of change in a 
public-sector context, and establishes that the literature has broadly concluded that, 
despite its appeal to technical rationality, the bulk of modernisation reform appears to 
have failed to achieve its objectives.  
 
Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6 present the empirical evidence that is the core of the 
contribution of this thesis. Chapter 3 addresses the first aim, Chapters 4 and 5 the 
second aim, and Chapter 6 the third aim. 
 
Chapter 3 presents the findings contained in Paper 1. It establishes the context in 
which PPPs and their outworking and oversight must be considered. It analyses 
modernisation of public services in the Australian public sector (addressing the 
study’s first aim) and confirms linkages between Australian and international 
experiences, outlining the role of accounting and management technologies in 
fostering modernisation. It also reports on the outcomes of modernisation at the macro 
(Australian public sector) level.  
 
Chapter 4, which reports findings from Papers 2 and 3, has several objectives. As 
noted in Table 1.1 above, Chapter 4 focuses on the nature of PPP objectives and their 
establishment in the pre-contracting stage. Chapter 4 begins with a review of the PPP 
literature to provide insights into conflicting views about PPP objectives.  Chapter 4 
raises issues relating to the changing nature and purpose of PPPs, and examines the 
role of key accounting and management technologies (such as risk allocation, costing 
benchmarks, and VFM) that have been used to manage and control PPP decision-
making in the pre-contracting stage.  
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The first objective of Chapter 4 is to present evidence about the incidence, cost and 
type of Australian PPPs, and to outline evolving PPP policies, objectives and 
technologies. The second objective of Chapter 4 is to chart PPP development in 
Victoria since 1991 through an analysis of PPP implementation, focusing on pre-
contracting accounting and management appraisal technologies. Findings indicate that 
over the period 1991-2007 Victorian PPP models have become less complex (and less 
controversial) as PPP policies have, paradoxically, increasingly relied on principles 
derived from NIE and complex accounting and management technologies to 
rationalise and justify the use of PPPs. The empirical findings confirm there is a 
discrepancy between stated and unstated objectives of pre-2000 PPPs. 
 
Chapter 5 (which also addresses the second aim in conjunction with Chapter 4) 
examines the use of contracts to manage and control the achievement of 
modernisation objectives in the PPP execution stage. Chapter 5 presents the 
contribution, analysis and findings of the case study into five Victorian PPP prisons 
that are presented in Paper 4, which are augmented by additional research. Initially, 
the chapter reviews the contracting literature to provide additional insights into the 
role played by contracts in managing and controlling the delivery of services, in 
responding to uncertainty, and in promoting trust between the partners. The examined 
prison contracts support the contention that NIE theories, such as agency theory and 
transactions cost economics [TCE], have influenced Victoria’s approach to PPP 
contracting, and that, as predicted in the literature, performance specification in 
contracts is largely quantitative. Uniquely, this research also uncovers evidence that 
the pre-2000 PPP prisons were intended to drive a radical modernisation agenda 
throughout the Victorian correctional services sector, a key finding of this research. In 
its examination of the role of the pre-2000 PPP prisons in driving modernisation 
reform, Chapter 5 presents empirical evidence that indicates that, contrary to 
expectations in the PPP literature, the pre-2000 PPP contracts are capable of fostering 
the development of goodwill trust between the partners. Goodwill trust appears to 
have emerged despite punitive risk transfer arrangements embedded in the pre-2000 
contracts, the failure of one PPP prison, and evidence of continuing problems at 
another. The findings in Chapter 5 confirm the value of longitudinal studies to 
examine the effectiveness of modernisation reform implementation in particular 
settings (Lapsley and Pong, 2000; Lapsley, 2001d; Modell et al, 2007). 
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Chapter 6 (which addresses the third research aim and relates to Paper 5) contains a 
number of themes and concerns. Chapter 6 reviews the performance audit literature 
and its relation to modernisation in the PPP setting. The literature suggests that 
performance audit is largely systems-based rather than substantive (Pollitt et al, 
1999); and that PPP audit has largely focused on auditing adherence to PPP policies 
and procedures in the pre-contracting stage and, in some cases, has acted to legitimate 
government policy (Broadbent and Laughlin, 2003). The relative absence of PPP 
audits in Victoria explains why the focus of this investigation was broadened to 
include auditor-general audit of all Australian PPPs. Second, using Pollitt et al’s 
(1999) framework, the characteristics of performance audits of PPPs are analysed.  
 
The research reported in Paper 5 confirms the linkages between the development of 
and changes in performance audit and public-sector modernisation over time. Paper 5 
is the first study to examine the extent, focus and characteristics of the performance 
audit of Australian PPPs. Using Pollitt et al’s (1999) distinction between systems-
based and substantive audit and an audit framework devised for this research, Paper 5 
examines the extent to which auditors-general have substantively examined the 
achievement of PPP objectives. Findings are analysed in the light of Power’s (1999) 
insights into how public-sector modernisation has created ‘an audit society’ in which 
state audit appears to be increasingly more focused on checking compliance with rules 
and policies and in legitimating government policies and procedures, than on 
providing independent oversight of the implementation of those policies. This 
research confirms English and Guthrie’s (2003) contention that Australian PPPs have 
been subject to inadequate independent auditor-general oversight. 
 
Finally, Chapter 7 summarises conclusions, reflects on the contribution of this 
research, considers limitations, and concludes with suggestions for future research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
Research Approach 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Chapter 1 established the motivation, objective and aims of this research. The purpose 
of this chapter is twofold. The first objective is to outline the research method and 
approach, which occurs in sections 2.2 and 2.3. Section 2.2 introduces middle range 
thinking, the research method underlying the empirical investigation undertaken in 
this thesis, and in the five papers that comprise it. Section 2.3 discusses data sources, 
and links the research method with the approach adopted to guide documentary 
analysis.  
 
This thesis answers calls for longitudinal research (Humphrey et al, 2005; Lapsley, 
2001d; Broadbent et al, 2004a) into public-sector modernisation and its effects in 
different contexts over time. The focus of this research is the modernisation of public 
services in the Australian context. The use of PPPs as a modern infrastructure 
procurement technology, and the extent and characteristics of their independent 
oversight, cannot be understood in isolation, but must be analysed within the broader 
context of public-sector modernisation (Lapsley, 2001c). Accordingly, the second 
objective of this chapter is to establish the analytical framework that guides the 
interpretation of the research undertaken in this thesis. The review of the 
modernisation literature presented in this chapter provides additional insights into a 
spectrum of related ideas, ranging from new institutional economics [NIE] (Barton, 
2001; English and Guthrie, 2001; Hood, 1991; English, 2005b) at the theoretical end, 
to the role of accounting and management implementation technologies proposed by 
professional consultants at the practical end (Olson et al, 1998).  NIE and accounting 
and management technologies have been identified with the genesis and development 
of modernisation reform of the public sector in OECD nations (Christensen et al, 
2007). This analysis takes place in section 2.4. Section 2.5 reviews critiques of the 
rationales for modernisation and highlights problems associated with its 
implementation. The drivers and nature of modernisation change are introduced in 
section 2.6. Section 2.7 summarises the chapter’s findings. 
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This chapter provides insights into the broad theoretical and analytical context within 
which the thesis’s three aims are addressed. As indicated in Chapter 1, each of the 
following chapters will briefly summarise the literature in the relevant papers and may 
also include analysis of literature and empirical findings that are not reported in the 
papers, but which reflect additional research that has occurred in the course of writing 
this thesis. Also, Chapters 3-6 include reflection on how the research approach 
contributes to moving the empirical analysis forward. 
 
 
2.2 Research approach: middle range thinking 
Implicit in the various approaches to empirical research are a number of critical 
assumptions that determine choice of approach (Crotty, 1998). Building on Burrell 
and Morgan (1979), Laughlin (2004, p. 263) (quoting from Laughlin, 1995, p. 66) 
argues that: 
[A]ssumptions on being (ontology), on the role of the investigator (human 
nature), on perceptions of society (society), on perceptions of understanding 
(epistemology) and ways to investigate the world (methodology) … provide 
the framework in which the discovery and discursive process, surrounding the 
discovery, exists and functions.  
 
Divergent views on ontology, human nature, society and epistemology mean that 
choices have to be made about theory, methodology and change (Laughlin, 1995; 
2004). Accordingly, it is important for researchers to articulate their research 
approach and the method used to undertake empirical work.  
 
The research approach adopted in this thesis is based on Laughlin’s (1995; 2004) 
middle range thinking. While many classifications of empirical research recognise 
and consider each of the key assumptions outlined in the quotation above, Laughlin 
(1995; 2004) suggests that these assumptions can be classified into what he terms 
three broad “choices” about theory, methodology and change. Laughlin (2004, p. 271) 
suggests that the understanding process “involves a combination of assumption sets in 
relation to the theoretical and methodological categories” that are mutually 
interdependent, implying that the change choice is separate and follows on from 
theory and methodology choices.  
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Middle range thinking recognises a reality external to the researcher, and also the 
subjective role of the researcher in engaging with the empirical data. Laughlin (2004, 
p. 268) states that “[m]iddle range thinking sets up structures around the subjective 
processes which recognise and accept the subject in the discovery process yet also set 
some limits on how that subjectivity can be operationalised”. The middle range 
theorist accepts that some a priori theorising is useful in “alerting us to the empirical 
points of interest with which the research will first seek to interact … [and] gives us a 
language to allow us to describe and reflect on the nature of the change” (Broadbent 
and Laughlin, 1997, p. 627). However, the role of a priori theory is moderated 
through the recognition of the importance of context-driven formulation whereby 
“generalizations about reality are possible, even though not guaranteed to exist … 
these will always be ‘skeletal’ requiring empirical detail to make them meaningful” 
(Laughlin, 1995, p. 81). Different understandings about the meaning of the data, and 
also of the theories guiding the data collection and analysis arise from the iterative 
and reflexive processes of the theory and methodology dimensions. 
 
Laughlin (2004, p. 271) suggests that ontology is “the foundation for all other 
choices” and that prior theories guide choices about methodology and data collection 
method. The ontological and theory choices have implications for the assumed role of 
the researcher in the resulting empirical engagement. Laughlin’s Table 1 (1995, p. 80) 
and Figure 1 (2004, p. 272) outline the key features of the middle range approach. 
Table 1 in the 1995 paper indicates that the middle range position views theory as 
providing broad ‘skeletal’ understandings of the phenomena under examination, and 
that the primary purpose for empirical engagement is the fleshing out of the ‘skeleton’ 
which inevitably involves a degree of subjectivity on the part of the researcher 
(Laughlin, 2004, p. 274).  
 
Laughlin (2004, p. 268) articulates the links between ‘skeletal’ theory and method, 
and the conclusions (the change dimension) drawn by the researcher: 
There are ‘skeletal’ rather than ‘full’ or ‘no’ theories which can explain 
accounting in practice or, more generally, any empirical phenomena. 
However, these ‘skeletal’ theories need the richness of the empirical detail to 
make them meaningful in particular situations. There are structures that 
underlie social situations but not ones which fully capture the diversity and 
detail of these situations. For instance it is possible to say something about 
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different levels and pathways of organisational change … that applies to every 
organisational setting. Yet such theories are not all-encompassing. They 
provide a language that allows researchers to interrogate the empirical site 
being analysed. They guide and structure the way actual organisational 
settings can be viewed, but they also need the detail from these settings to 
make these ‘skeletons’ live. Equally, where the empirical details do not fit the 
theoretical ‘skeleton’, the empirical data provides a basis for extending and/or 
reforming this framework. In this sense the ‘skeletal’ theory guides the 
discovery process but in such a way that can be reactive to the ‘fit’ of the 
detailed ‘flesh’ that is being added. 
 
Also, Laughlin (2004, p. 274) indicates that the nature of the method chosen is 
definable, but subject to refinement in actual situations, and invariably qualitative. 
The data sought will be longitudinal, case-study based, heavily descriptive, 
empirically rich, but also analytical; and the conclusions derived will be reasonably 
conclusive, and tied to ‘skeletal’ theory (Laughlin, 1995, p. 80). Data collection 
methods include an examination of documents, “a wide range of forms that represent 
the empirical world”, including public records and the media (see Figure 1 in 
Laughlin, 2004, p. 272). 
 
The change dimension is separate and follows the understanding process (Laughlin, 
2004, p. 271). Despite asserting that the change choice is the most important that the 
researcher will make, Laughlin (2004, p. 266) acknowledges that it is “the one to 
seemingly be made invisible” in his 1995 paper. In relation to the change dimension 
Laughlin (2004, p. 267) suggests:  
It is only after some level of understanding is achieved, under the assumptions 
that follow from the theory and methodology dimensions that it is possible to 
decide what should be done about what is discovered … this change 
dimension is of key importance for our research endeavour. 
 
It seems clear that the change dimension stems from the researcher’s efforts to make 
the theoretical ‘skeletons’ live through adding detailed ‘flesh’ through the empirical 
discovery process that can result in the researcher further explicating, extending or 
reformulating prior theories (Laughlin, 2004, p. 268). Arguably, the change choice 
remains under-explained in the 1995 and 2004 papers. However, it appears to 
encompass the role of research in contributing to policy debates and in changing 
practice as explained by Laughlin (1995, pp. 67-68): 
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What change means is complex and uncertain. However, in general, it refers to 
attitudes by the researcher concerning the worth or otherwise of maintaining 
the current situation that is being investigated as well as views about the 
necessity for actually doing something about this situation … Those in the 
‘middle’ … are more strategic in their attitude towards change – open to 
maintaining certain aspects of current functioning but also open to challenging 
the status quo. 
 
Laughlin suggests (1995, p. 68 and Table 1, p. 80) that the change dimension permits 
researchers to forcefully challenge the status quo. Indeed, this approach is adopted by 
some researchers who have examined PPPs in the context of the UK’s National 
Health Service (see, for instance, Shaoul (2005a); Pollock et al (2005); and Pollock 
and Price (2004), the implications of which are discussed in Chapter 4). 
 
 
2.3 Data sources and analysis 
Laughlin (2004, p. 274) maintains that some data collection methods are more 
appropriate to the middle range approach than others. For instance, questionnaires are 
judged an instrument that fails to adequately capture the detail required for studies 
that give rise to qualitative narrative. Appropriate data collection methods include 
documentary analysis and interviews. With regard to documentary analysis, Laughlin 
is silent on the approach to analysis, merely observing (2004, p. 275) that “the actual 
detail extracted and the way these are analysed will differ depending on the narrative 
requirements and the guiding research approach”. 
 
Yin (1994) suggests that case study is a design particularly suited to a situation in 
which it is impossible to separate the phenomenon’s variables from their context. 
Therefore, case studies can provide a distinct advantage in answering the ‘how’ and 
‘why’ questions implicit in the aims of this thesis. Also, the case study approach is 
useful to gain insights into how modernisation reforms are operationalised in the PPP 
and performance audit settings, and to make observations meaningful and 
understandable (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005). Following Yin (1989), multiple 
information sources are important for triangulation and enriched analysis. The sources 
used in this thesis include the academic literature for purposes of understanding and 
theory development. In addition, legislation, PPP policies and contracts, auditors-
general reports, parliamentary reports, other archival records (including reports 
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commissioned by governments investigating PPP outcomes), press releases and media 
reports have been analysed.  
 
Many of the documentary sources consist of government records.  Some of these 
records, although available previously, are no longer accessible on government 
websites.  Other government documents were obtained as a result of relationships 
developed in the course of this research.  Each of these documents is “inevitably 
shaped by the political context in which they are produced and by the cultural and 
ideological assumptions that lie behind [them]” (Scott, 1990, p. 60). The approach of 
this thesis to analysing these documentary records is guided by an historical process 
designed to discover and understand how and why the approaches to, and the 
outworking of, the phenomena of interest to this study (e.g. modernisation, PPPs and 
performance audit) have changed over the period under investigation, and to 
understand the significance of these observed changes (Peraekylae, 2005).  
 
Following Peraekylae (2005, p. 872), a four-stage process is adopted to guide textual 
analysis. The first stage is “a largely informal approach” designed to focus on the 
“propositional content” of the texts that tries “to pin down the assumptions and 
presuppositions that the texts incorporated”. In the second stage, publication dates 
gleaned through a historical survey of texts are used to provide important indicators of 
the timing of significant events that signal changes in social practices. The third stage 
involves textual analysis that is informed by theory, and used analytically as 
envisaged by Laughlin (1995; 2004). Finally, in the fourth stage, relevant texts (PPP 
policies, for instance) are assumed to serve as guidelines for actual social practices, or 
to reflect social practices (audit reports, parliamentary committee reports), permitting 
interpretation of motives and events.  
 
Although multiple documentary sources support triangulation, there are cases in 
which aspects of practice remain unclear. In such cases, attempts have been made to 
clarify matters and to corroborate impressions of motive and practice through 
discussions with government officials and PPP consortia members. These discussions 
are treated as informal for two reasons. First, the impartiality of these actors is 
questionable due to their involvement in PPP processes and operations, and 
limitations on their understanding imposed by, amongst other things, time and level of 
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involvement. Second, given the decision to rely on documentation, the discussions 
were not intended to provide an additional source of evidentiary material in the 
triangulation process. Those with whom discussions were held were advised that they 
would not be quoted. Arguably, this approach did not detract from the documentary 
analysis; indeed, it provided insights into motives, processes and procedures, and 
events outlined in documents, the significance of which might otherwise have been 
overlooked. 
 
In summary, the historical approach to documentary interrogation outlined by 
Peraekylae (2005) has much in common with the methodology of middle range 
thinking. Peraekylae’s approach resonates with the ‘structured subjectivity’ of middle 
range thinking, which “specifies in more precise and abstracted terms what is 
involved in this engagement process whilst, at the same time, not trying to squeeze 
out the intuitive, imaginative properties of individual observers” (Laughlin, 2004, p. 
274). Also, Laughlin (1995, p. 65) acknowledges the “inevitable truth that all 
empirical research is partial and incomplete”, a sentiment echoed by Scott (1990, p. 
35), who concludes that “the most that can be achieved by a researcher is an analysis 
which shows how the inferred internal meaning of the text opens up some possibilities 
for interpretation by its audience and closes off others”. 
 
In examining change in a public-sector setting, a longitudinal perspective is advocated 
by Pettigrew (1989) and Lapsley (2001d). Pettigrew (1989) cautions against research 
that provides snapshots of events from what are essentially iterative reform processes. 
For instance, Lapsley’s (2001d) study into the introduction of budgets in publicly 
owned hospitals in England and Scotland (p. 88) corroborates the dangers of inference 
from a single episode in a continuing process. It demonstrates the need to study the 
wider context of proposed changes to assess their impact. Furthermore, Lapsley 
(2001d, p. 87) notes that the prominent view in the modernisation literature of the 
failure of accounting as an agent of modernisation change in public services may have 
been reinforced through snapshot studies, and may not always reflect long-term 
outcomes. Lapsley (2001d) argues that his longitudinal study resulted in the 
unexpected finding that in some important respects the reforms had been successful in 
Scotland (although not in ways envisaged by the reformers), which he attributes to the 
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process of reform proceeding at a gentler pace than had occurred in England, where 
the opposite result was observed. 
 
Middle range thinking is the research methodology that underpins this thesis and 
binds the five papers that comprise it. Middle range’s reflexive methodology (that is, 
the iterative process of fleshing out skeletal understandings through subjective 
empirical engagement with data (Laughlin, 2004, p. 268)) establishes the structures 
around the subjective processes that recognise and accept the subject in the discovery 
process. However, the workings of reflexivity are subtle, and remain largely hidden 
from the reader who, in reading the work of middle range theorists, is more aware of 
context and the theory and choice dimensions, than of the methodology dimension. 
Similarly, the analysis of documents in all papers is also reflexive (Peraekylae, 2005), 
and does not necessarily give rise to a structured analytical approach that is obvious in 
the writing up of the research.  
 
Turning to review the modernisation literature, section 2.4 provides macro-level 
analysis of the modernisation of public services in OECD nations from the early 
1970s to the present, identifying the theoretical and technical drivers of 
modernisation, its characteristics, and insights into its evaluation and achievements. 
Section 2.5 reviews critiques of modernisation, and section 2.6 considers the stimuli 
for, and nature of, modernisation change. The chapter summary follows in section 2.7. 
 
 
2.4 Features of modernisation  
Making the public sector more like the private sector (through a move away from an 
input-oriented, rules-based public service towards private-sector models of funding, 
management and control (Hood, 1991; 1995; VCA, 1993a; b)) remains a critical 
element of a series of managerial and accounting reforms introduced since the early 
1970s to modernise public services in OECD nation states (see, for instance, 
Broadbent and Guthrie, 2008; Humphrey et al, 2005; Olson et al, 1998). Although the 
outworking of modernisation agendas in different countries is context dependent and 
changes over time (Hood, 1995; Olson et al, 1998), a number of its defining aims, 
rationales and features have not substantially altered (Modell et al, 2007). At the 
rhetorical level, the overarching goals of public service modernisation remain the 
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efficient, responsive and accountable delivery of public services (Chou et al, 2005). 
Modernisation has been justified as a theory-based, ideologically-driven, neo-liberal 
response to solving so called ‘crises’ (such as high levels of government debt) that are 
said to demand solutions in terms of ‘new’ ways of managing public services 
(Broadbent, 1998; Christensen et al, 2007; Laughlin and Pallot, 1998)5.  
 
Modernisation has resulted in the introduction of a range of policies and associated 
practices. These include ‘Best Value’ and ‘Next Steps’ in the UK (Chou et al, 2005); 
new procurement arrangements such as PPPs (Broadbent and Laughlin, 1999); and 
the development of performance audit and other inspection techniques (Power, 1999). 
Modernisation predates New Labour in the UK, despite the Blair government’s 
adoption of modernisation as a leitmotif (Lapsley, 2001b, p. 331) for its public reform 
agenda. Similarly, modernisation in the Australian context can be traced to the 
introduction of a series of management reforms in the Australian public sector since 
the 1970s that promoted ‘managerialism’ and ‘marketisation’ (Carlin and Guthrie, 
2001; English and Guthrie, 2001; Guthrie and Parker, 1998). These reforms are 
designed to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of public services, and to 
provide accountability for performance. Quantitative private-sector derived 
accounting methodologies are a notable feature of an array of technically rational 
implementation technologies utilised to achieve modernisation (Meyer, 1998). 
 
 
2.4.1 Theoretical drivers of modernisation 
Broad understandings about what modernisation stands for, and how it should be 
implemented, were initially developed and advocated by ‘epistemic communities’ 
(Laughlin and Pallot, 1998), which have been defined as comprising an international 
“network of professionals with recognised expertise and competence in a particular 
domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge” (Hass, 1992, at p. 3; 
                                                 
5 The origins of modernisation have been traced to the political pressures arising from burgeoning 
government expenditures, budget deficits and rising unemployment in a period of high inflation and 
high taxes which caused governments to seek to radically change the way public services are delivered 
in modern democracies (see, for instance, Barton, 2001; Broadbent and Laughlin, 1999; English and 
Guthrie, 2001). Invariably, reviews of government expenditures (such as VCA, 1993a; b) emphasised 
inefficiency in government operations, including lack of asset, liability and expense management, 
resulting in the adoption of accrual accounting in the government sector (see Barton, 2002; English and 
Guthrie, 2001). However, the adoption of accrual accounting has received relatively little prominence 
in the modernisation literature, notwithstanding it being central to modernisation. The influence of 
accrual accounting in the PPP context is raised in Chapter 4. 
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quoted by Laughlin and Pallot, 1998, p. 385; see also Hood, 1995, p. 102). 
Modernisation is strongly supported by supra-national organisations such as the 
International Monetary Fund [IMF], the World Bank, and the OECD to control public 
debt and make the provision of public services more efficient (Stiglitz, 2000). More 
recently, departments of treasury have assumed primacy in its implementation within 
OECD nation states (English and Guthrie, 2003; Lapsley, 1999; 2001a; b; Pollitt and 
Bouckaert, 2000). Public-sector modernisation rests on the twin pillars of guiding 
principles derived from NIE, and the associated private-sector derived accounting and 
management technologies that have been used to implement modernisation (Hood, 
1995; Modell et al, 2007).  
 
In outlining the characteristics of modernisation, these amorphous ‘epistemic 
communities’ adapted NIE (Barton, 2001; Hood, 1991) to a public-sector setting to 
conceptualise and rationalise what has recently been seen as an agenda to modernise 
public services (Broadbent and Guthrie, 2008). This modernisation agenda has 
championed technologies identified as critical to private-sector success: control of 
agency problems; competitive tendering; contracting; the separation of policy making, 
oversight and service delivery; output and outcome specification; and an emphasis on 
performance management and accountability for results (Hood, 1991; 1995; VCA, 
1993a; b).  
 
At the theoretical level modernisation draws on NIE such as public choice and agency 
theories, and also on transactions cost economics [TCE] (Barton, 2001; Boston, 1995; 
Pallot, 1998). Public choice theory [PCT] seeks to apply conventional economic 
behavioural postulates to political and administrative systems, with the objective of 
identifying policies that will enable the public (reinvented as consumers) to choose 
outcomes that will best serve their interests (English, 2005b; Barton, 2001; Corbett, 
1996). In relation to public-sector activities, PCT assumes that individuals have no 
innate preference between private (market-based) and public (by government) 
allocation of resources, and will choose the resource-maximising distributional or 
political solution (Stiglitz, 2000). It has been argued that the overriding political 
objective of modernisation is technical efficiency (the delivery of outcomes at lowest 
cost), rather than distributive or social justice which promote value-based judgements 
about delivery instruments and outcomes (Trebilcock, 1995). PCT assumes that all 
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distributional outcomes are equally acceptable, and can be efficiently determined 
through consumer choice in competitive markets. Also, PCT provides the rationale for 
the establishment of quasi-markets to underpin the modernisation of service delivery 
on private-sector principles (English, 2005b). 
 
Agency theory [AT] strengthens the theoretical appeal of PCT by allegedly providing 
a blueprint for reshaping public management and control structures in the public 
sector to minimise agency costs. AT promotes the use of contracts to provide ex-post 
control mechanisms to manage and control the performance of agents and reduce 
costs (Williamson, 1981; 1991; 2005). It is assumed that contracts involving private-
sector partners can be enforced to a satisfactory standard through contractually-
specified (largely quantitative accounting-based) incentive mechanisms (Broadbent et 
al, 2008) to align the interests of private contractors with those of governments. 
 
According to their proponents, PCT and AT have significant implications for 
government procurement of infrastructure and related services. PCT implies the need 
to replicate competitive markets within the government sector. A significant step 
forward for the implementation of a modernisation agenda in Australia was the 1995 
adoption of National Competition Policy [NCP]6 that privileged private-sector tenders 
through removing the relative competitive advantage of in-house (public) bids 
(English, 2005b).  
 
A third major theoretical stream, TCE (Williamson, 1981; 1991; 2005), explains the 
role contracting plays in economic transactions and provides a means by which 
agency problems can be controlled and managed. TCE holds that the management and 
control of transactions through contracting is influenced by three considerations – 
namely, bounded rationality; opportunistic behaviour; and asset specificity 
(Williamson, 1981; 1991). First, bounded rationality (a lack of ability to anticipate 
and contract for all future eventualities (Broadbent et al, 2003a)) introduces 
uncertainty to a transaction, making it impossible, ex ante, to completely anticipate 
future complexities and changes in the transaction and its environment, resulting in 
contracts that are invariably ‘incomplete’ (that is, the contracting parties are required 
                                                 
6 NCP is supported by the Competition Policy Reform Act 1995 (Commonwealth), parallel state 
legislation and Council of Australian Government Agencies agreements (between state and federal 
governments) and related regulations (English, 2003).  
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to engage in ‘gap-filling’ (Williamson, 1991, p. 278) during the execution stage). 
Second, opportunistic behaviour (by either party) may negatively affect the 
transaction, increasing the risk that self-interested and non-adaptive behaviours 
prevail when unforeseen events arising from uncertainty must be addressed and 
resolved. Third, asset specificity, which increases the bilateral dependence of 
contracting parties, may provide incentives for gap-filling and ease the resolution of 
uncertainty. Together, these three variables affect transaction costs. Problems 
associated with bounded rationality, opportunistic behaviour and asset specificity in 
long-term contracts can be mediated through the development of trust (Broadbent et 
al, 2003a)7.  
 
 
2.4.2 The technologies driving modernisation change 
On the level of practice, the modernisation of public services is characterised by the 
central role ascribed to accounting and management technologies such as accrual 
accounting, and performance management techniques (Humphrey et al, 2005; Olson 
et al, 1998), including techniques derived from the finance literature to cost and 
compare public and private provision options (Officer, 2004). These technologies 
have played a prominent role in defining the nature of change, in specifying 
performance standards and in monitoring and reporting outcomes (Humphrey et al, 
2005; Lapsley, 1999; Olson et al, 1998). Also, they have been characterised as a 
toolbox of technically rational modernisation implementation strategies, technologies 
and techniques derived from private-sector practices (Meyer, 1998). Furthermore, it 
has been claimed that these accounting and management technologies act to 
legitimate the financial and control dimensions of, and rationalities for, modernisation 
(Meyer, 1998). Chou et al (2005, p. 291) characterise accounting and management 
technologies as “an extensive (but still developing) network of tools and mechanisms 
for restructuring, redefining, monitoring and controlling the provision of public 
services”.  
 
 
                                                 
7 Further explanations of the implications of TCE in the PPP context are explored in Chapter 5, which 
also includes a review of literature critical of the capacity of TCE to explain observed contracting 
practices in complex long-term hybrid relationships in public and private sector settings. 
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2.4.3 Changing patterns of accountability in the modern state 
In addition, modernisation has broadened the emphasis of parliamentary scrutiny and 
control of government expenditure from its traditional focus on inputs and 
appropriations to include oversight of the results arising from the provision of public 
services by the government and by private contractors in governments’ name (Funnell 
and Cooper, 1998; Newberry, 2004). Performance audit is a modernisation 
technology developed in response to the emphasis on responsibility for performance 
(Guthrie and Parker, 1999), and is designed to provide assurance that program 
objectives have been achieved efficiently and effectively (or that value for money 
[VFM] has been achieved in service provision (Pollitt et al, 1999)). Performance 
audit8 has proved controversial and highly contentious on a number of grounds. First, 
in most nations (and in the majority of Australian jurisdictions), it is concerned with 
investigating the achievement of ‘effectiveness’ and ‘good management’ of service 
delivery, and raises questions about the use of ‘best practice’ frameworks as audit 
criteria (Broadbent and Laughlin, 2003; Gendron et al, 2001; Pollitt et al, 1999; 
Skaerbaek and Thorbjornsen, 2007). Second, performance audit has become 
controversial and risky for auditors-general (English, 2003) as governments have 
increasingly resisted investigation of government policy, thereby establishing a 
contestable distinction between auditing policy and auditing its implementation 
(Gendron et al, 2001). 
 
Modernisation has generally resulted in increased auditing activity (Power, 1999), but 
not necessarily in heightened public accountability. Performance audit has 
increasingly tended to verify adherence to prescribed processes and procedures and 
the reliability (and perhaps appropriateness) of performance data, rather than 
providing a substantive opinion on the effectiveness with which public services have 
been delivered, and whether programs actually achieve political objectives (Pollitt et 
al, 1999). For instance, in some cases, detailed analysis and conclusions about 
program achievements made in the course of state audit and other (internal and 
external) investigations remain hidden from view, and are used solely for the purposes 
of managerial control within the organisational hierarchy (Bowerman, 1998); they are 
also not available for parliamentary and public scrutiny because the relevant 
analytical detail is omitted for publicly available reports (including audit reports). 
                                                 
8 Performance audit is known as VFM audit in the UK (Sharma, 2007). 
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2.5 Critiques of modernisation 
Underlying many of the critiques of modernisation and associated outcomes is the 
belief that many of the reforms that attempt to introduce competition into public 
services are not appropriate in a public-sector setting because of the fundamental 
differences in the objectives and operating environments of the two sectors (see 
Barton, 2001; 2002; 2006). For instance, in relation to the concerns of this thesis, 
commercial-in-confidence contracting is perceived to be inappropriate in a public-
sector environment because of the need for the accountability of governments to 
parliaments and citizens (Watson, 2003; 2004). In addition, many commentators also 
believe that governments’ social responsibility to provide basic public services that 
would not otherwise be provided by markets (because of externalities) should not, and 
cannot, be provided by private contractors (driven by the profit motive) in artificially 
created quasi-markets governed by contracts (see, for instance, Andrew, 2007; Barton, 
2001; 2002; Quiggin, 2004; Shaoul, 2005a; Walker and Con Walker, 2000). 
Implicitly, this view questions the efficacy of the application of PCT to a public 
services setting. Barton (2001) argues that the shared nature (individual and social) of 
the benefits and costs flowing from public goods (such as the PPP hospitals and 
prisons examined in this thesis) makes performance outcomes difficult to measure. 
Attempts to capture performance in financial terms inevitably exclude the non-
financial benefits and costs that also flow to individuals and society as a result of their 
provision, raising questions as to how such benefits and costs can be identified, 
specified, monitored and reported. 
 
Other commentators have noted some paradoxes associated with the rationales and 
implementation of modernisation. For instance, the institutionalisation of performance 
audit and an emphasis on responsibility for performance (that are features of 
modernisation) sit uncomfortably with the observed propensity of governments to 
avoid disclosure on the grounds of commercial confidentiality (Barton, 2001) and the 
failure of proponents of modernisation to subject reforms to rigorous independent 
review and assessment (Olson et al, 1998), making it difficult to ascertain whether 
modernisation objectives have been achieved (Boston et al, 2001).  
 
Despite its appeal to technical scientific rationality (Olson et al, 1998), the 
implementation of modernisation has been controversial and its achievements 
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challenged (Bowerman, 1998; Humphrey et al, 2005; Lapsley, 1999; 2001a; b; Olson 
et al, 1998; Skaerbaek and Thorbjornsen, 2007). The application of accounting and 
management technologies has been questioned on the grounds that they lend selective 
visibility (Bowerman, 1998; Lapsley, 1999; 2001a; b) to certain issues and 
perspectives, thereby influencing agendas and meanings. Historically, accounting and 
management technologies have tended to be expressed in terms of quantitative 
techniques that most easily specify, measure and monitor performance, with the 
significance of qualitative factors commensurately downplayed, privileging a 
technical financial and economic discourse at the expense of the social discourse that 
had been characteristic of the traditional public sector (Pallot, 1998). Furthermore, 
Newberry and Pallot (2005), in their analysis of the introduction of modernisation in 
New Zealand, find that the acceptance, at face value, of stated rationalisations for 
modernisation can be misleading because hidden agendas may mask unacknowledged 
objectives that are concealed in technical developments. 
The relative lack of detailed assessment of the achievements of modernisation has 
been excused on several grounds: first, the problems associated with measuring costs 
and impacts; second, transitory teething problems that delay assessment (Guthrie et al, 
2005; Olson et al, 1998); third, that it is too early (in the implementation of particular 
modernisation programs) to make any concrete judgements (Broadbent et al, 2004b); 
fourth, that constantly changing reforms that build on one another make it 
increasingly difficult to test whether the original objectives have been achieved 
(Carlin, 2004); and fifth, that the technical problems associated with monitoring 
reforms have diffuse effects (Olson et al, 1998). Also, Carlin (2004, p. 280), in his 
study of reforms to performance-based outcome measures in Victoria, found that “in 
many cases no actual data is ever reported in respect of performance indicators. 
Instead during the (often brief) period of their survival, the only reported data is in the 
form of targets.” 
 
Olson et al (1998, p. 328) suggest that the root problem for auditors-general and 
others wanting to investigate modernisation outcomes is the “residing faith” that the 
“promised world” can be delivered only if the reform process is implemented in a 
better fashion. The belief that reforms based on theoretically-sound economic 
principles and tried technologies will result in optimal outcomes if implemented 
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properly may postpone and undermine investigation of the appropriateness of 
modernisation policies and associated implementation technologies themselves. 
Attempts to determine the merits of modernisation relative to what the situation might 
have been had there been no such initiative is seen by some (such as Olson et al, 
1998) to be potentially of critical relevance, although investigation of this nature is 
likely to breach the constitutional boundaries that insulate government policy from 
scrutiny by state audit (Pollitt et al, 1999). 
 
 
2.6 Drivers of modernisation change 
In identifying PPPs and performance audit as ‘change mechanisms’, Lapsley (2001c, 
p. 503) suggests that it is difficult to detect patterns of modernisation change in and 
between countries owing to the importance of context. Indicating that the role of 
accounting and management technologies in the modernisation process remains a 
major challenge to evaluators of public-sector transformation, Lapsley (2001c, p. 503) 
concludes that the jury is out as to “whether the public sector is still in a state of 
transition or whether it has indeed been transformed into a New Public Sector”. 
Meyer (1998) contends that accounting and management technologies do not deliver 
instrumental change, but are an integral part of a rationalising and modernising 
transformation that has effectively produced a new public sector, implying that the 
mission and consequences of these implementation technologies are integral to 
modernisation itself, and permeate and mould the institutions that comprise the 
modern public sector.  
 
Recent work by Lapsley (2001c; 2001d) and Modell et al (2007) confirms that 
implementation of hard-edged NIE-based reforms through the imposition of private-
sector derived accounting and management technologies has had mixed success at the 
micro (organisational) level (see also Guthrie et al, 2005; Olson et al, 1998). 
However, these studies demonstrate that modernisation reform can be ‘successful’, 
albeit not necessarily as initially intended (Lapsley, 2001d). Lapsley (2001c; d) and 
Modell et al (2007) suggest that successful implementation of reforms in different 
contexts has a number of common features. First, it is evolutionary and builds on 
previous reform experiences (also see Jacobs et al, 2007). Second, success is derived 
from organisational memory (Lapsley, 2001c; d) and “the potency of past experience” 
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(Modell et al, 2007, p. 471), which causes subsequent acceptance and adaptation of 
that which has previously been rejected. Third, in contrast to the NIE approach, 
successful implementation is sensitive to the context to be reformed. Fourth, ‘success’ 
has involved adaptations and innovations at the organisational level, albeit within a 
broad NIE-oriented policy framework at the macro level (Lapsley, 2001d; Modell et 
al, 2007). Fifth, detecting success requires longitudinal research that examines “the 
gap between strategic intent and operational implementation” (Lapsley, 2001d, p. 88 
(quoting Pettigrew, 1989)). 
 
Lapsley (2001c; d) claims that reform driven by relentless modernising reformers who 
are insensitive to the complexities of the organisations they are trying to reform 
(Brunsson, 1989; Brunsson and Olsen, 1993) has a strong correspondence to public-
sector transformation advanced by the epistemic communities advocating reforms 
driven by NIE theories and applied in practice through private-sector derived 
accounting and management technologies (Christensen et al, 2007). Lapsley (2001d) 
notes that the majority of studies of reforms to the UK’s NHS have reported failure. In 
identifying one example of ‘successful’ implementation, Lapsley (2001d, p. 106) 
attributes his findings to differences in the implementation process and to the 
longitudinal research method adopted. In trying to understand why implementation 
was unsuccessful in England, Lapsley (2001d, p. 106) noted:  
[T]he contrasting experience of the implementation process in England and 
Scotland … In England the process of implementation is captured by the ideas 
of the institutional theorists … who depict reformers as relentless modernizers, 
insensitive to the subtleties of hospital life, with the consequent failure of such 
initiatives.. From this perspective reformers are seen as driven, as being 
inculcated with beliefs about the benefits of modernization and insensitive to 
the operation of decoupled organization structures which contrast with their 
favoured unitary form of organizational structure. Scrutiny of the processes of 
reform in English captures this belief in rationalistic procedures both from the 
perspective of the government (which initiated these reforms) and hospital 
management (which was prevailed upon by government to implement these 
reforms). In Scotland, the process of reform has proceeded at a gentler pace 
and, while success was not immediate it is, nevertheless, demonstrable.  
 
The work by Modell et al (2007) is based on the notion of ‘path dependencies’. 
Confirming findings in Lapsley (2001d), Modell et al (2007) suggest that reforms 
driven by NIE and private-sector derived accounting and management technologies 
may have had less impact than many commentators (such as Meyer (1998)) believe. 
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Modell et al (2007, p. 471) distinguish between the policy level of government (which 
retains a preference for the NIE-based objective of managing for results) and 
successful implementation at agency level. Modell et al (2007, p. 471) found that the 
examined organisation (the Swedish Tax Agency) selectively adopted (and adapted) 
reforms that seemed consistent with the objectives of the performance orientation of 
the NIE model, concluding that this “supports the prediction that the ongoing re-
interpretation of current reform initiatives by individual ‘grass-roots’ organisations 
may resolve seemingly ‘irreconcilable’ performance management logics”. 
 
Accordingly, the work by Lapsley (2001d) and Modell et al (2007) appears to suggest 
that although central agencies (such as departments of treasuries and finance) at the 
macro level may continue to embrace the theoretical and applied precepts of NIE, 
recent reforms instigated by line agencies at the micro (organisational/project) level, 
while congruent with the broad objectives of NIE, may take different (and softer) 
approaches to implementing change that are responsive to context. The observed 
flexibility at the micro level raises questions about the role of accounting and 
management technologies in the change process. Meyer (1998) has suggested that the 
public sector has been transformed, and that quantitative accounting and management 
technologies are an integral part of the rationalising and modernising transformation 
that has produced a new public sector. However, the work by Lapsley (2001d) and 
Modell et al (2007) raises questions about the dominance (at the micro level) of these 
technologies as change mechanisms, and also indicates that the modernisation process 
is still in a state of transition. 
 
 
2.7 Chapter summary 
As outlined above, the research method guiding analysis and reflection in this thesis 
(and in the five papers comprising it) is Laughlin’s (1995; 2004) middle range 
thinking. The documentary data that provides the source of the empirical evidence in 
this thesis has been interrogated using an historical data analysis methodology that is 
compatible with the middle range thinking research approach and method. 
 
There is broad agreement about the initial drivers and macro-level features of the 
modernisation of public services in OECD nations. NIE and private-sector derived 
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quantitative accounting and management technologies have redefined public services 
and associated delivery mechanisms, purportedly making them more efficient, 
effective and responsive to ‘customer’ needs. However, these technologies have been 
implicated in legitimating modernisation, and also in perceived modernisation 
failures, such as making invisible non-financial objectives and outcomes. Problems 
associated with specifying, monitoring and reporting on modernisation’s 
achievements have largely been sheeted home to the private-sector accounting and 
management technologies used to drive efficient and effective outcomes. There is also 
agreement that modernisation has tangibly transformed public services delivery in 
OECD nations, and is probably irreversible, although changing iteratively over time 
(Broadbent and Guthrie, 2008; Lapsley, 2001b; Meyer, 1998). Modernisation has also 
affected public accountability and state audit, having given rise to performance audit, 
which is intended to assess the achievement of modernisation objectives. 
 
A number of common themes and concerns in the modernisation literature suggest 
that its implementation, although founded on supposedly technically rational theories 
and technologies, has frequently not resulted in the achievement of stated objectives. 
Some, such as Newberry and Pallot (2005), suggest that the divergence between 
espoused objectives and observed outcomes could result from unstated objectives, 
which explain the sometimes unexpected outworking of modernisation. Also, the 
propensity of modernisation to reinvent itself and to give rise to a rolling wave of 
reforms (Carlin, 2004; Lapsley, 2001b) has made oversight problematic and reduced 
the possibility of ascertaining whether or not modern procurement actually provides 
VFM in comparison with traditional public service delivery.  
 
Observed differences in modernisation in different national contexts over time 
(Guthrie et al, 2005; Hood, 1995; Lapsley, 2001a; Olson et al, 1998) provide a 
motivation for this research. Case-based analysis of the outworking of modernisation 
projects suggests a gap between the claims made for modernisation and its practice 
(Vignoni, 2005), although Lapsley (2001d) cautions against drawing conclusions on 
the basis of a methodology that provides snapshots of reform processes and outcomes. 
Indeed, Lapsley’s (2001d, p. 106) research in the context of reform of the UK’s NHS 
suggests that, despite the failure of the initial reform (management budgeting) and of 
a subsequent reform (resource management), a variant of the initial reform had taken 
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hold at both research sites (in England and in Scotland) with some degree of success. 
Lapsley (2001a; b; d) and others have regularly called for longitudinal case-based 
research into modernisation and its effects in different contexts and national settings. 
This thesis responds to these challenges.  
 
As would be expected, there is considerable overlap between the themes and concerns 
in the modernisation, PPP and performance audit literatures. As indicated earlier, 
these literatures will be further explored in the following chapters in which the three 
research aims are addressed, and the major findings of each of the five papers 
comprising this thesis are presented and analysed. 
 
 
 
33 
 
CHAPTER 3 
 
Public-Sector Modernisation in the Australian Context 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to address the first aim of this research, to analyse the 
characteristics of modernisation in the Australian public sector. Paper 19 identifies 
and analyses and the macro-level features of modernisation in an Australian context, 
and raises some implementation issues relevant to PPPs. As a counterpoint, an 
alternative perspective to the hard-edged NIE-based approach that dominates 
Australian public services modernisation is also canvassed in this chapter. It examines 
a European model designed to foster co-operation and consensus between 
stakeholders, potentially providing insights into the reasons underlying difficulties in 
achieving anticipated outcomes in the PPP execution stage.  Paper 1 and additional 
material from English and Skellern (2005) introduced in this chapter contributes to 
skeletal theory development that began in Chapter 2. Also, Chapter 3 begins the 
iterative reflexive process of applying the richness of the empirical detail to expand 
the skeletal theory to make it more meaningful in the context of this research 
(Laughlin, 1995; 2004). 
 
The purpose of Paper 1 is to provide contemporary insights into modernisation 
change in Australia, including a useful summary of the salient features of 
modernisation, and an analysis of the major issues and concerns highlighted in the 
literature related to its outworking. The purpose of introducing findings from English 
and Skellern (2005) is to understand the differences between the PPP and network 
approaches to partnerships between the private and government sectors, thereby 
highlighting features of an alternative approach to co-operative engagement between 
public and private stakeholders that may mediate against the observed failure of NIE-
based reforms (English and Skellern, 2005). The features of modernisation in 
Australia as outlined in Paper 1 are summarised in section 3.2. The relevance of 
Paper 1 findings to this thesis are presented in section 3.3. The alternative approach to 
                                                 
9 As indicated in Chapter 1, references to the five papers and material contained in them are 
distinguished by the use of the italic script. Italicised references to page numbers refer to the pages in 
the papers as published and not to pages in this thesis. 
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facilitating modernisation change is introduced in section 3.4.  The chapter’s findings 
are summarised in section 3.5. 
 
 
3.2 Features of modernisation in the Australian public sector  
The primary purpose of Paper 1 is to provide the macro-level contextual background 
for the micro-level analysis of the development and use of PPPs to modernise services 
delivery that follows in Chapters 4 and 5. A secondary purpose of Paper 1 is to 
highlight the motives, characteristics and critiques of modernisation in the Australian 
context, and their relationship to those outlined in Chapter 2.  
 
Using a perspective derived from institutional theory (Di Maggio and Powell, 1983; 
Meyer and Rowan, 1997), Paper 1 contends that the continuing momentum of public-
sector modernisation change in Australia reflects ongoing processes of coercive and 
mimetic isomorphism. As explained in Paper 1 (pp. 48-49):  
Coercive isomorphism has manifested itself in electoral pressures for reduced 
taxes and greater individual freedom of choice of services, and in the pressure 
upon the public sector brought to bear by neo-liberal political ideology that 
has captured both sides of the Australian political debate. Mimetic 
isomorphism has manifested itself in the public sector’s imitation and adoption 
of many private sector business structures, values, objectives, accountability 
systems, strategies, and performance indicators – in concept, language and 
action. 
 
Paper 1 introduces the logistical problems associated with public-sector research in 
Australia. These derive from a federal system of government, which gives rise to nine 
different governments (federal, six states and two territories). Each of these 
jurisdictions has its own legislative, judicial and public administration system, and its 
own auditor-general and audit legislation. Although there are significant 
commonalities between approaches taken in each jurisdiction (such as a common 
commitment to modernisation), researchers must take care to specify and describe the 
features of the context within which they conduct their research, as the outworking of 
modernisation differs between jurisdictions (English and Guthrie, 2001). The 
jurisdictional problem is relevant to this research as PPP development and 
implementation has not been uniform across Australia (English and Guthrie, 2003), 
and explains the focus on one site in this research. Because Victoria is Australia’s 
Chapter 3 Australian Context 35 
 
 
leading PPP proponent and has developed PPP policies that have influenced PPP 
implementation throughout Australia (English and Guthrie, 2003), PPP outworking in 
Victoria has been selected for investigation in this thesis. 
 
Table 2.1: Four Governance Models Implemented in Australia (Paper 1, p. 28) 
identifies the primary features of four public-sector governance models that have 
influenced and shaped public-sector modernisation in Australia since the 1970s. Table 
2.1 indicates that the market model best explains Australia’s current modernisation 
phase. Table 2.2: Implementing the Market Model – Linking Organizational 
Characteristics with Objectives and Implementation Strategies (Paper 1, pp. 31-33) 
outlines the organisational characteristics, objectives and implementation strategies of 
the market model. Relevant for this thesis are the influence of transactions cost 
economics [TCE] and public choice theory at the rhetorical level; risk management at 
the implementation level; and reducing the role of the state to promote cost-effective 
performance-driven service provision as primary objectives of modernisation.  
 
Also, Paper 1 explores implementation issues associated with the introduction of the 
market model in the Australian context. Table 2.3: Implementing the Market Model in 
Australia: Issues and Concerns (Paper 1, p. 37) identifies the key features of the 
market model, and potential problems relating to the private-sector derived 
accounting technologies devised to support its implementation. The purpose of Table 
2.3 is to identify and challenge some key assumptions explicitly or implicitly made 
about these technologies, and about their role in modernisation.  
 
 
3.3 Characteristics of public-sector modernisation  
Paper 1 confirms findings in the international literature that modernisation in the 
Australian context (as in other OECD nations) has been driven by perceptions of the 
need to solve ‘problems’ such as fiscal crises, big government and inefficient service 
delivery. Paper 1 also confirms that although the market model most closely 
characterises Australia’s current approach to transforming the public sector, 
modernisation is an iterative process that reflects the struggle of governments to 
pursue their own reform agendas in response to changing political, social and 
economic circumstances. Perceived successes and failures of previous reforms also 
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shape future modernisation change. Research by Modell et al (2007) and Jacobs et al 
(2007) suggests that the differences between the four governance models identified in 
Paper 1 may be more apparent than real because of the evolutionary nature of public-
sector change, and the propensity in the public sector to value process and procedure, 
the hallmarks of the traditional procedural model. For instance, the work by Jacobs et 
al (2007) suggests that modernisation’s commitment to radical transformation may be 
undermined in the longer term by the public sector’s long-standing reliance on 
process and procedure to provide some assurance that outputs and outcomes (however 
specified) are delivered as envisaged in policy initiatives. 
 
Paper 1 also confirms the influence of new institutional economics [NIE] and private-
sector derived accounting and management technologies on modernisation in 
Australia. For instance, the TCE framework has influenced the use of contracts to 
manage and control public service delivery and perceived agency problems. Public 
choice theory [PCT] provides the rationale for the introduction of artificial quasi 
markets to reduce costs, increase the competitiveness of service delivery and the focus 
on outputs and outcomes that supposedly eliminates the need to specify how suppliers 
should provide outputs, or the type of outputs to be provided. PCT has also 
contributed to the emphasis on cost as the basis on which to award contracts.  
 
The emphasis on risk management, performance-based management and the 
concomitant adoption of accounting methodologies to measure and report on 
performance reflects the influence of professional accountants in shaping public-
sector modernisation (Christensen et al, 2007). The introduction of accrual accounting 
has elevated the need to report assets and liabilities in public-sector financial 
statements, but has also introduced the recognition and disclosure issues familiar to 
corporate reporting. Finally, the commitment to reduce the role of the state and to 
make public services more responsive to customers’ needs reflects the pervasive 
influence of the overall rationale of modernisation, which has been characterised by 
Savas (2000) as a desire to privatise the provision of public services. 
 
Paper 1 provides insights into potential implementation issues associated with key 
features of Australian modernisation that are relevant in the PPP context. The 
implementation issues identified in Paper 1, Table 2.3 are VFM, risk management, 
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transparency and accountability, accounting and reporting, and performance 
specification and monitoring. For instance, Paper 1 questions the concept, nature and 
use of VFM in public-sector decision-making, and distinguishes between the 
management of project risk and what constitutes a ‘successful’ transfer of risk to the 
private sector. Paper 1 casts doubt on the ability of a slimmed down public sector to 
identify and manage complex risk effectively. Paper 1 suggests that the modern 
Australian public sector has a poor record in identifying and transferring risk. Also, it 
questions whether risks, once identified, can be effectively transferred to the private 
sector, because some risks are incapable of being transferred, irrespective of 
contractual obligations.  
 
In addition, Paper 1 notes the paradox between the espoused use of contracts to 
increase transparency (VCA, 1993a; b) and governments’ growing reliance on 
commercial confidentiality to shield contractual details from disclosure (Barton, 2006; 
Watson, 2003; 2004). Modernisation has also resulted in a redefinition and reshaping 
of traditional accountability of governments to parliament to more narrowly focus on 
the administrative responsibility for performance (to the internal public-sector 
managerial hierarchy) by public officials (Pallot, 2003). As noted in the literature 
review in Chapter 2, the specification of performance has resulted in an emphasis on 
capturing the quantitative at the expense of the qualitative, with associated problems 
of rendering non-financial aspects of service provision largely invisible (Bowerman, 
1998). Reflecting concerns in the international modernisation literature (see, for 
instance, Olson et al (1998) and Guthrie et al (2005)), Paper 1 flags concerns about 
the will and ability of Australian governments to adequately monitor and manage 
performance, suggesting that performance monitoring may not be a high priority. 
 
In summary, Paper 1 concludes that the changes to the Australian public sector 
associated with modernisation are irreversible. Paper 1 confirms the influence of NIE, 
private-sector derived implementation technologies, and political will on 
modernisation in Australia, affirming observations on the nature of modernisation 
change made by Lapsley (2001b; d). Furthermore, Paper 1 indicates that public-sector 
transformation in Australia continues to evolve (sometimes in surprising ways, as 
suggested by the initiatives to help the unemployed find work), but that change has 
become essentially iterative and evolutionary (as opposed to a series of radical 
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transformations), confirming insights by Modell et al (2007) and Jacobs et al (2007). 
Building on the findings of Guthrie and Parker (1998), Paper 1 demonstrates that 
accounting and management technologies have been integral to rationalising 
modernisation in Australia over a 20-year period, and to the nature of the 
transformation itself (Meyer, 1998). Longitudinal analysis of aspects of the effects 
and achievements of modernisation in a PPP setting is the subject of Chapters 4, 5 and 
6. 
 
 
3.4 An alternative approach: lessons from international experience 
The objective of section 3.4 is to consider the features of an alternative approach to 
policy development and implementation that has evolved in continental Europe. The 
purpose of reflecting on the attributes of network governance is to understand how a 
softer, more context-sensitive approach (than NIE) to partnership may have the effect 
of limiting the incidence of implementation failure (Lapsley, 2001d) that has been 
observed as characterising modernisation reform in Anglophone countries (Guthrie et 
al, 2005; Olson et al, 1998).  
 
Approaches to recent public-sector modernisation and change have been linked to the 
historical socio-political and economic cultures of different nation states (Pollitt and 
Bouckeart, 2000). Four governance models are identified in Paper 1: Table 2.1 (p. 
28). These are the traditional public-sector input-oriented model (identified as 
procedural governance), a transitional model (corporate governance), market 
governance, and the network governance model (the subject of this section). The 
period of modernisation change of interest to this thesis encompasses elements of the 
corporate, market and network governance models. As noted in Paper 1 (p. 28) the 
presentation of Table 2.1 suggests that these models have been adopted successively. 
This is an oversimplification. The dominant model of interest to this thesis is the 
market model, which continues to incorporate elements of the ‘earlier’ corporate 
governance model, and, more recently, of the network governance model.  
 
The major differences between the modernisation model (which dominates change in 
the Australian public sector) and the network model are summarised in Table 3.1.  
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Table 3.1: Comparison of Features of the Modernisation and Network Models 
Adapted from English and Skellern (2005, pp. 16-17) 
 
 Modernisation Model Network Model 
 
Origins Administrative doctrine influenced by 
reworking of neo-classical economic 
theories, private-sector management 
practices & accounting technologies to 
ensure the efficient & effective production 
of public goods & services.  
Governance model influenced by 
‘bottom-up approach’; 
intergovernmental relations 
literature; inter-organisational theory; 
& the interactive policy approach.  
Political 
motivation 
Increasing flexibility, quality & quantity of 
public resources at lowest cost. 
Responding to unmet need in social 
policy areas. 
Determination & 
implementation 
of policy  
Development & implementation of policy 
viewed as rational outcome of separation 
of roles & design of contracts that reduce 
agency costs, information asymmetry & 
specify performance hurdles and 
monitoring requirements. 
Development & implementation of 
policy viewed as games between 
actors, influenced by institutional 
context. Interdependence of public, 
private & semi-private actors, each 
with unique view of problems & 
solutions; outcomes result from 
negotiation, co-operation & other 
forms of network management. 
Desired outcome Transaction efficiency based on 
competition & price. 
Optimal social outcome achieved 
through interaction between actors. 
Emphasis of 
model 
Separation of policymaking, purchasing & 
provision; central role for contracting in 
attempts to minimise waste & inefficiency; 
outcomes-focused performance-based 
management; use of private-sector 
accounting technologies; devolution of 
responsibility & decision making. 
Institutional context in which 
complex interactions take place; 
assumes policy determination & 
implementation occur in complex & 
strategic interaction processes within 
networks of interdependent actors. 
Locus of control Despite emphasis on competition & 
contracts, involves strong top-down 
government control of policy making & 
implementation. Devolution of control at 
contract management level only. 
Government policy establishes broad 
legislative and institutional context. 
Network partners free to develop 
policies & determine forms of 
implementation.  
Role of contracts Contracts used to manage incentives, 
through government specification of KPIs 
& output requirements in contracts. 
Legislation establishes broad framework 
within which contracting takes place. 
Long term relationships based on 
trust, negotiation & collaboration; 
contracts used to specify agreements 
between actors negotiated co-
operatively. Legislation establishes 
broad network framework. 
General features Universal prescription of private-sector 
management techniques, & introduction of 
market-based measures. 
Focuses on mediating & co-
ordinating inter-organisational policy 
making & implementation. 
Service 
provision model 
Fixed quantity & quality of service 
provision; determined by contracts; suited 
to mass production of standard products. 
Services deployed according to 
unique characteristics and needs of 
clients; suited to individually-tailored 
negotiated solutions. 
 
 
Table 3.1 demonstrates that the market and network models are premised on starkly 
different intellectual foundations and assumptions about the means to achieve public 
policy change. As noted previously, the market model is ideologically driven by NIE 
and certain prescribed private-sector derived implementation technologies that 
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privilege the financial aspects of services (possibly at the expense of non-financial 
aspects), resulting in its hard-edged features that give rise to a number of issues and 
concerns that are captured in Paper 1 Table 2.3 (and have previously been raised in 
the Chapters 1 and 2, and earlier in this chapter).  
In the context of this thesis, Table 3.1 emphasises the difference between the NIE and 
network approaches to the specification and management of modernisation change in 
a public-sector setting. In the modernisation model, government plays a key role in 
establishing the institutions, policies and implementation strategies, which, despite the 
rhetoric of responding to citizens’ concerns, it drives in a command and control 
fashion (Pollitt and Bouckeart, 2000). By contrast, from the network perspective, 
outcomes are negotiated by various stakeholders and consensus reached within a 
loose institutional and policy framework established by government. The NIE 
approach appears to provide governments with greater control and certainty, and to be 
easier to implement as it dispenses with the need to consult widely to promote a 
genuinely consensual solution. By contrast, the network process appears to be less 
amenable to central control, and to require time and skilled negotiators to facilitate 
workable (but not necessarily controllable) solutions. Trust and flexibility are 
emphasised in the network model, but are largely absent from the NIE-based 
approach. Thus, in the context of social policy that addresses complex interactions 
between the state and individual stakeholders (such as hospital patients or prisoners) it 
may be more appropriate (in some instances) to facilitate change from a network as 
opposed to NIE perspective (as suggested by the use of the network approach to 
helping the long-term unemployed find work, which was reported in Paper 1). 
 
The network model was developed in continental Europe (as opposed to the 
Anglophone countries that have promoted and adopted the corporate and market 
models), and reflects European political traditions (such as a greater emphasis on 
consensus and mediation), which suggest a preference for long-term collaboration 
grounded in relationships of trust between the parties involved in providing and using 
public services.  
 
At the theoretical level, the network model is premised on a belief (reflecting a 
political science perspective) that successful policy development and implementation 
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results from complex collaborative interaction processes that take place between a 
large number of networks of independent actors (Klijn and Koppenjan, 2000, p. 139). 
The network model recognises and facilitates the influence of a range of disparate 
stakeholders on public policy implementation strategies and outcomes (Bovaird and 
Löffler, 2004), emphasises the sharing of risks (and not its management through 
transfer or optimum allocation on the basis of contractual arrangements as does the 
market model), and is responsive to stakeholder perspectives. The role of government 
in a network society is to provide the systems-level conditions (through laws, 
regulations and policies) that facilitate the creation of trust, negotiated outcomes, and 
minimise project risk through the achievement of committed and concerted action 
(Klijn and Teisman, 2000).  
 
By contrast, Anglophone implementation of modernisation has been characterised as 
a chain of low-trust principal-agent relationships mediated by contracts (Dunleavy 
and Hood, 1994). Network theorists eschew the TCE approach to contracting as a 
basis for partnership (Klijn and Teisman, 2000, p. 85). There is a stark difference at 
the rhetorical level between the market and network approaches to partnerships, as 
noted by English and Skellern (2005,  p15): 
One talks about the separation of purchaser and provider, the other about joint 
production. One talks about risk transfer and the contractual specification of 
costs and revenues, the other about ‘sharing’ risks, costs and revenues. 
 
Paper 1 suggests that corporate and market models may be inappropriate for the 
delivery of social policies because they fail to facilitate the development of long-term 
collaboration and trust between providers and recipients. Accordingly, there is some 
evidence in Australia and the UK (see, for instance, Paper 1; Chou et al, 2005; 
Kurunmaeki and Miller, 2006) that the alternative perspective characterised by the 
network model may have recently influenced elements of modernisation change in 
Anglophone countries (and represents another step along the iterative process of the 
evolution of modernisation. The question of interest to this thesis is whether the 
network approach has also influenced Australian governments’ approach to PPP 
relationships.  
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3.5 Chapter summary 
The purpose of this chapter was to address the first aim of this research, to analyse 
the characteristics of modernisation in the Australian public services. Paper 1 
addresses macro-level contextual issues and concerns about the implementation of 
modernisation in the Australian public sector.  
 
In summary, Paper 1 identifies the contextual complexities stemming from 
Australia’s federal system of government that suggest the need for researchers to 
focus on investigating modernisation outworking in specific jurisdictions. Also, Paper 
1 establishes the theoretical rationales and associated private-sector derived 
accounting technologies that underpin modernisation implementation in the 
Australian public sector, and identifies four models of public-sector governance, two 
of which reflect the hard-edged approach to modernisation driven by proponents of 
NIE theories and the application of private-sector disciplines into the control and 
management of public-sector service provision. Paper 1 outlines the features of the 
prevailing Australian approach to modernisation, and raises a number of issues and 
concerns relating to its implementation. Also, Paper 1 introduces the network 
governance model, which is characterised by negotiation, co-operation, consensus and 
flexibility. 
 
Modernisation, as implemented in Australia, resonates with the Anglophone hard-
edged approach that has also been identified by Hood (1991; 1995), Humphrey et al 
(2005), Olson et al (1998) and Pollitt and Bouckaert (2000), as outlined in the 
previous chapter. However, analysis in this chapter of the theoretical underpinnings 
and practical outworking of the network governance model builds on Paper 1 by 
providing additional insights into how elements of network theory could mitigate the 
negative effects of the Anglophone approach to modernisation which could 
undermine the effectiveness of long-term relationships grounded in hard-edged PPP 
contracting, a theme that is investigated in Chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
Establishing Modernisation Objectives in the PPP Pre-
Contracting Stage 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The second aim of this research, to analyse PPPs and their changing role as a 
modern procurement technology, is addressed in Chapters 4 and 5. In Chapter 4 the 
analysis and discussion in Papers 2 and 3 is supported and augmented by additional 
research findings. Chapter 4, which investigates PPP policies and the processes and 
procedures mandated to achieve policy objectives in the PPP pre-contracting stage, 
has two primary objectives.  
 
The first objective of this chapter is to establish PPPs within their economic and 
institutional context. This objective is achieved in Paper 3, which presents a macro-
level overview of PPP activity Australia-wide and distinguishes between two different 
PPP implementation periods. Thereafter, an analysis of evolving PPP policies in the 
period 1991-2007 summarises changing PPP objectives and identifies the accounting 
and management technologies mandated in the pre-contracting stage to achieve those 
objectives. Investigating PPP policies and their implementation in the pre-contracting 
stage is important because it establishes the policy context within which the 
achievement of agreed outcomes at individual PPP project level must be analysed.  
 
The second objective of Chapter 4 is to investigate empirical evidence that illuminates 
PPP implementation in practice. In the absence of disclosure of pre-contracting 
processes and procedures, this objective is achieved through an examination of project 
objectives and risk allocations in two PPP hospital contracts (that are representative of 
four projects) and analysis of the failure of one early PPP hospital, the Latrobe 
Regional Hospital [Latrobe], which is the subject of Paper 3. Through focusing on 
pre-contracting appraisal technologies, the intention of Chapter 4 is to provide 
evidence and explanations of changing PPP objectives and implementation over time.  
 
The development of skeletal theory began in Chapter 2. This chapter further develops 
skeletal theory, and also continues the middle range thinking process of progressing 
the research through the final two stages identified by Laughlin (1995; 2004). The 
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purpose of the skeletal theory is to guide and structure the way the organisational 
settings can be viewed (Laughlin, 2004, p. 267). The second stage involves applying 
the richness of the empirical detail to make the skeletal theory more meaningful. 
Reflexive interaction between theory and empirical data results in iterative discovery 
and interpretative processes that precede the separate third stage, the change 
dimension, which involves extending or reformulating prior theories (Laughlin, 2004, 
p. 268). Reflection on the goodness of fit of skeletal theory to empirical findings (the 
third stage) also begins in this chapter. 
 
Chapter 4 is organised as follows. Section 4.2 reviews the PPP literature to clarify a 
number of themes and concerns that dominate critiques of the PPP pre-contracting 
stage. This section builds on the literature in Papers 2 and 3.  The primary focus of 
the literature review in this chapter is to examine controversies relating to PPP 
objectives, and the pre-contracting accounting and management appraisal 
technologies designed to justify the PPP option and to manage the risks associated 
with PPP projects. Although there are some contextual differences between PPP 
implementation in the UK and in Australia, English and Guthrie (2003) confirm that 
the UK-based PPP literature is relevant to the Australian context. The literature 
review presented in section 4.2 identifies two appraisal technologies that are critical to 
the achievement of PPP objectives—risk management and VFM—and explores the 
nature of their relationship to the achievement of PPP objectives in practice.  
 
Sections 4.3 and 4.4 summarise relevant Paper 3 findings. Section 4.3 provides an 
overview of the incidence and characteristics of Australian PPPs. Section 4.4 
introduces the characteristics of the PPP model of interest to this thesis, and 
establishes that PPP development and implementation in Victoria can be divided into 
two distinct periods: pre- and post-2000.  
 
Sections 4.5 and 4.6 present findings that augment findings in Papers 2 and 3. 
Drawing on research undertaken for this thesis, section 4.5 presents an analysis of the 
Victorian government’s approach to PPP use and implementation in the period 1991-
2007. Section 4.6 reports empirical findings of an examination of approaches to risk 
management in two representative pre- and post-2000 hospital contracts. Section 4.7 
reports findings contained in Paper 3 in relation to pre-contracting occurrences that 
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contributed to the failure of the Latrobe hospital. Section 4.8 provides a reflective 
conclusion and chapter summary. 
 
 
4.2 Literature review of PPP pre-contracting technologies 
The themes and concerns that dominate the modernisation literature (as analysed in 
Chapters 2 and 3) are mirrored in the accounting-based PPP literature. The literature 
review in this chapter summarises and adds to the literature reviewed in Papers 2 and 
3. Chapter 4 examines critiques of stated and unstated rationales for PPPs (i.e., their 
nature and purpose in the terminology used by Broadbent and Laughlin (1999)), and 
the relationship between PPP objectives, risk management and VFM in the pre-
contracting stage. The literature relating to how PPP contracts manage and control 
performance and the partnership relationship in the execution stage is reviewed in 
Chapter 5.  
 
 
4.2.1 PPP objectives 
As noted in Paper 2, PPPs are time- and cost-specific agreements between the state 
and a private consortium for infrastructure-based service provision. The consortium 
undertakes responsibility for financing, designing and constructing (or refurbishing) a 
facility, and for providing a variety of infrastructure-based services. The consortium 
receives a revenue stream that is used to repay debt, fund operations and provide a 
return to investors (Pollock and Price, 2004). At the rhetorical level, many of the risks 
associated with financing and building the infrastructure and with service delivery are 
transferred to the consortium. The anticipated management of project risk and the 
efficiency gains resulting from reduced project costs derived from superior private-
sector management practices and innovation (Lapsley, 2001a) are said to result in 
VFM savings. These VFM savings (which are crystallised over the duration of the 
project) are claimed to justify the use of private finance that is more costly than 
government borrowings. Accordingly, effective risk management (through risk 
allocation) and resulting VFM are ostensibly the primary motivations for these 
projects and, it is argued by their proponents, make these partnership arrangements 
viable for governments (Maguire and Malinovitch, 2004).  
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Investigations in the literature of the “nature and purpose” (Broadbent and Laughlin, 
1999) of PPPs signal a questioning of PPPs’ real (as opposed to stated) objectives. 
The dual nature of PPPs (the procurement of an asset and the procurement of asset-
based services) explains the debates about their stated (as opposed to unstated) 
objectives.  
A UK House of Commons report (Allen, 2001, p. 10) explains the rationale for non- 
recognition of the asset and associated liability on the basis that the state has not 
acquired (and is not paying for) an asset, ostensibly because it has acquired, and is 
paying for, a stream of asset-based services: 
Under the PFI [read PPPs] the public sector does not own an asset … but pays 
the PFI contractor a stream of committed revenue payments for the use of the 
facilities over the contract period. Once the contract has expired, ownership of 
the asset either remains with the private sector contractor, or is returned to the 
public sector, depending on the terms of the original contract. 
 
However, Broadbent and Laughlin (1999, p. 102) propose that the ownership of the 
asset (i.e., accounting for PPPs) is directly related to the degree of risk transfer to the 
consortium, and not to explanations of how the transaction is portrayed and 
rationalised. Broadbent and Laughlin’s (1999) interpretation appears to link PPP 
‘success’ with an off-balance sheet accounting treatment, indicating that the 
management of financial risk (through maximising risk transfer to the private 
consortia) to avoid recognition of PPPs on government financial statements is the 
primary objective of (early) PPP arrangements10. Indeed, Broadbent and Laughlin 
(1999, p. 102) seem to reject the possibility that the achievement of whole-of-life 
VFM may be compatible with an on- balance sheet accounting treatment. 
If the transaction is to appear ‘on balance sheet’ for the purchaser it raises 
‘macro’ [economic] concerns. First, is the question of whether PFI is actually 
a financing arrangement for purchase or assets or a procurement of services? 
Secondly, and arguably more complex, is the possibility that PFI schemes 
which are ‘on balance sheet’ for the public sector may have national financial 
[debt] implications. There is a further and equally significant issue since the 
decision as to whether the transaction is on or off balance sheet for the public 
sector purchaser is the degree of risk transfer. If definable risks remain with 
                                                 
10 Broadbent and Laughlin (1999) confirm that the effects of macroeconomic pressures influenced the 
early development and implementation of the PFI. These pressures, which arose from high government 
expenditures etc, were also one of the original drivers of modernisation (and of PCT), as outlined in 
Chapter 2. 
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the purchaser then the view is that this is substantiation of ownership and the 
transaction needs to appear on the public sector balance sheet. If the risks are 
borne by the private sector supplier then the transaction will appear on the 
balance sheet of this ‘operator’. Put crudely, how the PFI is accounted for is 
representative of the success or otherwise of this financing arrangement. If a 
PFI transaction has to feature on the balance sheet of the public sector then, 
ipso facto, ‘micro’ risk has not been transferred to the private sector and 
‘macro’ benefits and arguments for PFI have arguably not been realised. This 
former element raises concerns about ‘micro’ ‘value for money’ issues… 
 
When the accounting treatment does not reflect the substance of the transaction 
(English and Walker, 2004), and intentionally renders the transaction invisible in 
public financial statements (Hodges and Mellett, 1999), the real cost of PPPs and their 
impact on future spending remains hidden (Lapsley, 1999; NSWAG, 1994). It is 
generally agreed that the lack of an accounting disclosure of the asset and associated 
liabilities in government financial statements (Lambert and Lapsley, 2006) suggests 
that the management of financial risk is the primary objective of these arrangements 
(English and Guthrie, 2003; English and Walker, 2004). This view suggests that PPPs 
are a financially engineered package, the unstated purpose of which is to enable 
governments to acquire infrastructure through borrowings that are not officially 
recognised as national debt (Broadbent and Laughlin, 1999; English and Guthrie, 
2003; NSWAG, 1994; Walker, 2002). In this interpretation of PPP objectives, the 
provision of services appears to be of secondary importance. 
 
However, as early as 1995, the UK’s Private Finance Panel (Private Finance Panel, 
1995, para 3.1, p. 15) identified two fundamental requirements of PPP projects. First, 
PPP projects must result in demonstrable VFM for the public sector. Second, the 
private sector must genuinely assume risk. Furthermore, considerably complicating 
analysis, the Panel noted that these fundamental requirements are inextricably linked.  
 
At the conceptual level, Grimsey and Lewis (2005, p. 363) contend that VFM is 
derived from three sources, which are established in the PPP contract. First, the 
resolution of agency problems which arise “due to the divergence between ownership 
and control of assets … are easier to manage in the private sector through managerial 
incentives and market disciplines”. Second, the transfer of risk (for example, of 
maintaining the infrastructure) to the consortium provides an incentive to maximise 
efficiency over project life. Third, resources are more efficiently allocated on the basis 
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of establishing property rights thorough contracts, where governments retain the risks 
associated with rights for which it is difficult to establish clear contractual 
specification, and transfer to the contractor those risks for which clear and 
unambiguous contractual and property rights can be formed (Officer, 2004). This 
analysis assigns a critical (NIE-based) role to contracts in establishing VFM in PPP 
arrangements, and explains their investigation in this thesis. 
 
As indicated by the Private Finance Panel, mechanisms are required to demonstrate 
VFM. Two technologies dominate VFM achievement in the PPP pre-contracting 
stage. These are risk management and private-sector derived technologies such as the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model [CAPM] and the Public Sector Comparator [PSC]11 used 
to calculate the cost of the public procurement option. In determining the cost of 
public procurement these technologies also facilitate the necessary demonstration of 
the dollar amount of VFM savings associated with the PPP option. A comparison of 
public and PPP costing estimates (enabling confirmation of VFM) is deemed to be 
both necessary and sufficient to rationalise the decision to choose the PPP 
procurement technology.  
 
Risk management 
In the pre-contracting stage, standardised risk allocation tables documenting 
anticipated risks and their recommended allocation are typically provided in PPP 
policy documents. Risk allocation tables are designed to facilitate management of 
project risk through driving down costs by ensuring that the most appropriate party 
bears nominated risks (English and Guthrie, 2003; Froud and Shaoul, 2001). 
However, irrespective of agreed assumptions of risk, governments ultimately retain 
primary responsibility for the delivery of public services. This political risk can never 
be wholly offset through management of project risk (Edwards and Shaoul, 2003) or 
the application of principles derived from NIE (Barton, 2001).  This suggests that 
private consortia may profit if the cost of political risk is not overtly factored into 
VFM calculations as governments are obliged to assume responsibility for the 
                                                 
11 Since 2001 the PSC has been the technology used in Australia for this purpose. The PSC is also used 
in the UK. Prior to the development of the PSC, the CAPM was used for the same purpose in Victoria 
after 1996.  
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delivery of core public services in the event of PPP failure (Barton, 2001; Edwards 
and Shaoul, 2003; Stanley and Hensher, 2004).  
 
 
The Public Sector Comparator 
Grimsey and Lewis (2005, p. 3) define the PSC12 as “the calculation of the benchmark 
cost of providing a specified service under traditional (public sector) procurement”. 
The PSC is developed iteratively in the pre-contracting stage and represents a 
composite project outcome derived from the original project brief. It incorporates 
accepted modifications (identified as a result of negotiations and discussions with 
interested bidders) prior to the determination of tender documents and the opening of 
the formal bidding process. It represents the net present cost [NPC] of the 
hypothetical public provision13. Importantly, the PSC is calculated solely on the basis 
of quantifiable financial costs and benefits (Grimsey and Lewis, 2005). 
 
At the conceptual level, Heald (2003) endorses the technologies that underlie the 
concepts of risk allocation and VFM determination. Nevertheless, a number of 
concerns have been raised in the Anglophone literature concerning the 
conceptualisation of VFM. The overriding emphasis on quantifiable financial costs 
and benefits in PSC calculations and pre-contracting VFM assessments has been 
criticised because of the exclusion of non-financial qualitative factors (both positive 
and negative) in PSC modelling (Broadbent et al, 2004b; Froud and Shaoul, 2001; 
Shaoul, 2005a; b). Additionally, PSC calculations are seen as susceptible to changes 
in assumptions (such as discount rates) that potentially affect the VFM outcome 
(Grimsey and Lewis, 2005; Shaoul, 2005a; b). Also, Froud (2003) has questioned the 
assumption implicit in PSC modelling that VFM will remain stable and relevant 
throughout lengthy PPP terms, implying that even if VFM calculations are ‘correct’ at 
contracting, whole-of-life VFM (as conceived at contracting) may be unachievable 
over PPP life (Heald, 2003) due to the inability of contracts to fully anticipate (and 
                                                 
12 See Grimsey and Lewis (2005) for a description and analysis of the use of the PSC in Australia, and 
Broadbent et al (2004b) and Froud and Shaoul (2001) for a discussion of its use in the UK context. 
13 ‘Hypothetical’ because projects selected as PPPs are deemed, by definition, to exclude the possibility 
of conventional procurement, thereby eliminating the possibility of the public procurement option 
(English and Guthrie, 2003). 
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effectively minimise) the costs associated with the resolution of future uncertainty 
(Froud, 2003).  
 
In addition, critiques at the level of practice suggest VFM calculations are “vulnerable 
to manipulation” and are “tarnished by the systematic suppression or foreclosure of 
options, allowing opponents of the actual decision to portray it as a fix” (Heald, 2003, 
p. 360). For Heald the fundamental question is whether PPPs evaporate, magnify or 
transfer the total amount of risk, which can only be determined empirically. There has 
been considerable debate about the theoretically sound interest rate at which to 
discount future cash flows (Grimsey and Lewis, 2005; Officer, 2004; Quiggin, 2004). 
The PSC has been criticised, most damningly by Jeremy Taylor, the Assistant 
Comptroller and Auditor-General responsible for the UK’s National Audit Office’s 
VFM audits of PPPs, who has (presumably) had access to the information identified 
by Heald (2003) as being necessary to evaluate PSC calculations. Jeremy Taylor has 
called the PSC “pseudo scientific mumbo jumbo” (as quoted in Broadbent et al, 
2004b, p. 17). This comment echoes critiques of the claimed scientific rationality of 
many of the accounting and financial management technologies and their role in 
modernisation (Humphrey et al, 2005; Olson et al, 1998). 
 
In summary, the PPP literature indicates there has been controversy about stated PPP 
objectives. Also, the role and specification of pre-contracting technologies such as 
risk management and the PSC have attracted debate, notably in the context of 
understanding how (if at all) they contribute to the achievement of VFM objectives in 
the execution stage, which is to be explored in Chapter 5. This chapter now reports on 
the empirical research undertaken for this thesis. Empirical findings are drawn from 
Papers 2 and 3, and from additional research undertaken during the course of writing 
up this dissertation. 
 
 
4.3 Empirical findings: PPP activity in Australia 
One objective of Paper 2 is to provide an overview of the economic importance of 
PPPs to the Australian economy, and to highlight problems associated with PPP 
disclosure. 
 
Chapter 4 Pre-Contracting Stage  51 
 
 
There is no consistently maintained and current PPP database in Australia (Hodge, 
2005). A national inventory of PPP projects was maintained by the Australian Council 
for Infrastructure Development (AusCID)14. AusCID’s most recent list of Australian 
PPP projects (AusCID, 2005) was compiled using data collected from “contacts with 
companies involved in the projects, annual reports and media releases from 
government and company websites” (AusCID, 2005, p. 5). The 2005 AusCID 
database was reviewed as outlined below. 
 
A revised database that was prepared for the research reported in this thesis is 
summarised in Table 1: Overview of the Financial Value, Category and Auditor-
General Oversight of the PPP Activity in Australian Jurisdictions as at December 
2006 (Paper 2, p. 257). Table 1 provides a summary of the number and value of PPP 
projects undertaken by the various Australian jurisdictions. Also, Table 1 indicates (in 
bold square brackets) the number and net present cost [NPC] of those projects that 
have been subject to performance audit within each category by jurisdiction. This 
table categorises PPPs into 11 project types and indicates that a total of 127 PPP 
projects had been entered into in Australia as at 31 December, 2006.  Of these, only 
16 have been subjected to performance audit by an Australian auditor-general as at 
mid 2007. The relative lack of attention PPPs have received from Australia’s auditors-
general is investigated more fully in Chapter 6.  
 
The AusCID (2005) register contains 17415 discrete projects for which contracts had 
been signed at 31 December 2005. The following steps were undertaken to update and 
correct the AusCID (2005) register. First, projects categorised by AusCID as 
privatisations, leases and additional capital expenditure (77 projects) were excluded 
because these projects fall outside a broad working definition of PPPs adopted by 
Australian governments and in this thesis. Second, the AusCID (2005) list was 
compared with the AusCID (2001) list and 17 projects that fell within the 
government’s definition were added. AusCID (2005) provided no indication of 
                                                 
14 In 2006, the lobby group AusCID was amalgamated with Infrastructure Partners Australia [IPA], 
also a lobby group, and the membership of which includes government and private-sector 
representatives. The IPA website (http//www.infrastructure.org.au/about/about.htm) contains no 
publicly available list of any Australian PPPs as at 10 September 2007. 
15 The text in the AusCID (2005) report (at p. 5) states that the “database currently contains 164 
projects”.  However, the register of projects contained in the report lists 174 projects so does not accord 
with this statement or the table provided on page 5. 
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reasons for the exclusion of these projects. However, one explanation appears to be 
that the 2005 database excludes some failed or discontinued PPP projects, including 
three in Victoria: the New Latrobe Hospital [Latrobe]; the Metropolitan Women’s 
Correctional Centre [Deer Park]; and three Victorian metropolitan rail franchises. 
Failure also affected one PPP hospital in Queensland [Robina] and one in South 
Australia [Modbury]. The Port Macquarie Base Hospital in New South Wales [NSW] 
returned to government control as a result of a change of ownership of the operator. A 
second explanation for the exclusion of these projects could be the tightening of the 
definition of PPPs that occurred with the creation of PV in 2000 and the development 
of PPP-specific policies. Third, a search of government and company websites, annual 
reports, media releases, news articles and other publications was conducted, resulting 
in 13 additional PPP projects being added.  
 
A number of additional problems were encountered in constructing Paper 2, Table 1. 
The major difficulty was the lack of consensus about the NPC (to government) of 
each of the projects. Costs identified in the AusCID (2005, p. 5) database are 
calculated from a contractor perspective, and exclude government contributions. 
Thus, the AusCID database understates the cost of PPP projects to the state because it 
omits financing and other PPP-specific direct and indirect costs16, including 
significant pre-contracting costs incurred by contracting agencies, and the social cost 
of other obligations undertaken by governments to get PPP projects up and running17. 
A search of the data sources noted above yielded some additional information about 
government costs for some, but not all, projects. Governments frequently provide no 
explicit information on financing costs, but do provide some information as to the 
overall cost of PPP projects. Whether these figures include estimates of indirect 
financial and non-financial costs is debateable. Where discrepancies could be 
identified, the AusCID figures were amended to provide a more appropriate cost for 
public accountability purposes. 
                                                 
16 For purposes of comparing the cost of PPP and ‘in house’ provision it is necessary to factor out costs 
that are applicable to both types of provision. Such costs include project management and monitoring 
costs. 
17 For instance, the NSW Joint Select Committee on the Cross City Tunnel (NSWJSCCCT, 2006a; b) 
commented that the non-financial costs incurred by the government included reduced flexibility to 
make future changes to the road network without exposure to financial liability (due to its contractual 
obligation to ‘encourage’ motorists to use the tunnel), community anger generated as a result of road 
closures and other ‘traffic calming’ measures. 
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The M5 East Motorway illustrates several of these problems. The AusCID (2005) 
database records the project cost as $94 million, whilst the NSW Auditor-General 
indicates a cost of $740 million (NSWAG, 1994, Vol. 2, p. 281). However, the NSW 
Roads and Traffic Authority [RTA] website states that the cost was $794 million 
(RTA, 2007). In creating Table 1, $794 million is identified as the cost, although the 
$54 million discrepancy between the auditor-general’s and the RTA’s figures cannot 
be confirmed, but may reflect the cost of negotiated changes to the toll road 
subsequent to its commissioning. 
 
Fitzgerald (2004) confirms that PPPs comprise about ten percent of Australia’s annual 
investment in infrastructure. Paper 2 Table 1 shows that Victoria is the dominant 
Australian jurisdiction in terms of the number of PPP projects and the total value of 
those projects. Of the 127 identified projects, 38.6 per cent (49 projects) are located in 
Victoria, followed by 23.6 percent (30 projects) in NSW. The Australian Capital 
Territory [ACT] is not engaged in any projects included in Paper 2 Table 1. In terms 
of the cost of PPP projects undertaken, Victoria again dominates with $14,061 million 
of the total cost of PPP projects. The correctional and health categories are significant. 
Whilst correctional projects outnumber health projects Australia-wide by 13 to 12, the 
cost of the health projects greatly exceeds the cost of the correctional projects, with 
health projects accounting for 7.5 percent of the total cost of the 127 projects, and 
correctional projects accounting for 4.4 percent of the total cost.  This statistic is 
possibly explained by the relative cost of building large modern hospitals compared to 
the cost of constructing modern correctional centres. 
 
The decision to focus analysis on Victorian PPPs in this thesis is explained by the fact 
that Victoria is Australia’s leading PPP proponent and PPP policy developer (as 
indicated in Paper 2). Additionally, in 2000 the Victorian government made a 
commitment to publicly disclose PPP contracts (English and Walker, 2004), making 
Victoria an attractive research site.18 Also, the failure of three pre-2000 PPPs in 
Victoria, and extensive reviews of pre-2000 PPP prisons undertaken by a new 
government after its election in late 1999, has resulted in an unusual amount of 
                                                 
18 The Central Register of Major Government Projects (Victoria) website contains the contracts for 
major projects in Victoria (whether PPP or not) that have been signed since 1992.  The Partnerships 
Victoria website contains the contracts for post-2000 PPPs. 
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publicly-available commentary and analysis in documentary form that is unavailable 
in other Australian jurisdictions. 
 
In summary, Paper 2 identifies a number of problems associated with the disclosure 
of PPP activity in Australia. There is a need for a timely, consistent and accurate 
Australia-wide PPP database. Given the problems associated with databases 
maintained by private-sector lobby groups and the demand for increased private 
investment in infrastructure identified above, it is recommended that a government 
body is responsible for the maintenance of a national PPP database that reports the 
NPC to taxpayers of all PPP projects. 
 
 
4.4 Empirical findings: overview of PPP development in Victoria: 1991-
2007   
As outlined in Paper 2, the establishment of Partnerships Victoria [PV] within the 
Victorian Department of Treasury and Finance in 2000 (VDTF, 2000) resulted in the 
development, for the first time in Australia, of a suite of detailed PPP-specific policies 
to guide and aid decision-making. The development of PPP policies by PV signalled 
the first attempt in Australia to rationalise and justify PPP decision-making on the 
basis of NIE, and acknowledged the influence of UK PPP policies on the Victorian 
approach19. Also, 2000 signalled the end of the use of various acronyms (such as 
BOO [build, own, operate] and BOOT [build, own, operate, transfer]) to identify 
PPPs, and the introduction of the generic term PPP(s).  
 
Two primary PPP models are also identified in the Victorian policy documents (Paper 
2). The models are distinguished by different payment scenarios based on the demand 
for services (PV, 2001c). The chief differences between the models are the source of 
the revenue stream, and the nature of government guarantees. The model of interest to 
this thesis is characterised by the provision of infrastructure that delivers core social 
services (such as clinical services in PPP hospitals and correctional services in PPP 
prisons), in which the state assumes demand risk and guarantees an agreed level of 
services and payments irrespective of actual levels of demand. Deductions occur if the 
                                                 
19 In the pre-2000 period generic infrastructure policies specified objectives and implementation 
technologies employed in all infrastructure projects (see Table 4.1 in this chapter). 
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consortium fails to meet specified performance standards. Typically, the service 
elements of these contracts are subject to recontracting at regular intervals, providing 
governments and consortia with the opportunity to finetune the service components to 
ensure they meet current market conditions in terms of VFM.  
 
Importantly for this research, Paper 2 highlights a fundamental change in this model 
over the investigated period. A feature of pre-2000 PPPs is private-sector 
responsibility for delivering the full gamut of core clinical and correctional services in 
PPP hospitals and prisons, and of all non-core services (such as maintenance, security 
and car parking) required to run modern hospitals and prisons. However, post-2000, 
the role of consortia in Victorian PPP hospitals and prisons was restricted to the 
delivery of the non-core services required to facilitate the provision of core services 
by the government employees. Accordingly, this longitudinal study  analyses the 
implementation of two distinct versions of the PPP model characterised by the state’s 
assumption of demand risk, and the provision of public services at minimal (or no) 
direct cost to service recipients. The pre- and post-2000 distinction is used throughout 
the remainder of this thesis as an analytical tool to examine change in PPP use and 
implementation. 
 
 
4.5 Empirical findings: the government’s approach to PPP use and 
implementation  
The PPP literature review in section 4.2 indicates that controversy surrounds PPP 
objectives and the technologies designed to achieve objectives in the pre-contracting 
stage. Broadbent and Laughlin (1999) suggest that if the management of financial risk 
is a primary objective then an off-balance sheet accounting treatment signals that the 
PPP project is ‘successful’. Contrariwise, the Private Finance Panel (1995) suggests 
that the management of project risk is the primary PPP objective, and that project risk 
management is inextricably linked with the demonstrable achievement of VFM. 
These different interpretations of intentions (and outcomes) can only be determined 
empirically (Heald, 2003). Paper 2 indicates that there was a change in 2000 in the 
Victorian government’s thinking about PPPs. 
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This section has a number of aims. First, it analyses Victoria’s policies from 1991 to 
determine stated PPP objectives. Second, it examines the changing role and nature of 
the pre-contracting appraisal technologies mandated in those policies. Third, this 
section elucidates on the Paper 2’s finding of significant change in PPP models and 
objectives.  
 
Extant Victorian PPP policies (at the time of writing) are summarised in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1 confirms differences between the pre- and post-2000 approaches to PPP 
development and use, and highlights significant change in PPP objectives and in the 
Victorian government’s management and control of pre-contracting decision-making 
over time. 
 
Section 4.5 introduces additional research and empirical findings that are not reported 
in the papers that comprise this thesis. 
 
 
4.5.1 Pre-2000 policies 
As indicated in Table 4.1 (below), the Victorian pre-2000 policies address the 
procurement of infrastructure in general, and are not PPP-specific. Confirming the 
thrust of Broadbent and Laughlin (1999), the 1991 policy (VDTF, 1991) is frank 
about the need to ensure borrowing remains off-balance sheet, indicating that the 
management of financial risk through the transfer of risk from the public sector to the 
private sector was the primary PPP objective. The 1994 and 1996 policies (VDTF, 
1994; 1996) demonstrate a growing awareness of the role of private-sector derived 
technologies (such as the CAPM, which was formally introduced in 1994, and risk 
management techniques, which were first introduced in 1996) to achieve efficient, 
effective and accountable outcomes. Reflecting changes in the Australian Loan 
Council Borrowing Requirements (English and Guthrie, 2003) and the dramatic 
reduction of the indebtedness of the state (English and Guthrie, 2001) the 1996 policy 
signals that the management of financial risk may not drive projects executed after 
1996. The 1996 policy suggests that the achievement of VFM had become 
acknowledged as the primary objective. These policies indicate a shift in the thinking 
of the government and its attempts to grapple with the concepts outlined by the 
Private Finance Panel (1995) above. The change in government thinking culminated 
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in the establishment of Partnerships Victoria in 2000 (VDTF, 2000) and the 
development of the PV policies summarised in Table 4.1.  
 
 
 
Table 4.1: PPP-Related Policies: Victoria 1991 – 2007 
(Adapted from Table 1 (English, 2005b)) 
 
Policy 
Document & 
Year 
Underlying rationales of policy Thrust of reforms 
Infrastructure 
Guidelines for 
Victoria: 
Public/Private 
Sector 
Partnership 
(VDTF, 1991) 
Strong financial need; overcoming fiscal 
restraints and Australian Loan Council 
restrictions: “The challenge of difficult 
economic times and national economic 
policies, which have reduced infrastructure 
spending to its lowest level since the end of 
World War II, mean that these vital 
investments cannot be met by Government 
alone.” 
Non-PPP specific policy. 
Acknowledges role for private 
sector in the delivery of 
infrastructure. 
Emphasis on packaging outsourcing 
arrangements to avoid ‘on balance 
sheet’ arrangements. 
Infrastructure 
Investment 
Policy for 
Victoria (VDTF, 
1994) 
Increased private involvement to stimulate 
growth and efficiency: “The Victorian 
Government is committed to the pursuit of 
growth and efficiency. It believes that this 
will be facilitated if the private sector 
participates to a greater extent in the 
provision of infrastructure and related 
services.” 
Non-PPP specific policy. 
Delivery of core and non-core 
services based on savings to 
government of private service 
provision. 
Use of CAPM to determine NPV of 
costs of ‘in house’ option. 
Unique benchmark model to be 
calculated for each project. 
Evidence accounting treatment still 
paramount to government, despite 
thrust of policy documentation. 
Investment 
Evaluation: 
Policy and 
Guidelines 
(VDTF, 1996) 
Establishes policy for all government bodies 
when assessing infrastructure investment 
proposals over $5 million whether wholly 
funded by government or funded in 
partnership with the private sector. 
Non-PPP specific policy.  
Underlying principles: cost benefit 
and cost effectiveness analyses. 
Impact analysis employed for non-
monetary and non-quantifiable 
impacts, distributional impacts and 
weighting the importance and 
magnitude of projects. 
Development of a total weighted 
score of financial and socio-
economic impacts, combining 
financial and non-financial impacts 
NPV the preferred evaluation 
measure. 
Evaluation processes to ensure 
effective risk management through 
development of risk management 
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plans, implementation management 
(including post-implementation 
review) and assignment of 
accountability for investment 
outcomes. 
Partnerships 
Victoria    
(VDTF, 2000) 
Seeks to harness benefits that may be gained 
by involving private parties in competitive 
bidding through achieving value for money in 
the public interest, and is more 
discriminating: “Choices between public and 
private provision of infrastructure and related 
ancillary services will be made on practical 
grounds. Such choices will be based on 
consideration of the needs of each project and 
will be assessed against a rigorous public 
interest test which will examine the potential 
impact on privacy, security, consumer rights, 
public access and equity.” 
Notable reforms introduced in 2000 
include: 
• Option to restrict role of the 
private sector to the provision 
of infrastructure and related 
ancillary services – that is to 
the delivery of non-core 
services only. 
• Introduction of a formal Public 
Interest Test (PIT). 
• Introduction of the Public 
Sector Comparator (PSC). 
• Less emphasis on accounting 
treatment. 
• Willingness to proceed with 
‘on balance sheet’ projects. 
 
Partnerships 
Victoria: Risk 
Allocation and 
Contractual 
Issues (PV, 
2001a) 
First of three documents to assist in 
implementing 2000 Partnerships Victoria 
[PV] policy framework. 
PV seeks to reap the financial and efficiency 
benefits of partnerships with the private 
sector, VFM criteria linked with public 
interest criteria to determine whether and 
how a PPP may be appropriate for a 
particular project. 
 
  
Purpose to: 
• Increase understanding of risk 
allocation. 
• Identify all major risks and 
indicate preferred government 
position on risk allocation. 
• Provide guidance (to 
government) as to how risks 
should be addressed to lower 
transaction costs. 
Partnerships 
Victoria: Public 
Sector 
Comparator: a  
Technical Note 
(PV, 2001b) 
Second of three documents to assist in 
implementing Partnerships Victoria [PV] 
policy framework. 
The promotion of effective and sustainable 
competition is a cornerstone of PV and is an 
imperative of government policy. A 
competitive bidding process improves choice 
and helps deliver VFM. 
 
Provides step-by-step guidance for 
construction of PSC. 
Establish the role of the PSC in PV 
project assessment processes. 
Acknowledges the PSC as a purely 
quantitative comparison that should 
be made in conjunction with 
assessment of qualitative factors. 
Partnerships 
Victoria: 
Practitioners’ 
Guide (PV, 
2001c) 
Last of three documents to assist in 
implementing Partnerships Victoria [PV] 
policy framework. 
Establishes qualitative analyses required to 
justify PV delivery (via a PPP) and PSC’s 
role as a reference project – the most likely 
and efficient public-sector delivery option.  
Identifies VFM drivers to look for 
in assessing the potential for a PV 
(PPP) project. 
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Partnerships 
Victoria: Non-
Metropolitan 
Urban Water 
Authority 
Approval 
Process (PV, 
2001d) 
Establishes fast-track process to approve 
projects initiated by Non-Metropolitan Water 
Authorities pursuing water and wastewater 
projects under PV policy. 
 
Streamlined approval process 
reduces PV pre-contracting stage to 
three distinctive phases: 
• Investment decision – requires 
Treasurer’s approval above 
capex $5 million; Minister 
forwards investment evaluation 
to Treasurer. 
• Project delivery solution – 
requires Treasurer’s approval. 
• PV stages – Treasurer 
approves stages against criteria 
of commercial principles and 
practices; Minister to endorse 
that service objectives 
addressed. 
Partnerships 
Victoria: 
Overview (PV, 
2001e) 
Reiterates government’s commitment to 
maximising level of infrastructure spending 
through responsible use of resources of both 
the public and private sectors. 
Choice between public and private provision 
made on basis of needs of each project and 
tested against a rigorous public interest test. 
Summary of government’s PPP 
policy. 
Establishes rhetoric and rationale 
for PPP delivery in context that 
emphasises a level playing field 
between the sectors; full cost 
benefit analyses; transparent public 
tendering; accountability and 
disclosure framework. 
Emphasises role of PV policy and 
technical guidance material in 
assessment process. 
Partnerships 
Victoria: 
Contract 
Management 
Policy (PV, 
2003a) 
Outlines components of the contract 
management framework and establishes 
accountabilities and responsibilities for 
contract management in PV projects. 
Objective is to establish proactive, 
practical and constructive 
management of PV contracts to 
achieve project objectives 
incorporating balanced long-term 
VFM outcomes. 
Components include this policy 
statement, PV Contract 
Management Guide, a credentialed 
training program and the 
establishment of a forum for 
information sharing. 
Partnerships 
Victoria: 
Contract 
Management 
Guide (PV, 
2003b) 
To help achieve project objectives 
incorporating balanced long-term VFM 
outcomes. 
To enable procurement team address and 
support principles of effective contract 
management. 
Supersedes the contract management material 
in PV (2001) Practitioners’ Guide. 
Purpose to provide: 
• Guidance for government 
management of PV contract 
through lifecycle of project.  
• Direction for procurement 
team. 
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Partnerships 
Victoria: Use of 
Discount Rate in 
Partnerships 
Victoria 
Process: 
Technical Note 
(PV. 2003c) 
VFM is a key element of PPP policy. 
PSC a key tool in determining VFM. 
Provides additional guidance on 
construction and application of 
PSC. 
Further advice on defining the PSC 
and its role in the evaluation 
process. 
Detailed worked example of 
constructing a PSC for a 
hypothetical hospital project, 
building on example in the 2001  
PSC Technical Note. 
Partnerships 
Victoria: Public 
Sector 
Comparator: 
Supplementary 
Technical Note 
(PV, 2003d) 
Provides additional guidance on preparing 
and using PSCs. 
To be read in conjunction with PV (2001b) 
Public Sector Comparator, and PV (2003) 
Use of Discount Rates in the Partnerships 
Victoria Process. 
 
PSC located in PV process.  
Provides further advice on defining 
PSC and its role in the evaluation 
process. 
Incorporates practical advice learnt 
since PSC Technical Note released 
in 2001. 
Provides a worked example for 
constructing a PSC for a 
hypothetical hospital. 
Partnerships 
Victoria: 
Standard 
Commercial 
Principles (PV, 
2005a) 
Outlines “current considered position” on risk 
allocations. 
Provides consistent and efficient risk. 
allocation framework, that permits flexibility 
to allow for individual needs of each project 
Aims to standardise PV contracts. 
To be read in conjunction with PV (2001a) 
Risk Allocation and Contractual Principles. 
Revises previous position on risk 
allocation. 
Objective is to ensure that pre-
contracting agreements on risk 
allocation are captured in contracts. 
Details and explains implications of 
identified risks, indicates which 
party should bear them, and how 
they should be treated in PV 
contracts. 
Includes information on remedies 
open to government for non-
performance. 
 
Partnerships 
Victoria: 
Advisory Note 
Determining the  
General 
Inflation Rate 
for Use in 
Partnerships 
Victoria Projects 
(PV, 2005b) 
Discusses appropriate source of general 
inflation forecasts to use in constructing the 
PSC. 
Recommends that the PSC should 
generally be prepared on a nominal 
basis and before income tax. The 
forecast general inflation rates 
should be obtained from forecasts in 
state budget papers. 
Partnerships 
Victoria: 
Managing 
Interest Rate 
Advisory note on management of interest rate 
risk in the period between lodging bids and 
financial close. 
Aims to manage the cost of debt finance to 
Recommends that interest rate risk 
between lodgement of bids and 
financial close remain with the 
government. 
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Risk (PV, 
2005c) 
the state. 
Addresses effects of interest rate changes 
prior to financial close that could have a 
considerable impact on the payments by state.
Indicates that pre-financial close 
interest rate risk must be managed 
on a project-by-project basis. 
Provides for revisions to funding 
submissions in the event of changes 
in interest rate risk. 
Determines that risk related to 
foreign currency denominated 
borrowings remain with the bidder, 
unless government undertakes to 
bear foreign currency risk, when it 
should be fully hedged. 
Partnerships 
Victoria: 
Advisory Note 
Disclosure and 
management of 
conflict of 
interest for 
advisors (PV, 
2005d) 
Provides a principles-based framework for 
practitioners, advisers, and government 
employees to identify, assess and manage 
conflict of interests in PV projects. 
Indicates what information should be 
disclosed to government by advisers to 
enable the government to identify, assess and 
manage conflicts. 
Defines conflicts of interest. 
Identifies three categories of 
conflicts: actual, potential and 
perceived. 
Provides guiding disclosure 
principles. 
Outlines sanctions. 
Provides examples of disclosure 
events, and of exceptions to 
disclosure recommendations. 
Provides a conflict of interest test. 
Indicates how conflicts should be 
managed. 
Considers implementation of 
guidelines and governance issues. 
Partnerships 
Victoria: 
Advisory Note 
Interactive 
Tender Process 
(PV, 2005e) 
Complements previous PV guidance material.
Designed to clarify and expand on the use of 
an interactive tender process. 
Aims to assist agencies and contractors to 
implement interactive tender processes. 
The interactive tender process 
provides a confidential, active 
interface between the state and 
individual short-listed tenderers. 
Facilitates discussion of 
development of concepts and 
designs and receipt of feedback in 
the context of the state’s output 
requirements prior to tender 
submission. 
Essential to reduce interface risk in 
social infrastructure projects; helps 
clarify state’s requirements, reduces 
costs of misunderstandings, 
minimises need for re-bid processes 
based on design matters. 
Provides for a series of workshops 
(technical, service and commercial 
clarification) with individual 
tenderers. 
Provides examples of recent 
interactive tender process in action. 
Guides public officials in conduct 
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of interactive tender process. 
Partnerships 
Victoria: 
Overview 
(PV, 2006)  
Revised edition of PV (2001). 
Summarises PV objectives. 
Explains relationship between various PV 
policy documents. 
Integrates PV lifecycle with 
Gateway Review Process*. 
Provides overview of PV objectives 
and implementation strategies.  
Reiterates and updates PV 
principles and links them to relevant 
PV policies. 
Partnerships 
Victoria: Public 
Disclosure 
Policy (PV, 
2007) 
Provides for a Project Summary to 
accompany public disclosure of PV contracts. 
Objective to better inform the public about 
the nature and outcomes of PPPs in practice. 
Must be released within three months of 
financial close. 
Contains two main sections: 
• Summary of project features: 
rationale, tender process, 
VFM, risk management, 
comparison between PSC and 
winning bid, including details 
of estimated cost savings, 
disclosure of unquantifiable 
risks, public interest 
considerations, contract 
milestones. 
• Summary of commercial 
features: parties, key 
contractual relationships, risk 
allocation table, overview of 
contractual relationships, 
obligations of parties, 
government costs and 
payments, state contributions, 
performance measures and 
abatement, default and 
termination regime, state 
guarantees and rights at expiry, 
processes for government 
modifications of 
services/facility. 
*The objective of the Gateway Review Process [GRP] is to review high and medium risk projects at 
key decision points. GRP involves independent, short, structured reviews at six critical stages of project 
lifecycle to identify issues that need to be addressed to ensure successful project delivery. The six 
critical lifecycle stages provide strategic assessments of: the business need, the business case, the 
procurement strategy, the tender decision, the readiness for service, and benefits evaluation (VDTF. 
2007). Victorian Department of Treasury and Finance GRP documentation acknowledges that the GRP 
is based on material in the Successful Delivery Toolkit Version 4.5, produced by the UK Office of 
Government Commerce in 2004. 
 
 
4.5.2 Post-2000 policies 
Subsequent to the establishment of PV in 2000 (VDTF, 2000), 16 PPP-specific 
policies have been developed. As indicated by Table 4.1 above, a feature of the post-
2000 policies is the articulation of the government’s PPP objectives, detailed 
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explanations of objectives, and instructions about how to ensure the achievement of 
objectives. The post-2000 policies can be categorised as follows. 
 
Table 4.1 shows that five PV framework documents (VDTF, 2000; PV, 2001c; e; 
2003a; 200620) provide an overview of the government’s PPP policies, its rationales, 
and of the role of technologies, including risk management, the PSC and contract 
management in achieving PPP objectives. 
 
Seven documents provide extensive practical guidance as to how objectives are to be 
achieved. Risk identification and its management to achieve VFM is the subject of 
two policies (PV, 2001a; 2005a). Quantifying VFM and providing justifications for, 
and technical explanations of how to calculate and apply, the PSC technology are 
covered in four detailed technical policies (PV 2001b; 2003c; b; 2005b). PV (2005c) 
provides guidance on the management of interest rate risk in the period between the 
lodgement of bids and financial close. Capturing risk allocations and VFM in PPP 
contracts is the subject of PV (2001a), while PV (2003a) is concerned with 
minimising the unintended assumption of risk in the post-contracting stages of a PPP 
project.  
 
Three policies are designed to streamline pre-contracting processes to reduce costs. 
Two policies (PV, 2005d; e) are designed to facilitate private-sector involvement in 
PPP projects. Another policy (PV, 2001d) establishes a fast-track approval process for 
non-metropolitan water projects.  
 
The most recent policy (PV, 2007) is an attempt to appease public criticism of the 
lack of transparency surrounding Victorian PPP projects (VPAEC, 2006). PV (2007) 
provides for the disclosure of contract summaries and outlines what such summaries 
should contain.  
 
 
                                                 
20 PV (2006) summarises the subtle changes in approach since the development of the initial 2000 
policy and outlines the government’s current rationales and explanations of PPP policies. 
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4.5.3 Linking risk management with VFM 
As indicated in Table 4.1, since 1991 risk management has subtly shifted from risk 
transfer (to enable the management of financial risk and an off-balance sheet 
accounting treatment (Maguire and Malinovitch, 2004; English and Walker, 2004)) to 
the management of project risk to achieve VFM. This transformation has been 
supported and accompanied increasingly by the development of highly sophisticated 
technologies to identify and quantify risk, particularly in the post-2000 period.  
 
Reflecting the subtle shift from the use of PPPs to transfer risk to the use of PPPs to 
allocate risks, by 2001 the concept of risk management had been recast: 
 
The principle governing risk transfer is that each risk should be allocated to 
whoever is best able to manage it at least cost, taking into account public 
interest considerations. This requires an optimal rather than maximum transfer 
of risk (PV, 2001b, p. 52). 
 
The risk allocation guidance material (PV, 2001a) establishes the nexus between 
VFM and the management of risk:  
 
The emphasis of Partnerships Victoria is on services received by government, 
not government procurement of infrastructure. Government pays for services 
provided by the private party, which are delivered through privately owned 
infrastructure as part of the service package. The philosophy of risk allocation 
underlying this emphasis on service purchase and delivery is that government 
frees itself from asset-based risk (including design, construction, operating and 
residual value risk), and becomes a service recipient… (p. 8) 
 
Risk … is at the core of project profitability (for the private party) and 
efficiency (in delivering public sector objectives). (p. 16) 
 
The emphasis on the receipt of services as opposed to the procurement of the asset is 
reminiscent of the analysis and explanation of the nature and purpose of PPPs offered 
by the Private Finance Panel (1995), which was explicated in section 4.2 above. 
 
By 2006, the government appears to have become more certain about the rhetoric 
surrounding sources of VFM and its role and meaning. According to the most recent 
PPP policy overview (PV, 2006, p. 8), VFM drivers are definable and measurable 
service outputs; whole-of life costing; integration of design, construction, operation 
and maintenance over the life of an asset in a single project package; opportunity for 
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innovation and transfer of risk to a private party; appropriate third-party use of 
facilities, either concurrently or out-of-hours (which reduce net cost to government); 
and market capability and appetite. It is interesting to note that the 2006 document 
(PV, 2006) includes risk management as only one of a number of sources of VFM. 
 
In relation to the role and use of the PSC, the 2001–2003 technical guidance material 
(see Table 4.1) emphasises the linkage between VFM and the PSC (which is 
essentially a technical reworking of private-sector derived technologies to cost future 
projects): 
 
The construction of a PSC is necessary in almost all Partnerships Victoria 
projects to test whether a private investment proposal offers value for money 
in comparison with the most efficient form of public procurement … (PV, 
2001b, p. 1) 
 
A number of fundamental principles and objectives underpin government’s 
approach to Partnerships Victoria, including … encouraging the rigorous 
application of financial evaluation techniques, including a proper appreciation 
of the financial consequences of risk… (p. 3) 
 
The PSC represents a hypothetical rather than actual dollar cost to government 
… (p. 7) 
 
It is government policy that a benchmark and formal evaluation process is to 
be used for all Partnership Victoria projects to assist in an assessment of 
whether bids in a Partnerships Victoria bidding offer better value for money 
than public procurement. (p. 12) 
 
 
Reflecting on PPP policy development in the post-2000 period in Victoria English 
(2005b, p. 104) concludes: 
 
There is less emphasis on accounting treatment and a stated increased 
willingness to proceed with on-balance sheet projects, reflecting the dramatic 
turnaround that had occurred in the state’s on-balance sheet indebtedness … 
The emphasis given to the Public Interest Test [see VDTF, 2000] indicates the 
growing sensitivity of citizens to PPP projects. The Public Interest Test 
assesses the impact of PPP projects in terms of their effectiveness in meeting 
government policy objectives and accountability standards; in ensuring that 
the rights of affected individuals and communities have been protected; in 
guaranteeing that disadvantaged groups have access to the infrastructure; that 
public access to the infrastructure is safeguarded; that consumer rights are 
protected; and that public health, safety and privacy are not impacted. The 
introduction of the PSC is a further step in the legitimisation of PPP on 
technical efficiency grounds. 
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… The ostensible purpose of [PPP policies] is to aid public servants and 
private parties in understanding the government’s PPP policies and decision 
making criteria. Although most of the technical documents are produced in the 
period 2001-2003, they codified and rationalised previous practice, much of it 
derived from the UK (English and Guthrie, 2003). These complex financial 
technologies to define and allocate risk, calculate the PSC and quantify VFM 
have been increasingly used to legitimise the utilisation of PPP to deliver 
services that many citizens would rather were delivered by governments 
through borrowings. Their role has been to reassure the public that there are 
theoretically sound technical efficiency grounds for the implementation of 
PPP, and that the decision to enter into a PPP arrangement is based on 
mathematically sound financial modelling. 
 
 
4.5.4 Evaluation of PPP outcomes 
Analysis of the post-2000 policies above also confirms English and Guthrie’s (2003) 
contention that PPP policies are largely concerned with managing and controlling PPP 
decision making in the pre-contracting stage. Appraisal of the achievement of 
objectives in the execution stage remains largely unaddressed in the PV policies. PV 
(2003b) guidelines require a formal review of PPP projects at the end of the first year 
of operations. However, in informal discussions, Department of Treasury and Finance 
officials were surprised to be reminded of this requirement, suggesting that, in the 
absence of treasury monitoring, such reviews have not taken place. Recent Gateway 
Review initiatives (see VDTF, 2007) represent an attempt to address this imbalance. 
The Gateway Review Process is a technology designed to systematically evaluate 
discrete stages in the implementation of projects, potentially providing the 
government with the ability to systematically evaluate the achievement of PPP 
objectives. 
 
 
4.5.5 Analysis of changing policy developments 
Maguire and Malinovitch (2004) suggest that there was realignment in government 
thinking in relation to PPP objectives and their implementation as early as 1993. They 
contend that the pre-1993 period was characterised by the objective to manage 
financial risk through maximising transfer of risk to private consortia. They argue that 
the period 1993-1999 was dominated by the belief that increased private-sector 
involvement (through PPPs) could deliver efficiency gains, as demonstrated in a high 
level of risk transfer, and private-sector responsibility for full-service provision.  They 
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claim that the post-2000 policy phase is dominated by the objective of achieving 
VFM in the public interest through optimal risk transfer (Maguire and Malinovitch, 
2004, p. 28). 
 
Nevertheless, it is argued in this thesis, as contended in Paper 2, that PPP 
development and use in Victoria is more appropriately characterised by the pre- and 
post-2000 distinction. This distinction is important because it signals a significant 
change in PPP nomenclature, objectives, and approach to risk management. Also, it 
captures the significant change in the extent of private-sector responsibility for service 
delivery in the PPP model of interest to this research. 
 
 
4.6 Empirical findings: project objectives and risk management in pre- 
and post-2000 hospital contracts 
The purpose of section 4.6 is to examine contractually-based empirical evidence 
relating to the nature of changing approaches to the management of risk in the pre- 
and post-2000 periods. Section 4.6 also introduces findings that are not reported in 
Papers 2 or 3. In the absence of disclosure of pre-contracting processes and 
procedures, contracts provide evidence of PPP objectives and the intended method of 
the achievement of these objectives. Consistent with the Paper 3 analysis of the 
failure of a pre-2000 PPP hospital, the empirical examination of risk management 
strategies reported in this section also focuses on Victorian PPP hospital contracts.  
An examination of the pre-2000 Latrobe and Mildura Base Hospital [Mildura] 
contracts (accessed from the Central Register of Major Government Projects 
(Victoria) website on 8 August 2003) establishes that these two contracts are similar.  
Likewise, an examination of the post-2000 Casey Hospital [Casey] and Royal 
Women’s Hospital [Royal Women’s] contracts (accessed from the Partnerships 
Victoria website on 8 August 2003) establishes that these two contracts are similar.  
Accordingly, the La Trobe and Casey contracts were examined (as representative of 
the pre-2000 and post-2000 contracts respectively) to determine pre- and post-2000 
objectives and approaches to risk management. 
 
The pre-2000 Latrobe and Mildura PPPs include the design, financing, construction 
and maintenance of the public hospital, the delivery of core clinical services to public 
Comment [le1]:  
Comment [le2R1]:  
68 Pre-Contracting Stage Chapter 4 
 
  
patients (which are provided free of charge to public patients in public hospitals), and 
delivery of all associated services required to operate and maintain a large hospital 
and its grounds. In the case of each PPP, the consortium also received the right to 
build a private hospital on the government-owned land. The Latrobe contract provides 
for an initial term of 20 years (15 years in the Mildura contract). Both include an 
option to extend the term for an additional five years. Despite being built on crown 
land (English and Walker, 2004), there is no contractual requirement to transfer the 
two public hospitals back to the government at the end of the term. Latrobe and 
Mildura were not recognised in the relevant agency’s financial statements on 
commissioning21. The Latrobe contract was signed in 1997, and the Mildura contract 
in 1999.  
 
According to the pre-2000 La Trobe contract, the objective of arrangement was to 
provide for the operation and management of the hospital and the provision of 
services for public hospital patients to quality standards, where quality care was 
certified by the national accrediting body. In addition, clause 1 indicates that quality 
health care includes equitable access on the basis of clinical need regardless of 
financial or social circumstances; provision of effective linkages with other services 
providers for a smooth, integrated “seamless” transition between services for each 
episode of care; strategic targeting of services activity to maximise health outcomes in 
the context of demonstrated clinical needs of the region; attraction, retention and 
training of skilled and experienced professional service providers; integration of 
health promotion and education with the delivery of flexible services; and continued 
operation of the hospital within the requirements of relevant funding frameworks. 
 
A contemporaneous document (VDJ, 1996) indicates that the only risks assumed by 
the state in the pre-2000 period were government-initiated variations relating to time 
and cost in the construction period and change in demand for services (which were 
guaranteed at a certain level). Clause 39 of the Latrobe contract confirms this 
approach.  It states that the contractor accepted the entire responsibility for the costs 
and all risks of owning, operating and maintaining the hospitals, and for performing 
                                                 
21 The Victorian Auditor-General has indicated that as a result of the project to harmonise Australian 
with international accounting standards, all PPP accounting treatments have been reviewed and the 
relevant asset and associated financial obligations are now recognised in the balance sheet of relevant 
agencies (VAGO, 2006, p. 43). 
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any and all the obligations under the agreement. It is interesting to note that in 
addition to accepting the risks associated with the clinical management of the 
hospital, the contractor also accepted responsibility for changes in Commonwealth 
and state government health and funding policies, which have the potential (over long 
contracts in an environment of rapidly changing health care technology, clinical and 
patient care practices in the absence of recontracting provisions) to substantially 
increase daily per-patient costs (Broadbent et al, 2003a), apparently with no 
contractually-based mechanism (such as regular recontracting) to seek compensation.  
 
The post-2000 Casey and the Royal Women’s PPPs provide for the design, 
construction and financing of the hospital infrastructure by the private consortium for 
25 years, with no provision for term renewal. However, the principal differences are 
that the delivery of core clinical services in these hospitals is provided by the state, 
and that operator-provided service delivery is regularly recontracted, with the 
intention to market test service delivery costs and standards to ensure that VFM for 
the state is achieved. The consortia’s role in service delivery (and associated risk) is 
restricted to the provision of non-core support services such as security, car parking, a 
help desk, ground maintenance and training, thereby reducing project risks for both 
parties. Unlike the pre-2000 hospitals, the post-2000 hospitals are to be transferred 
back to the state for zero consideration at the end of their terms, and have been 
recognised in the relevant agency’s financial statements since commissioning. The 
Casey and Royal Women’s Hospital contracts were signed in 2004.  
 
Part 1 of the post-2000 Casey contract articulates two objectives in clause 2. These 
relate to project objectives and project risk. Project objectives include the 
achievement of financial VFM in the procurement of the hospital facilities. Also, the 
contractor is required to provide a facility that assists the hospital operator (the 
relevant health authority) to deliver best practice patient care and efficiency outcomes 
(in use of facilities and in operating costs). As the consortium is not responsible for 
managing the hospital or providing clinical services, its role is to enable the public 
operator to achieve financial and non-financial VFM objectives over the life of the 
project as they pertain to providing quality health care. These VFM objectives are 
detailed as the provision of an operationally efficient facility capable of meeting 
service specifications (so that the operator is able to operate within its allocated 
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budget); and provision of a hospital with sufficient capacity to meet changing needs 
over time that is capable of adapting to future needs, new technologies and clinical 
practice changes. The risk management objectives provide for the contractor to accept 
all risks associated with the cost of constructing the hospital (including interest rate 
increases) and any future changes in hospital functions.  
 
In summary, the pre-2000 policies conceal the scope of the modernisation objectives 
attached to the pre-2000 Latrobe project. Interestingly, the objectives of both pre-and 
post 2000 contracts are framed as aspiration qualitative outcomes. Differences 
between the range and scope of the objectives of the Latrobe and Casey contracts, and 
their different approaches to the management of project risk provide insights into the 
nature of change in the Victorian PPP context. The contracts confirm substantial 
changes to the PPP model over the examined period, and reflect the simplification of 
PPP objectives and the concomitant reduction of project risk in the post-2000 period. 
Also, differences in the language in the Latrobe and Casey contracts appear to 
indicate a softening in the government’s post-2000 approach to managing and 
controlling the relationship through contracting. The ramifications of these changes 
will be examined in greater detail in the next chapter. 
 
 
4.7 Empirical findings: failure of the Latrobe Hospital 
Paper 3 analyses evidence related to the risk management in the Latrobe project and 
reasons for its failure. As noted in Paper 3 (p. 294), the failure of Latrobe provides a 
case opportunity to compare ex-ante claims about anticipated VFM and the approach 
to risk management with ex-post outcomes. The evidence presented in Paper 3, which 
relies on several auditor-general reports that contained a running commentary on the 
Latrobe project22 and also on a report written subsequent to the failure by a private-
sector lobby group, Infrastructure Project Partners [IPP] (2003), augments the 
contractually-based evidence presented in section 4.6 above. 
 
 
                                                 
22 The Victorian auditor-general has not undertaken a performance audit of any PPP hospitals. As 
indicated in Paper 3, auditor-general commentary has been taken from various financial statement 
audit reports.  
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4.7.1 Determining anticipated VFM 
Paper 3: Table 15.1 Latrobe Hospital provision of public health services: summary of 
bids and estimated NPV savings (8% per cent discount rate) (p. 296) provides 
evidence that the government prepared a benchmark (using the CAPM technology as 
required in the 1994 policy) to calculate the cost of public provision of the project, 
and to quantify financial VFM and justify the choice of the successful bidder. Paper 3 
Table 15.1 indicates that the choice of contractor (‘sponsor’ in terms of Paper 3) 
appears to have been made solely on the basis of cost, suggesting that qualitative 
aspects of performance outlined in the contract were given insufficient attention in the 
Latrobe pre-contracting process, providing additional support for the contention that 
accounting treatment was the main driver of the pre-2000 hospital PPPs.  
 
Initial auditor-general ex-ante analysis of risk management in the La Trobe contract 
(VAGO, 1997, para. 8.161-2) concluded that key risks associated with the 
development and operation of the new hospital had been substantially transferred to 
the private sector.  It is interesting to note that, at the time, the auditor-general did not 
question the viability of the risk transfer arrangements or of the pre-contracting 
decision-making processes until after the failure of the arrangement.  
 
However, an auditor-general report subsequent to the failure (VAGO, 2002, para. 
3.23) suggests that the comparative analysis of the costs associated with public 
provision and the PPP option carried out by the Department was unsatisfactory. It 
does not make clear whether mandated government processes were in general 
unsatisfactory, or whether they had been applied unsatisfactorily in this instance: 
 
[A]t the time these arrangements were established, comprehensive studies had 
not been undertaken by the Department relating to costs and efficiencies 
associated with the privatisation of public hospitals or the private provision of 
public hospital services. 
 
 
Indeed, ex post the auditor-general (VAGO, 2002, para 3.22) suggested that the 
Department of Human Services had been unrealistic in its assumption that a private 
operator could extract the amount of savings nominated. In other words, the auditor-
general suggested that government officials may have been naïve in their assessment 
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of the operator’s capability of achieving the savings nominated, making acceptance of 
the bid risky for the government: 
 
… AHCL’s bid was based on the presumption that it could provide hospital 
services far more economically and efficiently than the public sector and on 
that basis it had tendered a contract price at a substantial discount (compared 
with the costs of internally providing the services). The fact that the tender 
process allowed for what proved to be an unsustainable bid price by AHCL to 
succeed is of concern. 
 
In short, in this instance, the Victorian Auditor General drew contradictory ex-ante 
and ex-post conclusions of the appropriateness of the pre-contracting processes and 
decision making in relation to the La Trobe arrangement. 
 
Additional research undertaken for this thesis suggests that the government’s 
ideological commitment to NIE-based modernisation principles may have clouded its 
appreciation of the efficiencies achieved in the management of public hospitals as a 
result of the reforms it had instigated (Duckett et al, 1999). The Duckett et al (1999) 
discussion paper reviewed sector-wide hospital-based health care and confirmed that 
reforms had resulted in competition at sub-contractor level and that competition had 
driven significant technical efficiency gains in the public metropolitan healthcare 
sector after the introduction of the casemix-funding model in 1996. Accordingly, as 
noted by the auditor-general in the quotation above, the government had raised the bar 
in terms of the efficient delivery of hospital-based care and should have been sceptical 
about whether the apparent savings (see Paper 3 Table 15.1) could be delivered by 
the successful tender.    
 
The IPP (2003) analysis of the failure indicates that unrealistic assumptions were not 
one-sided. As outlined in Paper 3, the IPP report reveals that the consortium did not 
understand the revenue implications of the casemix-funding model. The operator was 
committed to falling per-procedure funding on the basis that the model rewarded 
improvements of 1.5% with the same level of funding and penalised under 
achievement with a reduction in funding. Under the Victorian casemix model, funding 
only increases if hospitals significantly improve their performance in terms of the 
number and type of procedures they complete each year. Thus, the operator was 
committed to falling per-procedure funding in the context of having bid on the basis 
of outdated costs, and a funding model that also put significant pressure on public 
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hospital performance (VAGO, 1998), requiring public hospitals to receive significant 
on-going capital injections to keep operating (as confirmed in Paper 3).  
 
 
4.7.2 Risk management, accounting treatment and project objectives 
Analysis of the pre-2000 Latrobe contract in section 4.6 above questions Maguire and 
Malinovitch’s (2004) contention that by 1993 the state was more concerned with 
achieving efficiency gains than with managing financial risk. The blanket transfer of 
risk in the pre-2000 contracts is interpreted by Maguire and Malinovitch (2004) as the 
basis for efficiency gains.  
 
However, a review of pre-2000 contracting in Victoria (Audit Review, 2000a, p. 47) 
indicates that financial obligations were either not reported, or only reported to “the 
limited extent identified by the Auditor-General” (i.e., disclosed as a contingent 
liability), and concluded that in many cases the disclosure was inadequate given the 
government’s ultimate political obligation for service provision. The Paper 3 analysis 
of the accounting treatment of Latrobe provides additional evidence in support of this 
conclusion, and confirms, contrary to the claims of Maguire and Malinovitch (2004), 
that an important objective of pre-2000 PPP projects was to avoid the recognition of 
associated debt in the government’s financial statements. 
 
In summary, analysis by the auditor-general subsequent to the failure of Latrobe 
(VAGO, 2002) indicates that the government held unreasonable expectations of the 
private sector’s ability to produce cost efficiencies in health care delivery and that its 
pre-contracting decision-making processes and procedures were inadequate. Indeed, 
the government’s (and the operator’s) belief in the innate superiority of private-sector 
management and innovation appears to have been a contributing factor in the Latrobe 
failure.  Also, the government had accepted an unsustainable bid price due to the 
emphasis at the time on maximising risk transfer and minimising cost so as to manage 
financial risk and achieve what turned out to be unrealistic savings. Paper 3 indicates 
that the Latrobe consortium failed to comprehend the ramifications of the casemix 
funding model on contracted payments. Paper 3 provides evidence that casemix 
funding has also undercut the ability of the public hospital system to provide quality 
health care consistently over time, for which the operators of the PPP hospitals (unlike 
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their public hospital counterparts) were not compensated. Arguably, the Latrobe case 
also illustrates that there may have been insufficient dialogue and trust creation 
between the state and the bidders in the pre-contracting stage, which resulted in the 
state remaining unaware that the bidder did not fully understand the mechanics and 
ramifications of casemix funding on its revenue stream, and the implication of this 
lack of understanding on the future of the project. 
 
 
4.8 Reflective conclusion and chapter summary 
In conjunction with Chapter 5, this chapter addresses the second aim of this research, 
to analyse PPPs and their changing role as a modern procurement technology. 
Chapter 4 has continued the development of skeletal theory that began in Chapter 2. 
Chapter 4 has also begun the process of addressing the final two stages that comprise 
middle range thinking: the iterative reflexive process that allows the individual 
researcher to analyse and reflect on the meaning of the empirical data in the light of 
skeletal theory, and the refinement of skeletal theory in the light of conclusions drawn 
from the data.  
 
Chapter 4 had a number of objectives. The first was to establish PPPs within their 
economic and institutional context. Paper 2 presented evidence about the incidence 
and type of PPPs that indicated their economic importance in Australia. Also, Paper 2 
established the pre- and post-2000 distinction in the Victorian government’s approach 
to PPP management and control. Analysis in this chapter provides insights into the 
differences in the pre- and post-2000 approach to PPPs and confirms that this 
distinction facilitates analysis of change over the investigated period. Chapter 4 
focuses on decision making in the pre-contracting stage. The PPP pre-contracting 
stage is important because it establishes project objectives and understandings of 
‘success’ in the execution stage. 
 
The literature review in section 4.2 raised several themes and concerns relating to PPP 
objectives and the pre-contracting appraisal technologies designed to achieve those 
objectives. Section 4.2 indicated that the controversy surrounding PPP objectives 
reveals a possible discrepancy between stated and hidden objectives. Also, section 2.4 
raised questions about the nature and purpose of risk management and the PSC in PPP 
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pre-contracting decision making. Although the lack of disclosure of pre-contracting 
decision-making processes and procedures hinders research into intended outcomes, it 
is contended in this thesis that PPP contracts provide a window through which 
intentions and approaches can be inferred. Accordingly, Chapter 4 investigated 
possible discrepancies between stated objectives and PPP practice through an 
examination of PPP policies over time and approaches to risk management in two 
representative pre- and post-2000 hospital contracts.  
 
The empirical data presented in this chapter indicates that PPP objectives and the 
specification of risk management in the examined contracts has changed over the 
investigated period, and is reflective of changes observed in PPP policies in the pre- 
and post-2000 periods. It appears that blanket risk transfer and the lack of a 
requirement to transfer the hospital back to the public sector at the end of the term in 
the pre-2000 contracts has more to do with the management of financial risk (and the 
non-recognition of government debt) than with the espoused objective of managing 
project risk to achieve VFM, which appears to have become the dominant objective in 
the post-2000 period.  
 
The analysis of the Latrobe case confirms that an absence of trust may have 
contributed to the failure of the project. Also, it demonstrates that, despite contractual 
agreements, governments cannot walk away from their responsibility to provide social 
services to the public in a modern democracy such as Australia. The Latrobe case 
supports Paper 3’s contention that the government had not taken into account the cost 
of political risk in its pre-contracting decision making. The evidence suggests that the 
government and the consortium had miscalculated the risks associated with the pre-
2000 model and the project. The approach to risk management in the Casey contract, 
however, reveals an apparent softening of the government’s approach that is more 
aligned to the thrust of its post-2000 policies; that is, with the management of project 
risk to achieve VFM. Heald (2003) raised the question of whether PPPs evaporate, 
magnify or transfer the total amount of risk associated with PPP projects. The 
investigations in this chapter confirm that PPPs can magnify risks due to the political 
risks associated with the provision of public services (Barton, 2001).  The post-2000 
changes to the PPP model had the unstated effect of reducing the political risks 
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associated with poor service quality and failure, and, accordingly, of potentially 
increasing opportunities to reap less ambitious VFM outcomes. 
  
Section 4.5 revealed that paradoxically, as the PPP model under investigation in this 
research has become less complex and less risky for both the government and private 
consortia, pre-contracting accounting and management appraisal technologies have 
become increasingly complex and technical. The Chapter 4 examination of policy 
change suggests that the Victorian government began to subtly redefine the stated 
purpose of PPPs as the efficient procurement of services as early as 1996. This change 
in focus was accompanied by a shift to managing project risk to achieve VFM. In the 
post-2000 period the shift was underpinned by a consistently articulated raft of 
technically-based policy documents.  
 
While the ostensible purpose of these policy documents is to aid the decision-making 
processes of public officials and potential bidders and to reduce bid costs, they can 
also be interpreted as an attempt to legitimate PPP arrangements and hence the use of 
private financing to fund the construction of infrastructure. It has been suggested in 
this chapter (and in English (2005b)) that this paradox may be explained by the 
government’s need to provide an apparently technically-sound rationale and 
justification for its continuing use of PPPs in the face of growing public scepticism 
about their merit and worth, and its desire to manage and control decision-making by 
line agencies and to control the risk of failure23.  
 
An alternative explanation of the apparent gulf between policy complexity and PPP 
model simplification is the use of technical developments to disguise unstated 
objectives such as a continued commitment to the privatisation of public services 
(Newberry and Pallot, 2005). Under this interpretation, previous implementation of a 
hard-edged NIE-based approach to modernisation in the PPP setting was replaced by 
a softer and apparently less-threatening approach that appears to be more responsive 
to public concern. However, the observed post-2000 changes in approach to risk 
                                                 
23 Subsequent to the election of a new government in late 1999 three ailing pre-2000 PPPs failed. In 
addition to Latrobe, the other failures were Deer Park Prison (to be investigated in Chapter 5) and the 
Metropolitan Tram and Train Franchises (see Stanley and Hensher (2004) for an analysis of the failure 
of that project).  
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management and the introduction of the Public Interest Test (VDTF, 2000; English 
and Guthrie, 2003) may be more appropriately explained as a pragmatic example of a 
change in government philosophy that questioned the efficacy of the hard-edged NIE-
based implementation of modernisation, but not the NIE-based goals of modernisation 
per se.  
 
The analysis of PPP policies in this chapter confirms that change in the modern public 
sector may be predominantly evolutionary as opposed to revolutionary. The findings 
in this chapter appear to resonate with the observations of Modell et al (2007) and 
Jacobs et al (2007) that, despite recent (post-2000) international trend towards 
increasing reliance on output- and citizen-centred performance management (that is 
also a feature of modernisation in Australia), processes and procedures still exercise 
an important influence on central government operations. Lapsley’s (2001b) 
contention that the processes by which public organisations are reformed and become 
more modern is driven by reformers’ beliefs in the benefits of modernisation also 
appears to explain the nature of change analysed in Chapter 4. Thus, although the 
post-2000 policies appear to represent a retreat from the hard-edged NIE approach to 
modernisation, Victoria’s Department of Treasury and Finance (through PV) 
continues to dominate Victoria’s use and development of  PPPs, and its policies act to 
manage and control the pre-contracting appraisal of PPPs at agency level to achieve 
the government’s broad economic, political and social objectives. It is contended in 
this chapter that these objectives have not changed substantially since the early 1990s. 
What has changed is the manner of their implementation. This thesis now turns to 
examine the achievement of project objectives in the execution stage. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
Using Contracts to Manage and Control the Achievement of 
Modernisation Objectives in the PPP Execution Stage 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter continues the investigation of the second aim of this research, to analyse 
PPPs and their changing role as a modern procurement technology. By way of 
establishing the macro-level context, Chapter 4 presented empirical data relating to 
the incidence and types of PPPs, and argued that PPP implementation in Victoria can 
be usefully classified into two periods: pre- and post-2000.  Also, Chapter 4 
established that PPP objectives (and their use as a procurement technology) have 
changed over time. Chapter 4 provided contractually-based evidence of the effect of 
policy change on PPP objectives and approaches to risk management and VFM 
achievement. The current chapter further continues the iterative process of reflective 
interaction between skeletal theory and the empirical data that began in Chapter 3.   
 
The thesis is further progressed in Chapter 5 by examining the use of contracts to 
manage and control the achievement of modernisation objectives in the lengthy 
execution stage of PPP projects. Chapter 5 builds on the analysis in Paper 4. Paper 4 
outlines and discusses the contracting practices that have informed the governance of 
five Victorian PPP prisons commissioned between 1996 and 2007. One pre-2000 and 
one post-2000 PPP prison contract (representing five PPP projects) are examined in 
Paper 4 to determine how, in the context of a dynamic environment, they facilitate the 
governance of PPP relationships and the achievement of long term policy objectives. 
 
Appendix A: Comparison of pre- and post-2000 Victorian Prison Contracts of Paper 
4 analyses the representative contracts from the following perspectives: overview of 
objectives; approaches to risk allocation; service delivery standards; payment and 
incentive mechanisms; and management and control structures. Section 5 of Paper 4 
presents the discussion of these elements of the investigated pre- and post-2000 
contracts. Due to a relative absence of publicly-disclosed information relating to the 
post-2000 contracts, the bulk of the discussion in Paper 4 (and in this chapter) focuses 
on the pre-2000 prison contracts and their ability to manage and control service 
delivery and the PPP relationship. 
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Paper 4 Appendix A and Section 5 confirm that the effects of the post-2000 decision 
to eliminate the role of the private sector in the provision of core service delivery in 
PPPs has radically altered project objectives and reduced project risk. Changes in the 
government’s attitude towards contracting in the PPP setting, and a more pragmatic 
approach to allocating risk and dealing with the uncertainty arising in the execution 
stage, is evident in the examined post-2000 contract. For instance, the post-2000 
policies (such as PV, 2001a) recognise the existence of ‘difficult to allocate risks’ 
which gives rise to embedding a material adverse effects regime (as advocated by 
transactions cost economics [TCE]) in the post-2000 contracts. By contrast, the pre-
2000 contracts are characterised by the intention to maximise the transfer of risk to 
the operator, and are reflective of an unquestioning belief in the power of the practical 
application of NIE theories (particularly TCE) and private-sector accounting and 
management technologies to achieve desired modernisation outcomes.  
 
In relation to service standards, Section 5 of Paper 4 indicates that the quantitative 
nature of the service delivery outcomes (SDOs) in the pre-2000 contracts (which are 
outlined in Table 2: Service Delivery Outcomes (SDOs) for Deer Park, Fulham and 
Port Phillip Prisons (at contract date)) inadequately specified performance standards 
anticipated by the government. Although Section 5 provides evidence that the pre-
2000 SDO regime was subject to regular recontracting, revisions to the SDOs in 2003 
(see Table 3: Comparison Port Phillip SDOs) failed to counteract criticisms of SDO 
specification by the auditor-general (VAGO, 1999) and others (such as Kirby (2000)). 
The payment and incentive mechanisms (outlined in Table 4:Payment Details of Five 
Victorian PPP Prison Contracts) embedded in the pre-2000 contracts also failed to 
adequately penalise operators for poor performance. In relation to the management 
and control of the relationship, Appendix A and Section 5 of Paper 4 indicate that the 
representative contracts contain mechanisms to ‘discipline’ poor performance, 
including a default regime.  
 
Chapter 5 contains a considerable amount of material that adds to the Paper 4 analysis 
and conclusions. This additional material can be characterised along the following 
lines. 
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First, the Paper 4 literature review (contained in Section 2 of Paper 4) has been 
revised in section 5.2 of this chapter. These revisions challenge the power of TCE to 
explain contracting in long-term hybrid relationships. The addition of this material 
provides the basis of a richer understanding of PPP contracting than is presented in 
Paper 4. 
 
Second, in writing this dissertation, Paper 4’s analysis of the objectives of the 1993 
New Prisons Project [NPP], which is contained in Section 3 of Paper 4, was revisited. 
As a result, it became apparent that NPP had dual objectives relating, first, to 
performance associated with the PPP prisons, and, second, to their role in driving 
modernisation reform across the whole of the Victorian correctional services sector. 
Analysis of the features and implications of NPP does not receive prominence in 
Paper 4. An appreciation of the objectives of NPP now contextualises the 
examination of the PPPs undertaken in this thesis. This approach resonates with the 
perspective taken by the auditor-general (VAGO, 1999) and others (Kirby, 2000; 
OCSC, 2000) who have investigated pre-2000 prison outcomes. This gap has been 
corrected in Chapter 5 with additional material about NPP in section 5.3.  
 
Third, the systems-wide implications of NPP and the failure of the pre-2000 
contracting regime to adequately capture the qualitative aspects of service delivery 
required by NPP prompted further examination of events after 2000. Kirby (2000) and 
others (VAGO, 1999) recommended significant systems-wide reforms to support the 
implementation of NPP objectives. Indeed, following the Kirby (2000) 
recommendations, significant across-the-board reforms to the Victorian correctional 
services sector were implemented in 2001. The nature of the 2001 initiatives raises 
questions about the extent to which the rigid neo-liberal inspired pre-2000 contracting 
regime is capable of adapting to the modernisation of the management of the 
correctional services sector, prisons and prisoner management that these reforms 
required. The 2001 reforms were driven by a ‘network governance’ approach which 
emphasises consensus and cooperation in the individual case-management of 
prisoners.  This is reminiscent of the reforms to reduce long-term unemployment 
highlighted in Paper 1, as discussed in Chapter 3 of this thesis. Table 3.1 in Chapter 
3, which compares the network approach to the neo-liberal based approach to the 
modernisation of public services, indicates the two are diametrically different, 
82 Execution Stage Chapter 5 
 
  
suggesting that the pre-2000 contracts may not have the capacity to support the 
introduction of negotiated, prisoner-based solutions. 
 
Accordingly, Chapter 5 contains a great deal of additional material, much of which 
extends the analysis, findings and conclusions drawn in Paper 4. In writing Chapter 5 
an attempt has been made to clearly identify material that is taken from Paper 4 and 
from additional research that has been undertaken subsequent to its publication. 
 
The organisation of Chapter 5 proceeds as follows. Section 5.2 extends the literature 
review presented in Paper 4.  It introduces literature critical of the TCE-based 
contracting literature, providing the basis of alternative insights into empirical 
findings.. Section 5.3 of Chapter 5 introduces NPP and analyses its objectives. Section 
5.3 expands on material in Section 3 of Paper 4 and provides the frame within which 
the Chapter 5 evidence is presented and subsequent analysis is undertaken.  
 
Section 5.4 presents empirical findings in relation to the examined PPP contracts. It 
examines performance specification, payment and incentive mechanisms and 
problems associated with the pre-2000 contractually-based default regime. 
Accordingly, section 5.4 expands on the analysis and discussion presented in Section 
5 of Paper 4.  
 
Section 5.5 presents revised empirical findings and analysis relating to the 
achievement of NPP modernisation objectives over an eleven-year period. Section 5.6 
presents the reflective conclusion and chapter summary. 
 
 
5.2 Literature review: the use of contracting in a PPP setting 
The following literature review extends the literature review findings presented in 
Paper 4. Additional material is drawn from empirical studies of long-term hybrid 
relationships in private and PPP settings that are critical of the power of TCE to 
explain contracting practices. 
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5.2.1 Insights from transactions cost economics 
Chapter 2 and Paper 1 indicated that TCE has influenced contracting practices 
associated with the drive to modernise public-sector procurement in Australia. TCE 
suggests that contracts can be used to manage and control agency problems associated 
with contracting out service delivery. As argued in Paper 4, from a TCE perspective, 
contracts are used to specify and manage performance and incentive mechanisms, and 
to control the resolution of uncertainty in order to reduce transactions costs in the 
execution stage. 
 
In the PPP context, which is characterised by lengthy contracts that magnify the 
potentially negative effects of uncertainty on the achievement of VFM objectives, 
there is a need to actively manage risk (particularly as risk management is the basis of 
VFM achievement in the execution stage (PV, 2006)). In the Victorian PPP setting (as 
in the UK) the management of risk occurs through contract-based mechanisms, 
including regular market testing (recontracting) of the service elements of PPP 
contracts (Broadbent et al, 2003a). Recontracting provides a window for both parties 
to periodically reassess VFM/profitability, and to recalibrate agreements about the 
financial and non-financial parameters of service delivery.  
 
TCE is founded on the premise that transactions for goods and services can be 
distinguished by their coordinating and control mechanisms, by varying abilities to 
adapt to unanticipated events, and the desire to minimise transactions costs and reduce 
overall project costs (Williamson, 1991; 2005). As indicated in Paper 4, section 2, 
transactions costs are related to the inability to control for bounded rationality, 
opportunistic behaviour and asset specificity. These variables can increase costs in the 
execution stage because of the need to resolve uncertainty, which cannot be perfectly 
anticipated or eliminated, resulting in incomplete contracting. TCE indicates that 
incomplete contracting forces parties to engage in ‘gap-filling’ in the execution stage. 
Williamson (1991) suggests that transactions costs in long-term hybrid contracts may 
be mediated by elastic contracting mechanisms which establish a framework (such as 
dispute resolution procedures) to cost-effectively promote gap-filling (i.e., by 
specifying how to resolve problems that arise from incomplete contracting, 
opportunism and asset specificity). 
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5.2.2 Critiques of TCE24 
Recently, however, the TCE framework has been deemed inadequate to explain 
contracting in complex long-term hybrid relationships in private-sector settings. 
Tomkins (2001, p. 177) questions the agency role of contracts when he notes that “the 
major value of contracting may lie in it being a device to set down goals and methods 
to enable mutual planning, rather than being primarily an ex-post control device”. 
Mouritsen and Thrane (2006) and Dekker (2004) suggest that structural and 
functional approaches such as TCE are unable to explain the ways in which hybrid 
relations are constructed and governed. Cooper and Slagmulder (2004) contend that 
the emergence of hybrid forms makes relationships more complicated than 
contemplated by TCE. Also in a private-sector setting, Van der Meer-Kooistra and 
Vosselman (2000) have extended the TCE hybrid model to take into account 
embedded social factors, indicating that trust between the parties is necessary to 
guarantee continuity, and to retain the economic advantages to all parties of 
outsourcing in long-term hybrid relationships.  
 
In a PPP setting, Broadbent et al (2003a; 2004a) have also challenged TCE’s ability to 
explain observed contracting outcomes. They argue that because it is a (theoretically-
based) heuristic model and not empirically based, TCE is unable to adequately 
explain the management and control of PPPs, underscoring one of the major 
contributions of Paper 4 and this chapter, which provide empirical evidence of PPP 
contracting practices. Broadbent et al (2004a) argue that if the PPP contracting regime 
is to successfully replace the essentially bureaucratic relationships that exist in the 
public sector, the development of goodwill trust and ‘relational contracting’ is 
necessary. They argue (2004b, p. 61) that the TCE bias towards economic analysis of 
contract law is misplaced in a public-sector setting because: 
We need to ask the question as to whether PFI contracts have the capacity to 
become relational contracts. That is a contract that is geared towards defining 
the boundaries of the relationship that seeks to clarify a framework in which it 
can be seen how changes might be dealt with. It is based on notions of 
regulatory law … and thus seeks to provide a framework in which social 
relations can develop autonomously rather than be pre-defined to bring about a 
particular end. 
 
                                                 
24 This section augments the analysis in Paper 4. 
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In the Broadbent et al (2003a; 2004b) analysis, the TCE concept of bounded 
rationality refers to something that has not been anticipated, whereas “presentiation” 
(Broadbent et al, 2003a, p. 176) refers to the recognition in legal terms that 
contractors are aware of certain types of unanticipated events and provide a process in 
the contract for their ex-post resolution. This is based not on gap-filling and elastic 
contracting mechanisms written into the contract (as envisaged by TCE), but on 
reflexive social relations that are enabled and interrelate in complex ways. These 
social relations are facilitated by the contracting process, thereby stimulating the 
development of goodwill trust and relational contracting, which they characterise as 
“a consciously co-operative working relationship” (Broadbent et al, 2004a, pp. 59-
61). Relational contracting is also in the long-term interests of private partners who 
are committed to a long-term capital investment (Spackman, 2002). 
 
Froud (2003) has questioned the capacity of PPP contracts to become relational and 
effectively facilitate the management and control of future uncertainty. Broadbent et 
al (2003a), however, maintain that residual risk in a PPP setting is the result of the 
inability to eliminate or allocate uncertainty (the shared risks) through contracting, 
and that the development of goodwill trust is necessary for its resolution. It is 
interesting to note that relational contracting appears to share some of the features of 
network governance as identified in Table 3.1 (of Chapter 3). In both cases the role of 
institutional arrangements and contracts with government is to establish a framework 
within which the development of trust and negotiation are facilitated.  
 
Busco et al (2006, p. 17) defines trust as “a mechanism that can reduce uncertainty in 
contexts of interaction and facilitate the functioning of organisational systems through 
the behaviour of social actors”. Dekker (2004, p. 46) concludes that although 
managing appropriation concerns resulting from opportunistic behaviour can be an 
important objective of control in hybrid contracting, “trust in a partner’s goodwill and 
capabilities may strongly influence the strength of association between the 
relationship’s control problems and the use of control mechanisms”.   
 
Mouritsen and Thrane (2006) view trust as a problematising device that is closely 
aligned with interpreting and implementing various kinds of management accounting 
information. Busco et al (2006) and Dekker (2004) also suggest that management 
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accounting can play a significant role in the development of trust in new relationships 
(such as PPPs) that are forged on the premise of changing an existing culture. 
Similarly, Broadbent et al (2003a, p. 185) acknowledge the role of management 
accounting in the development of relational contracting through making visible the 
relationship between the parties, in demonstrating how control is operationalised, and 
in providing a means to measure the notion of VFM. Imperfect quantitative 
performance specification, monitoring and control mechanisms in PPP contracts, and 
the need to accommodate the effects of unanticipated events (uncertainty) inevitably 
impact the risk allocations agreed in the pre-contracting stage, resulting (in the 
execution stage) in negotiated (essentially qualitative) refinements to understandings 
of performance standards and payment streams, and what constitutes VFM 
(Broadbent et al, 2008).  
 
However, in the PPP context, Broadbent et al (2003a, p. 184) suggest there may be a 
contradiction between the demands of achieving efficiency, and of the need to 
develop goodwill to manage a long-term relationship in an essentially bureaucratic 
(public-sector) system. Also, Broadbent et al (2003a) note that although risk 
assessment is central to pre-contracting project appraisal, they observed no explicit 
attempt (by the investigated NHS Trust) to seek to evaluate whether the required risk 
transfers had been achieved. Instead, the (management-accounting specified) contract-
based performance monitoring procedures were used as a surrogate mechanism to 
manage risk. 
 
In conclusion, recent literature has deemed TCE inadequate in the private-sector and 
PPP settings to explain contracting in complex hybrid relationships because of its 
failure to take into account the importance of social interactions in making these 
relationships work over the long term. Relational contracting requires the 
development of goodwill trust. Field-based research (see, for instance, Mouritsen and 
Thrane, 2006; Busco et al, 2006 and Van der Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman, 2000) 
suggests that goodwill trust is developed through the need to negotiate mutual 
understandings of the practical meaning and implementation of the accounting and 
management technologies embedded in contracts that manage and control 
performance specification.  
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In summary, this review of recent literature suggests that development of goodwill 
trust and of relational contracting are not based on gap-filling and elastic contracting 
mechanisms (as envisaged by TCE), but on reflexive social relations that lead 
contractual parties to a conscious willingness to negotiate and compromise.  This 
outcome appears questionable given the hard-edged approach to risk transfer that is 
characteristic of the pre-2000 PPP contracts examined in this thesis. 
 
 
5.3 Empirical findings: objectives of the five Victorian PPP prison 
contracts 
This section expands on the analysis in section 3 of Paper 4, which outlines the 
institutional-level policy context that shaped the PPP prison projects. Section 3 of 
Paper 4 alludes to the New Prisons Project [NPP] (on page 15), the objectives and 
outcomes of which are examined in greater detail in additional research undertaken 
for this thesis and reported in section 5.3.  Accordingly, section 5.3 adds to the 
analysis contained in Paper 4 by further elucidating and reflecting on the 
ramifications of the modernisation objectives of the pre- and post-2000 PPP contracts.   
 
 
5.3.1 Objectives of pre-2000 contracts 
Paper 4 (section 3, p.15) indicates that, prior to the execution of the three pre-2000 
PPP prison contracts, significant changes occurred at the systems-level to facilitate 
their introduction and to clarify their objectives. However, section 3 of Paper 4 fails 
to highlight sufficiently that the three pre-2000 PPPs (the Metropolitan Women’s 
Correctional Centre [Deer Park], Port Phillip Prison [Port Phillip] and the Fulham 
Correctional Centre [Fulham]) had two broad objectives under the 1993 NPP. 
 
First, the financial VFM objective is categorised as the achievement of cost savings in 
the delivery of prison infrastructure and custodial services in PPP prisons and, 
through the introduction of sector-wide competition between the publicly and 
privately managed prisons, throughout the correctional-services sector. In terms of 
financial VFM, NPP intended to drive competition in the management of correctional 
services by extending the PPP contracting framework, including the contractually-
based management accounting control technologies (such as performance 
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specification, monitoring and payment for results) across the publicly managed prison 
system. 
 
Second, the non-financial VFM objective was to transform (modernise) all aspects of 
correctional services management throughout the state’s (privately- and publicly-
managed) prison system. Its purpose was to improve the treatment and rehabilitation 
of prisoners (Kirby, 2000; VAGO, 1999; VDJ, 1996), and embraced across-the-board 
improvements in housing and educating prisoners. These non-financial VFM 
objectives were primarily established in the Performance Management System [PMS] 
which formed part of the Project Brief (VDJ, 1996) and are reproduced in Appendix 
A to the pre-2000 contracts and reflected in the objectives and body of the pre-2000 
contracts (see Appendix A: Comparison of pre- and post- 2000 Victorian Prison 
Contracts in Paper 4).  
 
NPP modernisation objectives are characterised as financial and non-financial for 
analytical purposes. It is recognised that this distinction does not adequately reflect 
the interdependence of these concepts, which are more complex than the analysis in 
this chapter suggests. The term ‘non-financial VFM’ has been adopted to draw 
attention to the fact that, contrary to assertions in the literature (see, for instance, 
Froud, 2003), PPPs can have significant non-financial objectives. 
 
To support the implementation of these dual financial and non-financial 
modernisation objectives, the public choice theory [PCT] principle of function 
separation to replicate private-sector governance functions (Trebilcock, 1995) was 
implemented within the Department of Justice. The public prisons were managed by a 
new unit known as CORE25. An Office of Correctional Services Commissioner 
[OCSC] was established to monitor and report (to the Minister26) on service provision 
across the system, and to provide policy advice. Also, a Contracts Management 
Branch was established to manage the contractually-based relationship between the 
Department and the 13 public and private prison operators.  
 
 
                                                 
25 As far as can be ascertained, CORE is not an acronym, but was the name given to the division in the 
Victorian Department of Justice charged with managing the publicly-managed prisons. 
26 With the exception of OCSC (2000), OCSC reports are not publicly available in Victoria. 
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5.3.2 Objectives of post-2000 contracts 
In keeping with the significant changes to Victorian PPP policies and objectives 
outlined in Chapter 4, the intention to reduce and more effectively manage and control 
project risk is reflected in two post-2000 contracts. The significantly less-ambitious 
objectives of the post-2000 prisons are outlined in the Recitals (objectives) to the 
contract in Appendix A of Paper 4. As indicated in Paper 4 (page 17), the role of the 
operator is restricted to designing, constructing and financing the facility, and to 
providing accommodation, maintenance and security systems services. Essentially, 
the role of the PPP operator in these post-2000 arrangements is to construct the prison 
and to provide selected services (outside the perimeter of the publicly managed 
prison) which support and facilitate the delivery of correctional services by public 
service personnel. 
 
 
5.4 Empirical findings: performance specification in pre- and post-2000 
contracts 
Performance specification in the two representative pre- and post-2000 contracts is 
analysed in Section 5 and Appendix A of Paper 4. Section 5 of Paper 4 analyses the 
pre- and post-2000 contracts from the perspective of the key contractual elements 
designed to facilitate the achievement of stated objectives. However, as noted above, 
the role and achievement of the pre-2000 contracts in promoting the 1993 NPP 
objectives are less thoroughly examined in Paper 4. Sections 5.4 and 5.5 of this 
chapter respectively correct this imbalance. In relation to the pre-2000 contracts, 
section 5.4 provides empirical evidence on contractual specification of performance 
and on the problems associated with managing performance and implementing default 
mechanisms. Also, section 5.4 outlines contractual performance specification in the 
post-2000 contracts.  The purpose of section 5.5 is to provide empirical evidence 
about the achievement of financial and non-financial VFM objectives of the pre-2000 
contracts. The investigation of contract specification and achievement of financial and 
non-financial VFM objectives of the pre-2000 arrangements is undertaken over an 
eleven-year period (1996-2007). There is, unfortunately, insufficient publicly-
available evidence to examine VFM achievement in the post-2000 contracts. 
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Analysis in sections 5.4 and 5.5 of this chapter is sourced from Paper 4 augmented by 
material from the following four reports: VAGO (1999); Audit Review (2000b); 
Kirby (2000); and OCSC (2000).  There reports are hereafter referred to in this 
chapter as VAGO, Audit Review, Kirby, and OCSC respectively. Additional material 
presented in section 5.5 relating to the achievement of the NPP’s non-financial VFM 
objectives after 2000 is sourced from two auditor-general reports (VAGO, 2003; 
2007a) and two Department-commissioned reports (Birgden and McLachlan, 2004; 
Graffam et al, 2005), which investigate the implementation of 2001 reforms designed 
to reduce the rate of prisoner re-offending.  
 
The primary reason for relying on these eight reports is that they analyse the 
achievement of the objectives of the three pre-2000 Victorian PPPs within a policy 
context.  This is important for a number of reasons. For instance, ignoring the 
objectives of NPP leads Andrew (2007, p. 4) to conclude that government policy 
“focused largely on cost-effectiveness rather than service quality”. Andrew’s (2007) 
review of eight PPP prisons in five Australian states also overlooks the subtle 
contextual differences (inevitable in the Australian federal system), which result from 
changing policies over time and place, and which give rise to different approaches and 
outcomes in different states. As a result, her analysis assumes that observed outcomes 
in one jurisdiction are applicable to all. As this thesis has demonstrated, changes in 
context over time, even within one jurisdiction, cannot be ignored in analyses of 
PPPs. For instance, in relation to Victoria, Andrew (2007) ignores information 
provided by VAGO and Kirby about the comparative performance of privately and 
publicly-managed prisons, thereby failing to place the evaluation of the performance 
of PPP prisons within its broader institutional context.  
 
Features of the contractual arrangements of the three pre-2000 prisons (Deer Park, 
Port Phillip and Fulham), and the two post-2000 prisons (the Margoneet Correctional 
Centre [Ravenhall] and the Metropolitan Correctional Centre [Lara]) are outlined in 
Paper 4, Table 1 Contractual Characteristics. This table reveals details of the scope 
of the pre- and post-2000 contracts.  Paper 4, Table 4: Payment Details of Five 
Victorian PPP Prison Contracts provides details of the contractually-based payment 
and incentives mechanisms. The original version of the pre-2000 service delivery 
outcomes [SDOs] are contained in Paper 4, Table 2: Service Delivery Outcomes 
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[SDOs] for Deer Park, Fulham and Port Phillip Prisons.  Paper 4, Table 3: 
Comparison of Port Phillip SDOs provides a comparison of the original 1996 SDOs 
and 2003 SDOs (for one item, prison escapes) that resulted from the first round of 
recontracting of the pre-2000 arrangements. The analysis and discussion in sub-
sections 5.4.1 and 5.4.2 builds on this material in Paper 4, and on the additional 
empirical findings presented below. 
 
 
5.4.1 Contractual specification of performance: pre-2000 contracts 
Section 5 of Paper 4 reveals that the original pre-2000 SDOs (as outlined in Table 2 
of Paper 4) were quantitative, and that performance achievement determined the 
annual Performance Linked Fee [PLF] (the operator’s return on equity).  As indicated 
in Table 2 of Paper 4, the SDOs attempted to encapsulate both VFM and sector 
modernisation objectives. However, the pre-2000 SDOs have been criticised by 
VAGO and two government commissioned reports (Audit Review and Kirby) on a 
number of grounds. Notably, the SDOs fail to capture the qualitative elements of 
performance (devised to achieve non-financial VFM) that are outlined in the 1993 
NPP, in the PMS (which was to be introduced across the correctional sector (VDJ, 
1996)), the Operating Manual, and in Appendix A to the contracts (see, also, 
Appendix A, Paper 4). The primary purpose of the PMS was to operationalise the non-
financial aspects of the NPP.  
 
The capacity of consortia to integrate the prison management principles captured in 
the PMS into their bids was an evaluation criterion of the PPP project brief (VDJ, 
1996, p. 13), suggesting that the contractors should have had an appreciation of the 
Department’s understanding of required standards. The PMS, which was intended to 
drive the non-financial VFM objectives of the 1993 reforms, contains detailed quality 
specifications in relation to the key NPP objectives of containing and supervising 
prisoners in a safe, secure, humane and just manner; providing opportunities for 
rehabilitation to prepare prisoners for law-abiding and productive participation in the 
community on release; and facilitating reparation to the community through work 
performed in prison. Also, the contractors were expected to outline in detail how the 
achievement of these qualitative requirements was to be achieved in the Operating 
Manual. The Operating Manual was signed off by the Department, suggesting that the 
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two parties had reached a mutually negotiated understanding of the meaning of the 
PMS specifications and how they were to be achieved prior to commencement of the 
operating stage.27 
 
Nevertheless, the VAGO, Audit Review and Kirby reports also confirm that these 
qualitative requirements, although subject to continuous prison-based monitoring by 
the OCSC, were not directly related to the contractually-based payment incentive 
scheme (i.e., the PLF). Accordingly, the quantitative pre-2000 SDOs inadequately 
reflect all key aspects of the prison operators’ performance (VAGO, para. 7.36; Audit 
Review, p. 23). In addition, the mechanics of SDO linkage to the PLF meant that it 
was possible for a contractor performing poorly in a number of key areas to still 
receive the full amount (or a substantial proportion of) the annual PLF; and that the 
system potentially provided incentives for the under-reporting of incidents (Audit 
Review, p. 21). Also, VAGO (para. 7.72) noted that financial penalties had been 
minimal in terms of total contract value even though identified deficiencies remained 
unaddressed for long periods, and resulted in significant expense to the government in 
terms of OCSC monitoring.  
 
Paper 4, Table 3 reveals that the recontracting provisions in the pre-2000 contracts 
provided the Department with an opportunity to formally renegotiate the SDOs. 
However, Table 3 also indicates that although some refinement to the SDOs was 
possible, the scope of change was limited.  The renegotiated SDOs failed to include 
qualitative indicators and to recalibrate the link between the SDOs and the PLF (as 
recommended by the VAGO, Audit Review, and Kirby reports). Thus, the mismatch 
between stated modernisation objectives and the contractually-based payment and 
incentive scheme embedded in the pre-2000 contracts seems to remain largely 
immune to substantive change. The problems associated with performance 
measurement and monitoring also seem to have complicated the 2006 recontracting 
negotiations with one of the pre-2000 operators. These negotiations required a 
prolonged extension of the recontracting period to facilitate a mutually-acceptable 
outcome.  Accordingly, it appears that the pre-2000 contracts constrain the facilitation 
of problem solving. 
                                                 
27 The Operating Manual was developed during the design and construction stage (i.e., prior to 
commissioning). 
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5.4.2 Problems associated with managing operator performance and 
implementing default mechanisms: pre-2000 contracts 
Performance risk (which was identified by Kirby as the primary risk associated with 
the PPP prisons and is identified as sponsor risk in Paper 3) is further illustrated by 
additional problems encountered by the government in managing and controlling 
operator performance standards at Port Phillip and Deer Park.  
 
Problems with accommodation services and correctional services at Port Phillip 
resulted in a Default Notice (VAGO, 2001), and in the Kirby inquiry (Kirby, p. 3). 
However, it was Deer Park that ultimately failed on 2 November 2000, after receiving 
three Default Notices that year relating to performance standards. The OCSC report 
into the Deer Park failure indicates that problems at the prison had begun to emerge in 
1999, with an increase in the number of adverse incidents relating to security, prisoner 
management and safety. The report also provides ample evidence of OCSC 
difficulties in establishing the primary cause of identified problems, and in persuading 
the contractor (and the Contracts Management Branch) to fully comprehend and 
acknowledge the extent and implications of contractual obligations in relation to 
prison management.  Furthermore, the OCSC report into Deer Park’s compliance with 
its contractual obligations and the PMS also provides insights into the difficulties the 
OCSC encountered in managing and controlling operator performance.  
 
The OCSC report catalogues the repeated efforts it made throughout 2000 to rectify 
poor performance at Deer Park. The Deer Park saga confirms that in the event of 
unsatisfactory performance, the government had difficulty in enforcing the contract 
due to a lack of clarity concerning the rights and obligations of parties, and in dispute 
resolution and default processes. It also supports Kirby and VAGO criticisms of 
structural weaknesses (particularly in relation to the establishment and funding of the 
OCSC) in the institutional framework established to implement NPP. 
 
 
5.4.3 Contractual specification in the post-2000 contracts 
Changes in the Victorian government’s post-2000 PPP perspectives are reflected in 
the less ambitious objectives of the Lara and Ravenhall contracts (as outlined in 
Appendix A of Paper 4). Also, the contracts reflect the TCE-inspired post-2000 
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policies intended to facilitate dispute resolution and to foster the partnership 
relationship.  For instance, Paper 4 (pp. 21-22) highlights a more circumspect 
approach to risk management, the introduction of a contractually-based material 
adverse effects regime (including provisions for sharing risks and rewards arising 
from uncertainty) and pro-active efforts to promote the development of trust between 
the partners in the post-2000 contracts (as recommended by PV, 2003a; b; 2006). 
 
Section 5 of Paper 4 also provides an interesting insight into the Victorian 
government’s attempts to achieve financial VFM through controlling for uncertainty 
in post-2000 PPPs. For instance, page 22 of Paper 4 reveals the explicit role the 
financial model (prepared by the consortium as a key component of its bid) plays in 
managing and controlling the financial effects of negotiated changes to the contract to 
preserve anticipated financial VFM in the execution stage. The financial model 
provides details of operator-anticipated revenues and costs (and therefore of operator 
profitability) that the Department uses (in the five-year period preceding and during 
recontracting) to monitor costs to ensure that associated risks are not inadvertently 
transferred back to the state. Monthly monitoring by the Department of the effect of 
changes in costs on financial model specifications is diametrically opposed to 
Broadbent et al’s (2003a) observation that the NHS Trust did not appear to overtly 
seek to evaluate whether required risk transfers had been achieved. 
 
In addition, the post-2000 contracts provide for a targeted and pro-active project 
management regime that is intended to ensure the achievement of project objectives, 
facilitate early detection of problems, and to promote the development of trust (PV, 
2003a).  An edited version of a monthly Ravenhall facilities management report 
(Ravenhall FM Report, 2006) prepared by the operator28 indicates that the 
performance monitoring system remains under continuous review. Agreed SDOs are 
monitored throughout annual cycles and are subject to yearly renegotiation. This 
approach appears to acknowledge the value of facilitating continuous finetuning of 
SDO specifications so that they more accurately reflect ongoing change in a dynamic 
environment.  This dynamic environment is the result of changing influences on the 
public and private sector partners.  The SDOs require finetuning so that they cater for 
the potentially conflicting objectives of the public-sector prison management team 
                                                 
28 Provided by the Department of Justice. 
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(whose objectives change as correctional services philosophy and policy change) and 
the private contractor, whose role it is to deliver essential support services profitably.  
It is tempting to conclude that this new flexibility reflects learning from problems 
associated with SDO specification in the pre-2000 contracts, and recognises the need 
to facilitate the development of goodwill as recommended (PV, 2003a).   
 
 
5.5 Empirical findings: achievement of financial and non-financial VFM 
objectives: pre-2000 contracts 
Audit Review (p. 14) and the auditor-general (VAGO, para. 4.25) confirm that one of 
the main objectives of prison privatisation was to transfer design, construction, 
financing and operating risk to the private sector to achieve financial and non-
financial VFM (as outlined in section 5.3 of this chapter). Despite the PPP contracts 
appearing to provide ample means of ensuring accountability to the Contracts 
Management Branch and to the OCSC through contractually-based monitoring 
arrangements to verify compliance with a range of requirements included in the 
contracts (VAGO, para. 7.61), poor contractual specification hindered the 
management and control of some critical performance outcomes, as outlined below.  
 
 
5.5.1 Achievement of financial VFM 
From the perspective of the achievement of financial VFM, Audit Review (p. 18) 
confirms that the three pre-2000 PPP prisons were constructed for 20 percent less than 
the benchmark cost. Despite criticisms of the benchmark calculations, Audit Review 
(p. 18) concluded that the pre-2000 prisons had been good financial deals for the state. 
The Victorian auditor-general (VAGO, 1996, para. 8.88 – 8.106) indicated that 
projected operating savings over the lives of the three pre-2000 prisons were in the 
order of $16m (Deer Park), $157m (Fulham) and $62m (Port Phillip). The 1999 
performance audit into the implementation of NPP compared three similar publicly-
operated prisons with the three PPP prisons (VAGO, para. 7.88). It indicates that 
average daily operating costs at the private facilities were significantly less than those 
in the comparable prisons run by CORE29. Audit Review confirms that daily costs 
                                                 
29 VAGO’s assessment has not been collaborated by Audit Review (p. 49), which suggests the 
opposite. The difference in these conclusions appears to be related to the basis of comparison. VAGO 
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were trending down at the private prisons (possibly due to the effects of new building 
design changes (Spackman, 2002) or management and technological innovations 
(Maguire and Malinovitch, 2004)). Nevertheless, VAGO, Kirby and Audit Review 
agree that there were difficulties (due to, for example, prisoner mix, numbers, and 
facility design) in comparing costs of the publicly and privately managed prisons, and 
that such comparisons may not be reliable. Information about cost savings relating to 
the post-2000 PPPs is not publicly available. 
 
 
5.5.2 Achievement of non-financial VFM 
In relation to the achievement of non-financial VFM (that is the modernisation of 
prison service delivery across the state to improve the treatment, housing, education 
and rehabilitation of prisoners), all three reports (VAGO, Kirby and Audit Review) 
indicate that although the private contractors encountered significant difficulties in 
performing to standards acceptable to the state, similar problems were also 
encountered in the state-run prisons.  
 
The VAGO report examined the extent to which non-financial sector-wide 
modernisation objectives had been achieved. It found that a completely level playing 
field (between publicly and privately managed prisons) had not been created by 1999.  
The introduction of competition within the correctional services sector had been one 
of the primary objectives of NPP. However, VAGO noted differences in the 
contractual framework governing the public and private prisons, with the public 
prisons not being subject to the same degree of monitoring, or to reductions in 
payments through the lack of a performance linked fee. Nevertheless, Audit Review 
(p. 3) (confirming the assessment of the auditor-general in the VAGO report) noted 
that the presence of private operators had led to a form of “competition by 
comparison” which had helped to improve the management of prisons and the 
delivery of correctional services across the system, suggesting that some elements of 
the non-financial aspects of the NPP modernisation reforms had been achieved across 
the sector by 1999. Indeed, confirming the findings of Spackman (2002), the VAGO 
                                                                                                                                            
compared three ‘similar’ public prisons with the three PPP prisons. However, Audit Review compared 
the daily costs of all Victorian prisons with costs at the three PPP prisons. As Audit Review notes 
(p.19), the public cohort includes ‘open’ prisons which are generally less expensive to run (and would 
explain the relatively low daily costs of the public prisons) than the PPP prisons. 
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report acknowledged that the development of SDOs, the PMS and the benchmarking 
of PPP performance and costs against the costs of public provision in the pre-
contracting stage had resulted in increased accountability of examined service public 
and private providers, and had the potential to further improve the quality of services 
across the system. The Audit Review and Kirby reports endorsed these findings and 
confirmed the difficulties facing the Department in implementing the NPP reforms 
across the system that had been identified in VAGO. 
 
Although Kirby had significant concerns about the operations of Deer Park (which are 
elaborated on in OCSC and preceded its default), it nevertheless considered that a 
number of the programs and practices established at Fulham and Port Phillip deserved 
recognition. It acknowledged that Port Phillip is a particularly difficult prison to 
manage, given the profile of its prisoners30, and the substantial prisoner movements at 
that prison, commenting favourably on the introduction of quality program initiatives. 
It also is clear that Kirby regarded the management, programs and facilities at Fulham 
(an easier prison to manage than Port Phillip due to prisoner type and mix) as 
excellent.  
Indeed, the Kirby review identified poor management (by the Department) of the 
corrections system at all levels, variable interpretations of case management, poor 
information management systems and the under-resourcing of the OCSC, as major 
problems in addition to those relating to inadequacies in the performance monitoring 
model, and in staff training and prisoner programs. Interestingly, for a review 
ostensibly into the management and operation of the three PPP prisons, the Kirby (p. 
5) findings confirmed that some problems faced by the private operators were beyond 
their control: 
When considering the performance of the State’s prison system (both public 
and private prisons) it is important to recognise that the system’s management 
is affected by a number of factors beyond the prisons’ control. Changes to the 
law, law enforcement and sentencing policy, reflecting (as they may) changes 
in society and community expectations, have led to increasing prisoner 
numbers and rates of imprisonment. In turn, this has resulted in overcrowding 
in the State’s prisons and a higher number of prisoner movements. Both these 
results give rise to significant additional difficulties for prison management. 
   
 
                                                 
30 Referred to as “the worst of the worst” by Departmental officials. 
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The Kirby report (Chapter 8) recognised that the systems-wide modernisation reform 
embodied in NPP was an ongoing process. Specifically, Kirby recommended the 
integration of the private and public prisons into one seamless system through 
changes to structural arrangements to ensure that the public prisons were subject to 
the same (or similar) management and control systems that applied to the privately 
managed prisons (as recommended by VAGO, Part 8).  Furthermore, to support 
improved performance in all of the state’s prisons, Kirby recommended the 
development of negotiated collaborative approaches (involving prisoners and 
custodial staff) to sharing information and designing and implementing programs for 
the security, safety and rehabilitation of prisoners.  
 
The Kirby report recognised that additional modernisation reform was required to 
meet NPP objectives, and that such outcomes may depend on the adoption of a very 
different management model to that espoused by TCE and agency theory.  These 
theories are premised on the assumption that increased competition and contractually-
based service specification, incentive and reward and monitoring systems are capable 
of driving behavioural change. Kirby recommended a series of quality reviews to 
comprehensively evaluate the overall performance of each individual prison, 
including the quality of its management and the effectiveness of its correctional 
services in relation to individual prisoners and their rehabilitation.  
 
Following the Kirby report, in 2001 the Department adopted the Corrections Long 
Term Management Strategy encompassing further reforms to the delivery of 
correctional services in Victoria (Graffam et al, 2005), which included attempts to 
reduce re-offending rates. Graffam et al (2005, pp. 40-41) provide an indication of the 
change in management culture that these reforms entailed: 
The program model calls for a high degree of interaction among stakeholder 
groups. The model suggests collaboration between employment consultants 
and Corrections Victoria location personnel in relation to referrals, 
registrations, client progress, and outcomes. Clients are expected to maintain 
contact and communicate with both employment consultants and Corrections 
staff [including those at Fulham, which participated in the pilot program] … 
Provider managers and employment consultants are expected to interact with 
relevant service providers in relation to advocacy and referrals to other needed 
services. 
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Subsequent performance audit reports into aspects of the 2001 reforms (VAGO, 2003; 
a) indicate that, as envisaged by Kirby (p. 107), reform to the prison system is an 
organic collaborative and negotiated process that continues to change as new needs 
are identified. Although these policies were implemented with extensive staff 
consultation and a strategic approach to managing the change process, the auditor-
general’s initial review of their implementation (VAGO, 2003) found (over a year 
into the reform process) that the Department had failed to manage the change process 
effectively, including a failure to implement the policies strategically. However, later 
Department-commissioned reports (Birgden and McLachlan, 2004 and Graffam et al, 
2005) suggest that these reforms were beginning to achieve their desired outcomes. 
 
Indeed, by 2007 the auditor-general reported (VAGO, 2007a) that considerable 
progress had been made. Offender management and monitoring practice in Victoria’s 
prisons has improved, and progress is being made towards ensuring that all eligible 
prisoners receive a formal risk and needs assessment.  Rehabilitation programs 
addressing offending behaviour have been fully developed and partially 
implemented31. Of particular interest to the concerns of this thesis, VAGO (2007a) 
noted that reforms have been implemented on a systems-wide basis. The VAGO 
(2007a) report confirms that the introduction of the reforms to reduce prisoner re-
offending has been successful (with re-offending falling from 42.5 percent in 2001-2 
to 36.5 percent in 2005-6 (VAGO, 2007a, p. 19)). It indicates that this success has 
been achieved through inclusive change management strategies that actively 
encourage prison management and custodial staff involvement in devising and 
implementing the 2001 reforms (VAGO, 2007a, p. 26), which Birgden and 
McLachlan (2004) confirm have been supported by additional funding.  
  
 
                                                 
31 VAGO (2007a) notes that although considerable progress had occurred in relation to the re-offending 
reforms has been made, there are still some outstanding implementation issues. 
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5.6 Reflective conclusion and chapter summary 
In conjunction with Chapter 4, the purpose of Chapter 5 has been to investigate the 
second aim of this thesis: to analyse PPPs and their changing role as a modern 
procurement technology. By way of establishing the context, Chapter 4, which 
focussed on the pre-contracting stage, presented empirical evidence about the 
incidence, cost and type of Australian PPPs, and identified changes to the features of 
the pre- and post-2000 PPP model of interest to this thesis. Chapter 4 addressed the 
second aim of the thesis through an analysis of PPP policies over the period 1991-
2007. This analysis was supported by an investigation of representative pre- and post- 
2000 hospital contracts. Also, a case study of the failure of the pre-2000 Latrobe PPP 
provided insights into the failure of pre-contracting processes and procedures to 
achieve project objectives. 
 
Chapter 5 has investigated how PPP contracts have been used to manage and control 
the PPP relationship to achieve project objectives in the execution stage. Examination 
of two contracts (and other documentation) representative of five Victorian PPP 
prison projects has revealed that the pre-2000 prisons had significant financial and 
non-financial modernisation objectives. By 2000, the achievement of the 1993 NPP 
modernisation objectives was debatable. VAGO, Audit Review, Kirby and OCSC 
reveal that two of the pre-2000 PPP prisons had significant ongoing problems in 
prisoner management and in achieving performance levels stipulated in contracts, 
some of which may be ongoing. Arguably, however, the Department has changed its 
approach to implementing ongoing modernisation reform in the post-2000 period, 
resulting in the successful implementation of the 2001 reducing re-offending reforms 
(Birgden and McLachlan, 2004; Graffam et al, 2005; VAGO, 2007a). 
 
 
5.6.1 Negotiating and managing change 
In re-engaging with Paper 4 in the course of completing of this thesis, section 5.2 of 
this chapter has highlighted concerns about aspects of the analysis of the contracting 
literature in section 2 of Paper 4 which affect aspects of the Paper 4 section 6 
analysis. 
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The nexus between the TCE concept of elastic contracting and relational contracting 
outlined in the Paper 4 literature review (see, Paper 4, p. 38) has been reworked in 
section 5.2 of this chapter. Elastic contracting is a TCE concept that refers to ex-post 
control devices embedded in contracts to control costs associated with the resolution 
of uncertainty. TCE suggests that contractual parties engage in gap-filling in order to 
overcome the inevitable failure of contracts to perfectly specify all aspects of the 
relationship. Also, contractually-based mechanisms (such as material adverse effects 
and dispute and default regimes) facilitate the filling of contractual gaps. 
 
Several studies (such as Dekker (2004), Tomkins (2001) and Van der Meer-Kooistra 
and Vosselman (2000), and (in a PPP context), Broadbent et al (2003a; 2004a) and 
Froud (2003)) have questioned the adequacy of TCE to explain long-term hybrid 
contracting. This literature questions the agency role of contracts, rejecting the 
disciplinary role ascribed to contractually-based mechanisms such as performance, 
payment and incentive regimes by TCE. Instead, the need to negotiate a mutually 
satisfactory interpretation of what these mechanisms mean, and how they are to be 
implemented in practice, is said to develop goodwill trust, although this outcome is 
not inevitable (Tomkins, 2001). Goodwill trust and relational contracting develop 
from relationships built on negotiation and collaboration. From this perspective the 
contract (and the negotiations preceding it) is merely the starting point from which 
parties will determine how the relationship is to be managed and controlled. Also, the 
choice of partner is crucial to the development of goodwill trust, the foundation of 
relational contracting (Broadbent et al, 2003a; 2004a; Dekker, 2004; Tomkins, 2001).  
 
Evidence presented in this chapter and in Paper 4 in relation to  the ‘success’ of the 
pre- and post-2000 contracts to effectively promote the management of change 
required in the modernisation process is mixed. It is clear that the post-2000 contracts 
contain more formal mechanisms (such as the material adverse effects regime and 
flexibility to alter the SDO regime) than the pre-2000 contracts. However, a lack of 
publicly disclosed information makes it impossible to determine the success (or 
otherwise) of these mechanisms in fostering the management of change. 
 
However, it is argued in section 6 of Paper 4 that there is evidence to suggest that the 
pre-2000 contracts have, to a limited extent, facilitated the successful management of 
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modernisation change. Although the first recontracting process in 2003 resulted in 
some changes to the SDOs outlined in Table 3 of Paper 4, the failure of the revised 
performance indicators to capture basic elements of the qualitative service standards 
relating to prisoner treatment, housing, education and rehabilitation established in the 
PMS suggests that contractual limitations constrained further reforms. In addition, the 
Department’s willingness to extend the 2006 recontracting period by six months in 
order to secure a mutually-acceptable outcome at one of the prisons is further 
evidence of the difficulties it faces in negotiating and managing change within the 
parameters established in the contracts.  It also indicates departmental reluctance to 
use the disciplinary mechanisms in the contract to ‘solve’ the problem by terminating 
the contract.  
 
The failure of the Department to remedy the problems at Deer Park is the most glaring 
indication of the failure of the pre-2000 contracts to provide a workable framework 
within which disputes could be successfully resolved. It has been argued in section 6 
of Paper 4 that there are indications that the government overlooked early teething 
problems (at Deer Park and Port Phillip) in order to give contractors time to overcome 
difficulties without incurring penalties. It is argued in section 6 of Paper 4 that such 
decisions indicate willingness to promote goodwill. However, the problems outlined 
in the OCSC report into the Deer Park failure are also a catalogue of the absence of 
goodwill trust. Arguably, the Department was also forced to recognise that some of 
the problems facing contractors were the result of events outside their control (such as 
changes in prisoner mix, numbers and profile), and that others had been caused the 
Department itself (for example, the decision to transfer all high-security prisoners to 
Port Phillip on commissioning with no allowance for prisoners to become gradually 
accustomed to the vastly different custodial style that Port Phillip represented). Kirby 
indicates that this decision had a number of unfortunate repercussions on prisoner 
behaviour, resulting in difficulties for custodial staff and management. Accordingly, it 
cannot be categorically stated that be the framing of the pre-2000 contracts and 
contractor recalcitrance were the sole contributors to ongoing difficulties in the first 
five years of at least two of the three PPP prisons. In relation to Deer Park, OCSC, 
Kirby and VAGO (2001) also suggest that poor contractor selection (Dekker, 2004) 
contributed to the irreparable breakdown in relationships and trust within the prison, 
and between the contractor and the government.  
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The strongest evidence that the pre-2000 contracts are capable of engendering the 
development of goodwill trust and of relational contracting is provided by the largely-
successful implementation of the 2001 reforms aimed at reducing re-offending. 
VAGO (2007a) states that this success has been achieved through inclusive change 
management strategies that actively encourage prison management and custodial staff 
involvement in devising and implementing reform (VAGO, 2007a, p. 26). However, it 
would be a mistake to assume that the goodwill underpinning the successful 
implementation of the 2001 reforms has spread to all areas of interaction between the 
government and PPP contractors. Indeed, the problems associated with renegotiating 
recontracting arrangements in 2006 indicate that difficulties remain, at least in relation 
to one of the remaining two PPP prisons.  
 
In summary, it appears that TCE theory has guided the Victorian government’s 
approach to PPP contracting and explains contracting practices in the Victorian PPP 
setting. Nevertheless, it would appear from the analysis above that the ‘alternative’ 
contracting literature that rejects TCE-based explanations of long-term contracting in 
hybrid relationships has greater power to explain how the pre-2000 PPP contracts 
have been used to manage and control the PPP relationship and achieve modernisation 
objectives more recently. The evidence presented here, which covers an eleven-year 
period, suggests that despite the rigidity of their approach to risk transfer, the pre-
2000 contracts have the capacity to foster goodwill and relational contracting in the 
special case of the implementation of the 2001 reducing re-offending reforms. In this 
case, the combative TCE-based arrangements were supplemented (financially and 
materially) by a more consensual approach that appears to have been successful in 
fostering change at all levels of the correctional services system. Evidence presented 
in this thesis (and by Broadbent et al, 2003a) challenges Froud’s (2003) conceptually-
based analysis that PPP contracting arrangements restrict the ability of governments 
to address uncertainties and respond to changes in a dynamic social, political, 
technological and/or economic context.  
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5.6.2 Achievement of financial and non-financial VFM objectives: pre-
2000 contracts 
The evidence presented in this chapter confirms that understandings of financial and 
non-financial VFM are not fixed, but that these are mutable concepts given meaning 
within a specific context and time in response to a dynamic changing context.  
 
The literature implies that there has been little attempt by governments to evaluate 
whether required risk transfer (essential to achieve VFM) has eventuated in the 
execution stage (Edwards et al, 2004). For instance, Broadbent et al (2003a, p. 190), 
in their study of two NHS PFI projects, observed that the implicit monitoring of VFM 
occurs through the contractually-based performance monitoring mechanisms. In that 
particular UK case, post-project evaluation only extended to evaluation of build 
quality. However, there is evidence that financial VFM is monitored in Victoria. 
VAGO and Audit Review confirm PPP construction costs were lower than 
comparable public procurement costs, and that financial VFM is evaluated by 
comparing daily per-prisoner costs at comparative prisons (with all the difficulties 
that such a comparison entails). The financial VFM effects of changes to systems-
level funding or to PPP-specific funding would appear to be captured (albeit crudely) 
in these statistics, providing that there is a reasonable basis for comparison.  
 
It has been argued in Paper 4 and in this chapter that, contrary to assertions in the 
literature (see, for, instance, Froud, 2003) the pre-2000 PPPs have far-reaching non-
financial VFM objectives. The failure of Deer Park indicates, in that arrangement at 
least, that these objectives were not achieved, confirming that ex-post realisations of 
risk management and VFM may differ significantly from ex-ante intentions, which is 
highlighted in the case of PPP failure (Edwards and Shaoul, 2003; English and 
Walker, 2004).  However, the early problems at Deer Park and Port Phillip were the 
catalyst for a number of reports (VAGO; Audit Review; Kirby; OCSC) into the 
operation of pre-2000 PPPs and the achievement of their changing non-financial VFM 
objectives, which were also extensively evaluated by the Department (Graffam et al, 
2005; Birgden and McLachlan, 2004; VAGO, 2003; 2007a). Collectively, these 
reports indicate that a number of radical sector-wide modernisation objectives 
(including some that were not envisaged in 1993 when the NPP was initially devised) 
have been achieved, and that the pre-2000 PPPs have been integral to this 
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achievement despite the early teething problems reported in VAGO, Audit Review 
and Kirby. The empirical findings in Paper 4 and this chapter are diametrically 
opposed to the view (proposed by Flinders (2005) in a conceptual analysis) that PPPs 
represent a ‘Faustian’ bargain in which short-term gains may be outweighed by 
longer-term problems.  
 
Indeed, Broadbent et al (2008) note that determining whether PPP contracts are VFM 
(and cater effectively for unanticipated events) can only be proved empirically over 
the duration of the contract. The empirical evidence presented in this thesis appears to 
challenge conclusions in the literature that PPPs are not VFM (see, for instance, 
Andrew, 2007; Edwards et al, 2004; Pollock et al 2005; Pollock and Price, 2004; 
Shaoul, 2005a; b), and that the non-financial aspects of VFM (such as service quality) 
are of little interest to governments (Andrew, 2007).  
 
As to questions of whether PPPs evaporate, magnify or transfer the total amount of 
risk (Heald, 2003), the empirical evidence presented in Chapter 5 and Paper 4 
suggests that although PPP contracts apparently establish an agreed approach to risk 
management, risk cannot be defined and measured as if it were static. Indeed, the 
evidence suggests that at different times and in different circumstances, elements of 
project risk may evaporate (as indicated in the implementation of the 2001 reforms), 
change (as suggested by the difficulties associated with the 2006 recontracting 
process), or be magnified (when performance is unsatisfactory and PPPs fail). This 
analysis also confirms that all risks associated with PPP projects can never be 
transferred to private contractors. Froud’s (2003) question about whether VFM is 
achievable over the life of PPP projects can only be answered by empirical studies 
(Broadbent et al, 2003a; 2004b) because the unanticipated effects of change and 
uncertainty over PPP life on VFM is determined not only by contractual 
arrangements, but also by how the partners react to unexpected events, and whether or 
not sufficient goodwill trust has been developed to support relational contracting that 
facilitates finding solutions that are acceptable to all stakeholders. 
 
As noted in Chapter 2, data sources are shaped by the political context in which they 
are produced, and by the cultural and ideological assumptions that lie behind them 
(Scott, 1990, p. 60). The reports examined in this chapter implicitly take as given the 
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government’s decision to introduce privately managed prisons into Victoria’s 
correctional services system. Accordingly, their starting point is not to critique policy 
or the NIE-based method of its implementation, but to examine outcomes within the 
context established by policy, and to provide recommendations for improvement 
within that context. As noted by Laughlin (1995; 2004) and Andrew (2007), choices 
regarding data sources and how data are analysed are subjective and determined by 
the ontology of the investigator.  
 
One caveat: as noted by Andon (2007) and Lambert and Lapsley (2006), the PPP 
literature is characterised by the strongly-delineated research approach of authors 
which pervades their analysis of PPPs. Accordingly, whether the evidence presented 
here convinces (or fails to convince) readers may depend on the reader’s perceptions 
of PPPs, and of the choice, reliability and interpretation of the data in the documents 
cited in Paper 4 and in this chapter.  The documents cited in Paper 4 and in this 
chapter differ markedly, for instance, from the data choices made and the critical 
perspective adopted, for instance, by Andrew (2007), Shaoul (2005a) and Cooper and 
Taylor (2005).  
 
The research into hybrid arrangements in the private-sector setting (see, for example, 
Busco et al, 2006; Cooper and Slagmulder, 2004; Dekker, 2004; Mouritsen and 
Thane, 2006; Tomkins, 2001; Van der Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman, 2000) draws on 
case-based field research to provide rich empirical data on the changing nature of the 
investigated relationships (which are considerably less complex than the relationships 
managed and controlled by the pre-2000 PPP contracts investigated in this thesis), and 
the role of contracts in their management. These studies, and the biases in the PPP 
literature, suggest that field research in the PPP setting could also enrich our 
understanding of these complex relationships and the use of contracts in practice to 
control and manage them over time and place. As empirically-based investigation of 
the PPP contracting practices has been largely neglected in the literature, this 
longitudinal study contributes significantly to our understanding of how risk and 
uncertainty have been managed and controlled in complex PPP arrangements that 
include the delivery of core correctional services in privately owned and operated 
prisons.  This study also contributes to our understanding of how PPPs have been 
used to modernise the design and construction of prisons, prison management 
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practices, and the treatment of prisoners within the politically-sensitive correctional 
services sector. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
Modernisation and the Changing Characteristics of Auditor-
General Oversight of PPPs 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Addressing the third aim of this research, to analyse the oversight of PPPs by 
Australian auditors-general, is the purpose of Paper 5 and Chapter 6. Auditors-
general have unique independence from executive governments granted in legislation 
that enables them to determine the focus and scope of their investigations. Also, 
auditors-general have the unrestricted access to government documents and public 
officials necessary to undertake rigorous, substantive audit of PPPs (English, 2003; 
English and Guthrie, 2001; Heald, 2003). The primary purpose of Chapter 6 is to 
introduce and reflect on Paper 5 findings, as no additional research has been 
undertaken to elucidate or augment Paper 5 findings. 
 
Paper 5, Table 1: Overview of the Financial Value, Category and Auditor-General 
Oversight of PPP Activity in Australian Jurisdictions as at December 2005 highlights 
that only ten performance audits of 16 PPP projects (out of a total of 124 identified 
projects) have been undertaken by Australian auditors-general.  Two of these relate to 
six Victorian PPPs32. Given the relative lack of scrutiny of this economically-
significant and contentious procurement technology, the purpose of Paper 5 is to 
investigate the characteristics of the oversight provided in all of the performance 
audits identified in Paper 5 Table 1, and to provide insights into the approach to the 
conduct of PPP performance audits as indicated in audit reports.  
 
Chapter 6 is organised as follows. Section 6.2 summarises and adds to the literature 
review in Paper 5. Section 6.3 outlines the Paper 5 research approach and method. 
Section 6.4 presents and reflects on Paper 5 results. Section 6.5 concludes the 
chapter. 
 
 
                                                 
32 Table 1 in Paper 5 is virtually identical to Table 1 in Paper 2 (which was analysed in Chapter 4). 
The figures in Table 1, Paper 5 differ slightly from those in Table 1, Paper 2 due to timing differences. 
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6.2 Literature review: performance audit and PPP oversight by auditors-
general 
Performance audit is viewed as a technology developed to facilitate the 
transformation of the public sector by investigating and reporting on the effectiveness 
of the implementation of modernisation (Arnaboldi and Lapsley, 2008; Pollitt et al, 
1999). Originally, performance audit focused on the need to provide assurance of the 
achievement of the administrative objectives of modernisation: the economy, 
efficiency, and effectiveness of the management of government programs (Guthrie 
and Parker, 1999; Hamburger, 1989). Despite agreement about its origins (English 
and Skaerbaek, 2007; Pollitt et al, 1999), the modernisation role of performance audit 
remains contested in the audit literature (Arnaboldi and Lapsley, 2008; Bowerman et 
al, 2000; Gendron et al, 2001; Power, 1999), and also in the PPP literature (Broadbent 
and Laughlin, 2003; Edwards and Shaoul, 2003; Edwards et al, 2004; Froud and 
Shaoul, 2001; Pollock and Price, 2004). More recently, English and Skaerbaek (2007, 
p. 239) have identified an interrelationship and a mutual co-dependency between 
modernisation and performance audit. Reflecting Meyer (1998), they view 
performance audit as a control mechanism, a framing device in shaping modernisation 
reform, and also as an integral component of the transformation of the public sector. 
 
Just as modernisation was the rationale for performance audit and shaped its initial 
concerns and boundaries, performance audit has also been shaped by the changing 
demands of modernisation. Auditors-general have increasingly had to justify the 
performance of their own offices (English, 2003; Gendron et al, 2001), which has 
affected the relationship between auditors-general and the executive arm of 
government and the parliament on one hand, and between auditors-general and 
audited bodies on the other. Evidence that auditors-general have publicly championed 
significant modernisation reform is provided by Skaerbaek and Thorbjornsen (2007), 
who imply that the National Danish Audit Office may compromise its own reputation 
should the ambitious reforms (that it has largely driven) to the financial management 
system in the Danish Defence Force fail to achieve their objectives, or result in 
unacceptable (and unforeseen) consequences down the track.  Irrespective of the 
eventual outcome, the independence of the National Danish Audit Office appears to 
have been compromised. 
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Also, Pallot (2003) has confirmed that performance audit has altered understandings 
of public accountability and the oversight role of state audit by raising the profile of 
the quality of program management. At the level of practice, auditing for 
effectiveness and ‘good management’ demands the investigation of outcomes 
(including those produced by private-sector contractors), and requires the use of 
independent evaluation criteria (Pollitt et al, 1999, p. 9). The controversy surrounding 
the audit of effectiveness and good management indicates that the meaning of these 
terms is context-dependent and mutable over time, and that conclusions about 
program implementation and achievements are contestable (Guthrie and Parker, 
1999).  
 
Adopting the Pollitt et al (1999) classification of performance audit into two types—
systems-based and substantive—Paper 5 characterises these classifications on the 
basis of the degree of independent investigation (as indicated in audit reports) that 
appears to have shaped the focus, scope, conduct and reporting of PPP audit. Pollitt et 
al (1999) suggest that a measure of the difference between these audit types is the 
choice of best practice framework against which observed practice is compared. 
Others (such as Guthrie and Parker, 1999; Hamburger, 1989) have suggested that the 
approach of individual auditors-general is correlated with systems-based and 
substantive auditing. 
 
Systems-based audits essentially check adherence to procedures mandated by 
auditors-general themselves (Gendron et al, 2001) or procedures mandated by 
governments (such as PPP policies (Pollitt et al, 1999)). Such audits are premised on 
the assumption that government policy and associated processes and procedures 
represent good management practice and are, therefore, the appropriate criteria 
against which to audit performance.  
 
An element of substantive audit does involve checking adherence to policy-mandated 
procedures and processes. However, substantive audits move beyond this narrow (and 
largely uncontroversial) framework to investigate the effectiveness of policy 
implementation against externally-derived criteria. Such a comparison can provide an 
indication of whether appropriate good management practices have been 
implemented, and program effectiveness (as determined by government policy) has 
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been achieved. The independent stance required for substantive auditing can result in 
performance audit appearing to cross the boundary between investigating the 
effectiveness of policy implementation and investigating the effectiveness of policies 
per se (Guthrie, 1989).  This renders performance audit contentious and potentially 
costly for governments and for auditors-general (English, 2003) as such examinations 
are technically beyond their mandate (Pollitt et al, 1999).  
 
The UK-based literature reveals a number of issues and concerns that relate to PPP 
performance audits undertaken by the UK’s National Audit Office [NAO]33 that  
appear to suggest that, for the most part, some scholars regard PPP audit as systems-
based rather than substantive. For instance, researchers have called for in-depth 
investigation of the achievement of anticipated risk transfer and value for money 
[VFM], for example by an analysis of spending in the execution stage to determine 
whether it is in accordance with contractual agreements. This type of analysis is 
deemed critical to determining whether PPPs have achieved their objectives (Edwards 
et al, 2004; Pollock and Price, 2004). Also, Edwards et al (2004) have called for 
investigations into the decision to consider the PPP option in the light of the costs and 
benefits of the conventional outsourcing option. Broadbent et al (2004b) have 
suggested that NAO audits are too narrowly focused on the financial aspects of VFM 
at the expense of non-financial aspects. Shaoul (2005a) has criticised the failure to 
systematically compile evidence as to how a PPP is operating in practice. Pollock and 
Price (2004) indicate that there is a need to investigate the changes to risk transfer and 
risk premia. Broadbent and Laughlin (2003) confirm that some systems-wide NAO 
audits have played a role in legitimating the UK government’s PPP policies and 
associated implementation technologies. The critical UK PPP literature and the 
Australian performance audit literature leave an impression (challenged by Pollitt et al 
(1999) in the UK context) that the bulk of performance auditing in the PPP context is 
not substantive, as it is characterised by investigating adherence to policies and 
mandated procedures and processes, or in elucidating how such processes should be 
implemented (Broadbent and Laughlin, 2003). 
 
 
                                                 
33 VFM Audit is the term used by the NAO to denote a performance audit (Sharma, 2007). 
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6.3 Research approach and method 
It has been argued in Chapter 4 that PPP policies, and the procedures and processes 
mandated therein, provide the context in which the implementation of PPPs can be 
understood, analysed and audited (Broadbent et al, 2004b). Paper 5 Table 2: 
Identification and Explanation of Procedures Outlined in PPP Steering Mechanisms 
identifies and explains 11 key procedures mandated in the post-2000 Victorian PPP 
policies, further elucidating the analysis of PPP policies in Chapter 4. Paper 5 
contends that these 11 elements can be deemed to represent government-endorsed 
best practice performance audit criteria in an Australian PPP setting, and uses them to 
develop a framework to undertake a preliminary analysis of the focus, extent and 
characteristics of the ten audit reports. Paper 5 indicates that the 11-element 
framework captures the focus of auditor-general investigations, even in audits 
undertaken in the pre-2000 period which predated the codification and extension of 
practice in the flurry of policy development in the post-2000 period. The findings of 
Paper 5 indicate that there was broad auditor-general awareness and understanding of 
the key elements of PPP arrangements prior to their elucidation in the post-2000 
policies; that Victorian post-2000 PPP polices are representative of Australia-wide 
approaches to PPP implementation; that there is broad consensus in approaches to 
performance audit practice in Australia; and that policies and mandated procedures 
and processes are used as best practice criteria in systems-based audits and in the 
systems-based elements of substantive audits. 
 
Following Gendron et al (2001), the empirical data presented in Paper 5 are derived 
from an examination of the identified PPP performance audit reports guided by the 11 
key procedures identified in the framework explicated in Table 2, which are used to 
capture the extent and focus of the investigated audits. Three steps were undertaken in 
the empirical analysis of the data. First, the audit reports were read to determine 
which of the 11 elements are mentioned in each of the audit reports. Second, the 
reports were re-read to determine whether they are systems-based or substantive. 
Third, the primary impetus of the audit was ascertained in order to determine whether 
there were any correlations between substantive audit and auditor-general and 
controversy surrounding the audited project, a finding that is common in the early 
Australian performance audit literature (Hamburger, 1989). Results are reported in 
Paper 5 Table 3: Performance Audits of Australian PPPs. Following Peraekylae 
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(2005, p. 872) and Laughlin (1995; 2004), the audit reports were assumed to reflect 
the social practices of performance auditing, permitting interpretation of motives and 
events informed by insights from the literature. 
 
 
6.4 Empirical findings: performance audit of Australian PPPs 
A number of findings can be drawn from the empirical evidence presented in Paper 5. 
Three primary findings are summarised below. These findings relate to: first, the 
extent and focus of Australian PPP performance audit; second, the classification of 
PPP audits as systems-based or substantive; and third, investigations of risk 
management and the achievement of VFM in the examined performance audits. 
 
 
6.4.1 The extent and focus of Australian PPP performance audits 
Findings relating to the first issue are summarised in Paper 5 Table 3: Performance 
Audits of PPPs (pp. 324-325) which confirms that no Australian state audit office 
appears to audit PPPs on an ongoing strategic basis. Analysis and discussion of the 
examined performance audits in Paper 5 uses a coding system introduced in Table 3. 
To maintain consistency in this dissertation, the Paper 5 coding system ([PA1], 
[PA2]… [PA9], [PA10]) is not followed in Chapter 6 analysis and discussion of 
Paper 5 findings. Where specific audit reports are referred to in the discussion that 
follows they will be referred to as in the Audit report reference row in Table 3. For 
example PA9 is the code for VAGO (1999), which has been extensively discussed in 
Chapter 5. In Chapter 6 discussion it will be referred to as VAGO (1999). 
 
Turning back to Table 3 in Paper 5, it is interesting to note that the most complex and 
controversial PPPs—the pre-2000 prisons and hospitals that include the direct 
provision of core public services to citizens by private operators (the three audits 
identified in Table 3 as Health in WA and Correctional in Victoria)—have been 
relatively under-investigated by Australia’s auditors-general. Toll roads have been the 
most investigated category of PPP, particularly in NSW, where six road projects have 
been investigated in five different reports. Most of the performance audits have been 
undertaken in NSW, followed by Victoria and Western Australia. Victoria and 
Western Australia are the only two jurisdictions whose auditors-general have 
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investigated outcomes in the execution stage of pre-2000 PPP prisons and hospitals 
respectively. 
 
Paper 5 Table 3 also reveals that risk allocation has received the most audit attention, 
followed by the public sector comparator [PSC] or other benchmark technology used 
to cost the public procurement option. As indicated in Chapter 4, and confirmed in the 
literature, these two pre-contracting appraisal technologies are at the heart of the 
determination and achievement of financial VFM, and provide the cost-based 
rationale to take the PPP option. Also, because of the unanticipated effects of 
uncertainty on financial and non-financial VFM achievement in the execution stage, 
substantive auditing of how effectively the state is able to manage and control 
performance outcomes through its contracting arrangements is also necessary.  
Accordingly, Paper 5’s investigation of PPP performance audit is important to 
determining the extent to which auditors-general bring a critical independent approach 
to the evaluation of PPP outcomes.  
 
Eight of the ten performance audits reported in Table 3 focus on the pre-contracting 
stage, confirming that following mandated processes and procedures remains a central 
control element in the modern public sector because it is seen to provide some level of 
assurance that outputs and outcomes are delivered as intended (Jacobs et al, 2007; 
Modell et al, 2007). Paper 5 results confirm that, for similar reasons, examining 
adherence to the dictates of policy is also a critical element of performance auditing. 
These findings are interesting because they suggest that, despite the change in focus 
from inputs to outputs and outcomes, and calls for devolved decision-making and 
responsibility (all of which are characteristics of modernisation reform) the modern 
public sector has nevertheless retained its essentially bureaucratic nature in which top-
down central control remains dominant (as predicted by Jacobs et al (2007) and 
Modell et al (2007)). 
 
Although it has been suggested that the duration of PPP arrangements explains the 
relative lack of performance auditing of the execution stage in the UK context 
(Broadbent et al, 2004a), it is clear from the performance audit of the implementation 
of the pre-2000 New Prisons Policy [NPP] reported in VAGO (1999) (which has been 
analysed in Chapter 5), that substantive auditing of the execution stage can occur 
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within two years of the commissioning of the asset and the commencement of 
operations. Also, Paper 5 indicates that, contrary to some assertions (Edwards and 
Shaoul, 2003; Edwards et al, 2004; Pollock and Price, 2004), substantive auditing of 
the pre-contracting stage is also possible.  
 
 
6.4.2 Substantive v systems-based auditing and its linkage with 
auditors-general 
The second issue investigated in Paper 5 is what audit reports reveal about the 
conduct of the audits. Paper 5, Table 3 reveals that four of the ten performance audits 
have been categorised as substantive, and six as systems-based. The basis on which 
this categorisation was made is explained on p. 326 of Paper 5. Quotations from one 
systems-based and all substantive reports are provided in Paper 5 to attest to the 
differences in approach between these classifications. Furthermore, the extensive 
analysis of VAGO (1999) in Chapter 5 provides further evidence of the qualities of 
substantive auditing, and substantiates the analysis of the differences between 
systems-based and substantive auditing that is presented in Paper 5. The analysis in 
Chapter 5 confirms that VAGO (1999) provides sufficient in-depth analysis and 
assessment (subsequently corroborated by Audit Review, 2000b and Kirby, 2000) to 
support the systems-based/substantive analysis that is presented in Paper 5. 
 
Also, Paper 5 analysis indicates that six out of ten PPP performance audits appear to 
have been conducted as a result of controversy surrounding the audit (with the 
primary impetus identified as public concern/parliament), and that four audits were 
undertaken on new initiatives. It is interesting to note that VAGO (2005) (which was 
identified as systems-based and analysed in the body of Paper 5 and coded in Table 3 
as PA6] was actually conducted after the commencement of the execution stage, 
although the audit neglected to examine whether or not VFM had been achieved as 
anticipated. Table 3 reveals that five audits were undertaken in the pre-2000 period; 
two audit reports are dated 2000 (which could be designated the cross-over period), 
and three audits were undertaken in the post-2000 period. As suggested in the 
literature, it would appear from the empirical evidence presented in Paper 5 that the 
characteristics of a performance audit are most closely correlated to particular 
auditors-general (Guthrie and Parker, 1999; Hamburger, 1989). Three of the 
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substantive audits were undertaken by a NSW auditor-general, and one by a Victorian 
auditor-general. All substantive audits occurred during the pre-2000 period, and all 
are associated either with public concern, or a formal request that an audit be 
conducted from the parliament. 
 
The audits identified in Paper 5 as substantive provide an indication of why 
performance audit has been challenged by governments (English, 2003), and the 
demarcation between auditing policy and its implementation is contested. Paper 5 
confirms that auditors-general whose reports are classified as substantive are more 
likely to be seen to challenge this barrier, and also to investigate the audited program 
within a wider policy context. However, Paper 5 also indicates that care needs to be 
taken in classifying audits as systems-based, as the apparently bland language in audit 
reports may be quite deliberate (as confirmed by Sharma, 2007) to promote co-
operation with audited bodies, and the probability of acceptance of recommendations.  
 
 
6.4.3 Risk management and the achievement of financial VFM 
The third issue investigated in Paper 5 is the extent to which Australian auditors-
general have investigated risk management and the achievement of VFM in audited 
PPP projects. Paper 5 indicates that three audits have investigated pre-contracting 
procedures and processes and the achievement of anticipated risk transfer and 
financial VFM in the execution stage in two pre-2000 PPPs delivering core 
correctional and clinical services. (These are the three audits identified as PA7, PA8 
and PA9 in Table 3.) A direction from the government (which was disputed by the 
auditor-general) in the substantive performance audit of the PPP prisons (VAGO, 
1999) forced the omission of certain information in the audit report that related to the 
cost benchmarks established to assess bids submitted by prospective tenderers during 
the bidding and selection process for each of the private prisons, as well as the actual 
cost bid submitted by each successful tenderer; payments made to private operators 
for the periodic delivery of prison services; and amounts deducted to date from 
payments to operators for poor performance or non-achievement of outcomes 
specified in contractual conditions (VAGO, 1999, p. viii). However, VAGO 1999 
confirms that average per-prisoner daily costs were lower in privately managed 
prisons than in publicly managed prisons. 
118 Auditor-General Oversight Chapter 6 
 
  
In auditing the implementation of the 1993 NPP, VAGO (1999) confirms that the 
concept of VFM in the PPP context is far more complex (see also Chapter 5 and the 
substantive NSW audits into the pre-contracting stage of toll roads) than may have 
been assumed in the literature (see, for instance, the call for the UK’s NAO to audit 
non-financial aspects of VFM by Broadbent et al, 2004a). The Victorian audit 
examined the rights and physical wellbeing of prisoners, the rights of prisoners, 
prisoner training programs (designed to promote their rehabilitation and successful 
reparation back into the community), and the quality of training and development 
programs for custodial staff (see chapter headings VAGO, 1999, p. 33). The list of 
bodies assisting the auditor-general (VAGO, 1999, p. 35) provides an indication of 
the level of scrutiny facing the managers of large modern prisons, whether they are 
publicly or privately managed.   
 
 
6.5 Chapter summary 
Paper 5 indicates that insufficient and perhaps inappropriate oversight of PPPs is 
provided by Australia’s auditors-general. The overall amount of performance audit 
has fallen in the post-2000 period. Although it has been argued in Paper 5 that 
substantive audit of the pre-contracting and the execution stages is necessary, it seems 
that the primary audit focus has been on the pre-contracting stage, leaving the 
assessment of achievement of anticipated VFM in the execution stage largely 
unaddressed.  However, this conclusion should be seen in the light of the evaluation 
of the pre-2000 prisons undertaken by the department and the government. 
 
The classification of performance audits as substantive or systems-based in Paper 5 
has indicated that there is a correlation between auditor-general and the type of audit 
conducted, suggesting that the approach to auditing PPPs could change as new 
auditors-general are appointed. Also, Paper 5 shows that all of the audits classified as 
substantive occurred in the pre-2000 period. Additional research is required to 
understand whether this phenomenon is solely related to particular auditors-general or 
if, more worryingly, there has been a more subtle change in the approach to 
performance audit by Australia’s auditors-general in general. Sharma (2007) suggests 
that VFM auditors (read performance auditors) in England work closely with the 
Public Accounts Committee [PAC] to bring to the public’s attention to weaknesses in 
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public administration that need to be addressed by the government. Sharma’s (2007) 
paper suggests that the bland language in VFM reports is deliberate and allows the 
PAC more scope to more theatrically highlight problems and grill public officials. 
However, as it is uncertain whether Australian auditors-general and PACs work in the 
manner described by Sharma (2007).  More research into state audit in Australia, its 
on-the-ground achievements, and the role of various PACs in monitoring PPP 
performance audits and implementation of audit recommendations, is required.  
 
Clearly, perceptions that recent performance audit of Australian PPPs may be 
systems-based rather than substantive pose problems for the reputation of auditors-
general, and raises questions about their supposed independence from executive 
government. Heald (2003) has argued that auditors-general are the only source of 
independent oversight of PPPs with unfettered access to government documents and 
officials, and with the right to determine how and when to conduct performance 
audits. In addition, audit reports are publicly available (unlike much of the evaluation 
undertaken by government departments). Accordingly, the nature and conduct of 
performance audit is critical to effective parliamentary oversight of executive 
governments and the effectiveness (or lack of effectiveness) of parliamentary scrutiny 
of the implementation of major government policies (including PPPs). The evidence 
presented in Paper 5 suggests that Australian auditors-general have considerable work 
to do in relation to the oversight of PPPs. Indeed, the concluding section of Paper 5 
suggests that recently Parliamentary Accounts Committees have taken steps to fill the 
oversight role usually undertaken by auditors-general. 
 
Paper 5 (p. 332) raises the question of who provides independent assessment of PPPs 
in Australia. Paper 5 notes that executive government (through their departments of 
treasury and finance) are the major PPP agenda setters and evaluators, implying that 
little independent internal examination of PPP outcomes is taking place. Chapter 4 
confirmed that, aside from regular facilities management undertaken by departments 
that is overseen on an exceptions basis by the Department of Treasury and Finance, 
PPPs have remained largely unassessed at central government level where PPP 
policies are determined. The Gateway Review Process is designed to fill this gap. 
Nevertheless, findings presented in Chapter 5 suggest that the Victorian government 
has commissioned some ad hoc evaluation of PPP projects, and that the Department 
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of Human Services (at least) has undertaken significant ongoing evaluation of PPP 
outcomes through the work of the OCSC and also through reports commissioned to 
evaluate program implementation (such as the 2002 reducing re-offending reforms). 
Unfortunately, as noted in Chapter 4, these internal reports are either confidential, or 
difficult to access. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
Conclusion 
 
7.1 Introduction 
This thesis has three aims, which were outlined in Chapter 1. The first aim was to 
analyse the characteristics of modernisation in the Australian context. The second aim 
was to analyse PPPs and their changing role as a modern procurement technology. 
The third aim was to analyse the oversight of PPPs by Australian auditors-general.  
 
The purpose of this concluding chapter is to summarise the empirical findings arising 
from the investigation of the three aims of this research, to reflect on the source and 
nature of differences (if any) between the empirical evidence provided in this thesis 
and findings in the literature, and to indicate its contribution. Reflecting the iterative 
reflexive process of theory development in the light of empirical findings, the analysis 
in this chapter summarises and draws together the major implications of the 
discussion and conclusions in each chapter.  
 
This concluding chapter is organised as follows. Section 7.2 reviews the research 
approach. Section 7.3 reviews the motivation of the research. Section 7.4 summarises 
and reflects on the principal findings in relation to the three research aims. Section 7.5 
presents policy implications of the empirical findings.  Section 7.6 considers the 
limitations of this research and outlines future research directions.  
 
 
7.2 Research approach 
As explicated in Chapter 2, this documentary-based study has been undertaken using 
the middle range thinking research approach developed by Laughlin (1995; 2004). 
Middle range thinking is congruent with Peraekylae’s (2005) approach to textual 
analysis. Scott’s (1990) observation that documentary sources are inevitably shaped 
by their political context and the ideological and cultural assumptions that underlie 
them is relevant to the analysis in this thesis, and resonates with Laughlin’s (1995; 
2004) acknowledgement of the subjectivity of the middle range approach. 
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Five published papers comprised the core of this ‘by publication’ PhD. However, in 
addition, each chapter reviewed relevant literature to establish the skeletal theory that 
underpins the investigation of the three aims. According to Laughlin (1995; 2004), 
there are three stages to the middle range approach. The first process is the a priori 
theorising (to develop the skeletal theory), which contextualises the research and 
provides some guidance as to the empirical points of interest and how to interact with 
them. The second stage is the empirical stage, which involves gathering the evidence 
and also reflecting on and modifying (where appropriate) the insights from the 
skeletal theory in the light of the findings. The third stage of the middle range process 
is the separate change dimension. As noted in Chapter 2, the change dimension 
remains under-explicated by Laughlin (1995; 2004). Laughlin suggests that it may 
involve questioning previous understandings of prior theory, revisions of prior 
theories, and/or contributing to policy debates. 
 
However, middle range theorists acknowledge that while generalisations about the 
empirical reality are possible, they are not guaranteed to exist as observed, interpreted 
and theorised. The subjectivity of the research approach has an additional outcome. It 
may not be possible for researchers to engage uncontroversially with any of the three 
stages, giving rise, for instance, to debates as to the nature of modernisation and its 
achievements in the literature.  
 
In the context of this thesis, the subjectivity (Andon, 2007; Lambert and Lapsley, 
2006) of PPP research (including in this thesis) is addressed in Chapter 5, which 
raises the notion of possible biases in relation to data selection and its analysis. In this 
thesis, the Victorian government’s decision to introduce PPPs within a particular 
policy context is taken as a given. Following Laughlin (1995; 2004), choices 
concerning data selection and the interpretation of data are determined by the 
ontology of the investigator. The inherent subjectivity of this research approach is 
acknowledged as a potential limitation of this thesis. 
 
 
7.3 Motivation 
In the light of scepticism about the use of PPPs and their outcomes, the overriding 
objective of this thesis was to analyse the use of PPPs as a modern procurement 
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technology. PPPs are a product of policies and processes devised to modernise public 
services (Broadbent and Guthrie, 2008). The modernisation of public services over 
the past three decades has affected not only how services are procured and delivered 
(such as through PPPs), but also how they are managed and controlled by 
governments. Modernisation has also reshaped the role and conduct of state audit 
(English and Skaerbaek, 2007; Pollitt et al, 1999; Power, 1999). 
 
The modernisation, PPP and performance audit literatures have questioned the nature 
of these reforms, their impacts and their achievements. Overall, many of these studies 
have concluded that modernisation has delivered less than promised. Much of the 
Australian PPP literature is critical of PPPs, suggesting that they fail to deliver VFM 
(Quiggin, 2004; Stanley and Hensher, 2004); result in wealth transfer (Walker, 2003); 
constrain future planning and expenditure (Quiggin, 2004); and that governments 
have not been held sufficiently accountable for their economic and social 
repercussions (Andrew, 2007; Watson, 2003; 2004). These critiques mirror those in 
the UK literature (English and Guthrie, 2003). The motivation for this research is 
found in many studies that have called for longitudinal investigations into the effects 
of modernisation in different times and in different nations (see, for instance, 
Broadbent et al, 2004b; Humphrey et al, 2005; Lapsley and Pong, 2000; Lapsley, 
2001c; d). 
 
In recognition that the modernisation of public services must be researched within 
national and institutional settings (Broadbent and Guthrie, 2008; Laughlin, 1995; 
2004), this thesis has located its investigation of PPPs within the context of the 
modernisation reforms that have been implemented throughout the Australian public 
sector. As noted by Broadbent and Guthrie (2008), there are many similarities 
between the implementation of modernisation throughout the OECD world. Also, as 
Australian PPPs are similar to the PFI in the UK (Broadbent and Laughlin, 2004) and 
in Europe (Bult-Spiering and Dewulf, 2006), the findings in this thesis may be 
relevant in other national contexts.  
 
7.4 Findings and contribution 
The purpose of this section is to summarise empirical findings and conclusions arising 
from the investigation of the three research aims. Each of the aims is addressed in 
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turn. As noted previously, the following discussion and analysis reflects on the source 
and nature of similarities and differences (if any) between the empirical findings in 
this thesis and in the literature, and indicates the contributions of the research. In this 
manner the iterative reflexive process of skeletal theory development and review that 
occurred in Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6 is summarised and conclusions drawn. 
 
 
7.4.1 Setting the theoretical context: overview of the international 
modernisation literature 
The literature reviewed in Chapter 2 indicates that modernisation in OECD nations 
(although context-specific and changing over time) can be characterised by a number 
of common factors, including the application of classical economic theories to the 
public-sector setting, and the use of private-sector derived technologies to justify, 
rationalise and drive public-sector transformation. In this thesis, it has been confirmed 
that new institutional economics [NIE] (Trebilcock, 1995), which embraces agency 
theory [AT] (English, 2005b), public choice theory [PCT] (Barton, 2001; English, 
2005b) and transactions cost economics [TCE] (Williamson 1981; 1991; 2005), has 
been identified as the primary theoretical driver of modernisation and the source of its 
rationalisation. The NIE goal of replicating private-sector disciplines in the public 
sector has resulted in the use of a number of technologies to implement modernisation 
reforms (Guthrie et al, 2005; Olson et al, 1998). It has also been argued in this thesis 
that modernisation has affected the nature and role of state audit, most notably 
through the development of performance audit, with its associated aim of providing 
assurance as to the achievement of results (Pollitt et al, 1999). 
 
Chapter 2 reviewed critiques of modernisation, including its focus on quantitative 
attributes that are most easily captured by accounting and management technologies. 
The use of these technologies can result in the invisibility of qualitative considerations 
(Bowerman, 1998) that are pertinent to the objectives of the PPPs of interest to this 
thesis. Newberry and Pallot (2005) have highlighted the potential for differences 
between stated and unstated modernisation objectives that may be concealed in 
technical developments. Chapter 2 also reviews literature relating to the nature of 
modernisation change in the public sector that suggests that modernisation 
Chapter 7 Conclusion  125 
 
 
transformation may be evolutionary. The Chapter 2 literature review provides a 
framework to guide the empirical analysis undertaken in the thesis.  
 
Findings relating to the three aims are outlined below.  
 
 
7.4.2 The first aim: to analyse the characteristics of modernisation in 
the Australian public sector 
Chapter 3 confirmed that modernisation in the Australian context, as in other OECD 
nations, has been framed by NIE theories, and its implementation and rationalisation 
dominated by private-sector derived accounting and management technologies.  
Chapter 3 identified a number of concerns relating to the practical implementation of 
modernisation in the Australian public sector. These concerns (which are also relevant 
to PPPs) relate to the concepts and implementation of VFM, risk management, 
performance specification and monitoring, accounting and reporting, and transparency 
and accountability.  
 
Although hard-edged neo-liberalism (Dunleavy and Hood, 1994) is the predominant 
modernisation paradigm, Chapter 3 signalled that network theory has also influenced 
aspects of the modernisation of public services in Australia. Network theory is an 
alternative approach to public services delivery that emphasises negotiation, 
cooperation and consensus between stakeholders to arrive at mutually-acceptable 
solutions to social problems. Table 3.1 of Chapter 3 outlined the key features of these 
different approaches to service delivery.  
 
 
7.4.3 The second aim: to analyse PPPs and their changing role as a 
modern procurement technology 
The second aim of this thesis was addressed in Chapters 4 and 5. In terms of empirical 
investigation, Chapter 4 focused on the PPP pre-contracting stage and Chapter 5 on 
the execution stage.  
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Findings: Chapter 4 
Chapter 4 had a number of purposes. In order to establish the context within which the 
second aim was investigated, Chapter 4 established the economic importance of PPPs 
to the Australian economy, providing data about their incidence and nature on a 
jurisdictional basis. It also examined the PPP policy setting in Victoria and outlined 
the features of the PPP model of interest to this thesis, which includes the delivery of 
core social services such as clinical services to public hospital patients and 
correctional services to prisoners.  
 
PPP policies over the period 1991-2007 were analysed in Chapter 4. This thesis 
contends that the establishment in 2000 of Partnerships Victoria [PV] within the 
Victorian Department of Treasury and Finance marked a turning point in PPP use in 
that state. It resulted, for the first time, in the development of a coherent statement of 
PPP objectives and detailed instructions of how these objectives are to be achieved. 
These policies reversed the earlier approach of transferring to the private-sector 
responsibility for the delivery of core and supporting services in PPPs. By 
reintroducing the public management of core services delivery, the post-2000 policies 
reduced the overall level of project and political risk associated with PPPs, making it 
easier for the state to manage and control the achievement of more limited 
modernisation objectives. Also, these post-2000 policies strengthened the control of 
executive government (through the Department of Treasury and Finance) over PPP 
decision-making at agency level.  
 
As noted in Chapter 4, the post-2000 PPP policies reveal a growing reliance, in the 
pre-contracting stage, on complex accounting and management technologies to guide, 
aid and rationalise PPP decision-making processes, and to manage project risk to 
achieve espoused VFM objectives. Chapter 4 confirmed the continuing role of NIE in 
framing the post-2000 Victorian approach to PPPs. It noted the clarification of 
objectives in the post-2000 policies.  The achievement of VFM became the paramount 
rationale for PPPs as the need to control state debt receded. Also, despite their NIE 
foundations, the post-2000 policies reveal a more flexible and pragmatic approach to 
the management and control of uncertainty and the partnership relationship in the all 
stages of project development and implementation. These changes in perspective were 
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confirmed through an examination of project objectives and risk transfer 
arrangements in the pre- and post-2000 hospital contracts in Chapter 4. 
 
Establishing the context in which PPPs are contracted and operate is important for 
several reasons. First, the research approach adopted in this thesis stresses the need to 
understand the institutional context in which the empirical investigation is situated 
(Broadbent and Guthrie, 2008; Lapsley, 2001d; Laughlin, 1995; 2004; Modell et al, 
2007). Second, PPP policies and relevant legislation establish the government’s stated 
objectives, rationales and implementation strategies, enabling investigation of stated 
(and unstated) objectives and their achievement (Newberry and Pallot, 2005). Third, 
as auditors-general conduct performance audits within the context of the program 
objectives established in government policies, cognisance of the policy framework 
also facilitates analysis of PPP audits (Pollitt et al, 1999).  
 
Chapter 4 confirmed that a number of themes and concerns relating to the pre-
contracting stage dominate the literature. Debates concern the nature and purpose of 
PPPs (Broadbent and Laughlin, 1999) and the role of pre-contracting accounting and 
management technologies in achieving objectives. The complex interdependency 
between PPP objectives, the management of project risk, the meaning of VFM, and 
the calculation of the PSC; and controversy relating to ‘official’ explanations of their 
role, were raised in Chapter 4. As pre-contracting decision-making technologies (such 
as the PSC) are not available to public scrutiny, the outworking of these variables was 
examined from three perspectives: ‘official’ public explanations contained in policy 
documents; evidence from representative pre- and post-2000 hospital contacts; and 
insights from the case of a failed pre-2000 PPP hospital. 
 
Chapter 4 revealed some tension in the objectives of the pre-2000 PPPs relating to 
their dual purpose: infrastructure provision and infrastructure-based service delivery. 
Analysis of the three data sources revealed that controversy about the stated and 
hidden nature and purpose of PPPs is also a complicating factor in implementing the 
pre-2000 Victorian PPPs. Private-sector responsibility for all aspects of the financing, 
design, construction and operation of the pre-2000 hospitals, combined with the 
blanket transfer of risk and the off-balance sheet accounting treatment, indicate that 
the management of financial risk (to avoid the recognition of debt in the state’s 
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balance sheet) was a primary objective of these early arrangements. However, the 
intention of shifting the risks associated with changes to health care policy (including 
funding) and in clinical practices to the private operators has the potential to create 
tension with the objective of achieving the delivery of quality health care services in a 
complex and changing environment over a long-term contract (in which the 
repercussions of unanticipated future events could require negotiated solutions). 
Indeed, the failure of the Latrobe hospital highlighted problems in pre-contracting 
decision making at agency and contractor level, the fallacy of blanket risk transfer, 
and the inability of the contracting regime to foster negotiated solutions. Irrespective 
of the contract (and the accounting treatment), the government had to accept the 
ultimate responsibility for the public’s right of access to quality hospital services, and 
take over the ownership and management of Latrobe.   
 
A second debate in the literature reviewed in Chapter 4 relates to what constitutes 
VFM as it is established in the pre-contracting stage. Echoing concerns in the 
modernisation literature reviewed in Chapters 2 and 3, the PPP literature reviewed in 
Chapter 4 suggests that the exclusive reliance on financial variables in the 
determination of the PSC (or equivalent benchmark technology), and a reliance on 
quantitative ‘accounting logic’ to specify and monitor performance in PPP contracts 
(Broadbent et al, 2008) privileges the articulation of financial (as opposed to non-
financial) VFM modernisation objectives in PPP projects. Accordingly, by stressing 
the dominance of the PSC, quantitative VFM objectives and performance 
specifications, the literature implies that qualitative VFM outcomes are neither 
anticipated nor achievable in PPP arrangements. However, as noted above, the 
examination of the Latrobe case indicates that pre-2000 project objectives 
encompassed financial and non-financial outcomes. The examined post-2000  hospital 
contract also confirms that financial and non-financial VFM outcomes were 
anticipated, albeit in the context of more limited project objectives and a reduced role 
of the private operator. 
 
Findings: Chapter 5 
Investigation of the nature of VFM and its achievement in the execution stage were 
explored in more depth through an empirically-based analysis of two PPP prison 
contracts (representative of five PPP projects) in Chapter 5. In relation to the analysis 
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of the pre-2000 prison contracts and outcomes, the empirical examination included 
analytical reviews of correctional services policies and four pivotal (and some 
additional) reports published during the period 1999-2007. As is evident from the 
Chapter 5 analysis, there is significantly less documentary evidence relating to the 
post-2000 projects. Accordingly, the bulk of the evidence and analysis in Chapter 5 
focused on the three pre-2000 prisons: Latrobe, Port Phillip and Fulham.  
 
Confirming Chapter 4 findings, it was established in Chapter 5 that significant 
modernisation objectives were attached to the three pre-2000 prison PPPs. As shown 
in this thesis, the nature and purpose of the sector-wide modernisation reforms to 
correctional services in Victoria were established in amendments to the Corrections 
Act 1986 and the 1993 NPP reforms that supported the introduction of NIE-based 
reforms across the correctional services system. These reforms, which were designed 
to deliver financial and non-financial VFM, attempted to create a contractually-based 
competitive market in correctional services delivery that was managed and controlled 
through contract-based performance specification and reward mechanisms. The 
approach to contracting was inspired by TCE. Also, the implementation of the NPP 
reforms was underpinned by the PCT-inspired separation of correctional services 
management, control and monitoring functions within the Department of Justice.  
 
The financial VFM reforms related to the provision of cost-effective infrastructure 
and correctional services in the PPP prisons, and also across the system through the 
roll out (to the publicly-managed prisons) of the contractual framework governing the 
PPPs. The non-financial VFM reforms related to qualitatively improving the 
management, treatment, housing, education, and rehabilitation of prisoners. 
Expectations as to the nature of NPP and standards of treatment of prisoners were 
established in the Performance Management System [PMS], which was included in 
Project Brief, the contract, and the Operating Manual (prepared by the contractor). 
 
Chapter 5 reveals that the SDOs were largely quantitative and failed to capture critical 
qualitative elements of the NPP objectives. In addition, it was shown that the 
contractually-based payment and incentive mechanism inadequately penalised poor 
performance, and that other mechanisms (such as continuous monitoring by the 
OCSC and the default mechanism in the contract) did not support the rectification of 
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problems. Evidence presented in Chapter 5 indicated that the recontracting provisions 
failed to facilitate the satisfactory resolution of friction. Indeed, the extension of the 
2006 recontracting window to enable negotiations with one of the operators indicates 
that there remain ongoing difficulties with aspects of the pre-2000 arrangements. 
These observations confirm the tensions arising from inherently conflicting objectives 
and a contracting regime that attempts to impose solutions on the management and 
control of unanticipated future events. 
  
In evaluating the achievement the PPP prisons to achieve their NPP objectives, it is 
necessary also to consider the achievement of modernisation objectives in the 
publicly-managed cohort of prisons, because NPP envisaged transforming the 
correctional services sector as a whole. Indeed, factors beyond the control of the 
prison operators (public and private) hindered the achievement of objectives (Kirby, 
2000; VAGO, 1999). For instance, Chapter 5 revealed that (prior to 2000) prison 
management was complicated by exogenous factors (such as changes in prisoner 
numbers, mix and profile). Also, the impact of departmental decisions, and failings in 
the Department’s management of the correctional services system negatively 
impacted the achievement of NPP objectives across the sector (Kirby, 2000; VAGO, 
1999).  
 
Despite these problems, Chapter 5 provided evidence that some aspects of the NPP 
objectives (both financial and non-financial) had been achieved by 2000 in PPP 
prisons and in the publicly-managed cohort (Audit Review, 2000b; Kirby, 2000; 
VAGO, 1999). For instance, savings had been achieved in the construction of the PPP 
prisons and average daily costs-per-prisoner reduced. It was also found that the 
presence of the PPP prisons had resulted in improvements in the management of 
prisoners and in accountability in the publicly- and privately-managed prisons.  
 
In addition, this thesis established that reforms introduced in 2001 were intended to 
support the achievement of NPP objectives. These reforms transformed the 
Department’s management of the correctional services sector (VAGO, 2003; 2007b) 
and aimed to reduce the rate of prisoner re-offending. Chapter 5 noted that these 
reforms had some measure of success by 2004 (Birgden and McLachlan, 2004 (whose 
findings are confirmed by Graffam et al (2005) and VAGO (2007a)).  Accordingly, it 
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is possible to conclude that despite the conflicting objectives inherent in the pre-2000 
arrangements and the inadequacies of the pre-2000 contracting regime, the pre-2000 
contracts do not appear to have impeded the development of the goodwill trust 
necessary to support the successful roll-out of the 2001 reforms in the remaining two 
pre-2000 prisons (Port Phillip and Fulham). 
 
It was noted in Chapter 5 that the 2001 reforms are grounded in a philosophy (and 
exhibit features) reminiscent of the network governance model. For instance, the 
reducing re-offending reforms require a high degree of collaborative interaction 
between stakeholder groups, including employment consultants, prison management, 
custodial staff and prisoners to achieve targeted outcomes at the macro (systems level) 
and, through negotiated management plans, for individual prisoners at the micro level.  
 
The introduction of the re-offending reforms provides evidence of the successful 
achievement of the implementation of qualitatively-based outcomes in the PPP 
prisons, and across the system as envisaged by NPP. The introduction of the 2001 
reforms support the conclusions in Chapter 4 that VFM (as quantified in the PSC or 
other benchmark calculation in the pre-contracting stage) is largely designed to 
control and rationalise the decision to take the PPP option. In the context of change 
over lengthy contracts and its omission of qualitative VFM objectives, the PSC’s 
ability to provide a realistic indication of VFM over project life appears to be limited. 
Irrespective of the role of the PSC, the evidence presented in Chapter 5 confirms that 
the Department of Justice has put in place complex mechanisms to monitor PPP 
performance on a continuous basis. For instance, in addition to OCSC monitoring, the 
use of the financial model to actively monitor and control risk transfer back to the 
government in the execution stage in the post-2000 contracts challenges findings in 
the literature, which suggests that VFM achievement is not actively monitored in the 
PPP execution stage (see, for instance, Broadbent et al, 2003b). 
 
The evidence presented in Chapter 5 seems to support the contention in the literature 
that successful partnership relationships in long-term hybrid relationships are based 
on goodwill trust (contrary to assertions by Froud (2003)). However, the evidence in 
Chapter 5 also suggests that goodwill trust itself is mutable, and does not necessarily 
support every aspect of the partnership relationship at any given time. For instance, 
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difficulties surrounding the recontracting process in 2006 occurred at the time that the 
2001 reforms were being implemented successfully. This implies that, irrespective the 
presence of goodwill trust, managing change over the long-term in poorly specified 
TCE-based contracts remains difficult. 
 
The problems associated with using privately managed prisons to foster 
modernisation change in a regime governed by NIE-based contracts raise questions 
about the assumptions underlying NIE and its application in some public sector 
settings (Lapsley, 2001c; d; Spackman, 2002). Classical economic theory questions 
whether ‘successful’ provision (in terms of cost, quality, public benefit and 
accountability) of social services (such as the management of prisons by private 
operators) is possible through unregulated competitive markets (Barton, 2002), which 
PCT and TCE attempt to replicate in a public-sector setting. Externalities make it 
difficult to establish a contracting regime that is capable of capturing the nuances of 
policy, public benefit, genuine and ongoing stakeholder participation, accountability, 
and of reacting to uncertainty required in the provision of social services in modern 
democracies, and helps to explain the problems experienced by the Victorian 
government in managing and controlling the project and political risks associated with 
the pre-2000 PPP prisons. As indicated in this thesis, network governance may 
provide an alternative approach in which the impact of externalities may be taken into 
account and neutralised.  Also, critiques of the TCE literature introduced in Chapter 5 
suggest that the purpose of contracting in long-term hybrid relationships should be to 
establish goals and methods to enable mutual planning, rather than to establish ex-post 
control mechanisms as envisaged by TCE (Tomkins, 2001). These findings suggest 
that Australian governments may need to re-evaluate their reliance on TCE-based 
contracting regimes to manage and support social policy change. 
 
In summary, the case-based empirical evidence analysed in Chapters 4 and 5 of this 
thesis established that the management of financial risk and control of the disclosure 
of public debt appears to have been a primary consideration (as predicted in the 
literature (see Broadbent and Laughlin, 1999)) of the pre-2000 PPPs. Nevertheless, 
the pre-2000 prison projects were also intended to achieve significant financial and 
non-financial modernisation objectives, and to drive modernisation reform throughout 
the Victorian correctional services sector. Accordingly, the findings in this thesis 
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challenge assertions in the literature that anticipated VFM is largely based on cost 
savings achieved in the design and construction phase (Broadbent et al, 2004a). 
However, the findings also confirm that the Department of Justice has struggled over 
time to enforce and modify aspects of the quantitative and qualitative performance 
standards embedded in the pre-2000 contracts because of flaws in the specification of 
performance, payment and default mechanisms and problems associated with TCE-
based contracting. 
 
It is clear from the analysis in Chapters 4 and 5 that the nature of the observed change 
in the implementation of modernisation in the setting of Victorian PPPs is not 
straightforward. The work by Lapsley (2001d) and Modell et al (2007), as 
summarised in Chapter 2, suggests that, although central agencies (such as 
departments of treasury and finance) at the macro level may continue to embrace the 
theoretical and applied precepts of NIE, successful reform instigated by line agencies 
at the micro (organisational) level, while congruent with the broad objectives of NIE, 
may take different (and softer) approaches to managing change that are more 
responsive to context. This thesis has demonstrated that some aspects of successful 
reforms to the delivery of correctional services have been based on the seemingly 
contradictory principles and application of NIE and of network theory. 
 
The observed flexibility at the micro level raises questions about the role of 
accounting and management technologies in the change process. Meyer (1998) has 
suggested that the public sector has been transformed, and that accounting and 
management technologies are an integral and dominating part of the rationalising and 
modernising transformation that has produced a new public sector. However, the 
work by Lapsley (2001d) and Modell et al (2007), and the findings in this thesis, raise 
questions about the appropriateness (at the micro level) of these technologies as 
change mechanisms in some circumstances, and also confirm that the modernisation 
process is still in a state of transition.  
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7.4.4 The third aim: to analyse the changing characteristics of auditor-
general oversight of PPPs. 
Chapter 6 contended that performance audit is a technology developed to provide 
assurance that modernisation reform has been implemented cost effectively. Despite 
agreement on its origins, the modernisation role of performance audit remains 
contested in the literature. English and Skaerbaek (2007) have identified an 
interrelationship and mutual co-dependency between modernisation and performance 
audit, which has given rise to suggestions that auditors-general are implicated in the 
introduction of modernisation reforms in the public sector (Gendron et al, 2001; 
Skaerbaek and Thorbjornsen, 2007), including PPPs (Broadbent and Laughlin, 2003). 
 
At the level of practice, auditing for cost-effectiveness and the management of 
programs requires the use of independent criteria (Pollitt et al, 1999). The nature and 
use of independent performance audit criteria is contested (Guthrie and Parker, 1999). 
Pollitt et al (1999) suggest that substantive audit uses independently-derived best 
practice criteria to evaluate observed outcomes, while systems-based audit uses 
criteria developed by audited bodies or by auditors-general themselves (Gendron et al, 
2001). 
 
The empirical evidence presented in Chapter 6 relates to three issues: the extent and 
focus of PPP audit in Australia; audit classification as systems-based or as 
substantive; and investigations of the PPP attributes (risk management and VFM) that 
are most closely associated with the achievement of stated PPP objectives. 
 
The analysis of PPP performance audit established the following. First, no Australian 
audit office appears to audit PPPs on an ongoing and strategic basis. Only 16 PPP 
projects (out of a total of 127 projects) have been audited in a total of ten performance 
audits. PPP auditing has been confined to three states: Victoria, NSW and WA. Most 
of the audits focus on the pre-contracting stage, although one substantive audit (of the 
implementation of the 1993 NPP modernisation reforms (VAGO, 1999), which is 
extensively reviewed in Chapter 5) indicates that, contrary to indications in the 
literature (Broadbent et al, 2004b), it is also possible to substantively audit the 
execution stage of PPPs within two or three years of their commissioning date. Again, 
challenging findings in the PPP literature (Edwards and Shaoul, 2003; Edwards et al, 
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2004; Pollock and Price, 2004), Chapter 6 reveals that it is possible to substantively 
audit the pre-contracting stage.  
 
Second, Chapter 6 revealed that only four of the ten PPP performance audits (of the 
16 projects) are classified as substantive. Also, Chapter 6 indicated that substantive 
audit is related to individual auditors-general, and also to public concern about the 
audited PPP. Substantive auditing appears to challenge the boundary between auditing 
policy and auditing the implementation of policy (English, 2003), whereas systems-
based audit is more likely to act to legitimate the implementation of government 
policy (Broadbent and Laughlin, 2003).  
 
Third, Chapter 6 indicated that risk management and the PSC (or equivalent 
benchmarks) are the most audited PPP technologies, confirming the focus in this 
thesis on these technologies and their role in implementing modernisation in a PPP 
setting. Furthermore, the Victorian audit of the implementation of modernisation in 
the context of correctional services provides some empirical flesh to the concept of 
VFM, indicating that VFM is more complex than may have been assumed in the 
previous literature (see, for instance, Broadbent et al, 2004b), and also confirming the 
analysis of VFM in this thesis in Chapters 4 and 5. 
 
In the context of performance audit, this thesis has documented an apparent retreat 
from independent substantive audit in the post-2000 period. The Chapter 6 analysis 
resonates with Jacobs et al’s (2007) findings that there has been a return to a reliance 
on process and procedure to provide assurance as to modernisation outcomes. Also, 
Chapter 6 raises the possibility that the documented change in PPP performance 
audits in the post-2000 period (from more auditing per se and more substantive 
auditing in the pre-2000 period to less auditing and all systems-based auditing post-
2000) could reflect a widespread transformation in the approach to performance 
auditing by Australia’s auditors-general.  
 
Chapter 6 acknowledged that the evidence provided in this thesis requires longitudinal 
research in different contexts before such a conclusion can be drawn. Nevertheless, it 
could be tentatively inferred from the Chapter 6 findings that the recent reliance in 
performance auditing on adherence to best practice frameworks devised by audited 
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bodies (or recommended by auditors-general) could represent a return to an audit 
emphasis on process and procedure (Guthrie, 1989; Guthrie and Parker, 1999; 
Hamburger, 1989), confirming the findings of Jacobs et al (2007).  
 
A significant contribution of this thesis is the wealth of the empirical data that 
supports its analyses and conclusions. Much of the PPP literature is based on 
normative argument and analysis of PPP technologies and their assumed effects in the 
absence of empirically-based evidence about aspects of PPP decision-making and 
outcomes (Heald, 2003). This thesis provides documentary-based evidence over 
1991-2007 to support its findings. Longitudinal research provides opportunities to 
investigate and compare outcomes of particular reforms over the short- and long-
terms, and is appropriate when investigating the implementation of complex 
modernisation reform in particular settings (Lapsley, 2001d). 
 
This concluding chapter now turns to reflect on the policy implications arising from 
research findings, and limitations and opportunities for future research in section 7.6, 
the concluding section of this chapter. 
 
 
7.5 Policy implications 
A number of policy implications arise from the empirical findings in this thesis. 
 
 
7.5.1 Achieving qualitative outcomes 
This thesis confirms findings in the literature that private-sector derived accounting 
and management technologies associated with NIE-based modernisation reforms 
privilege quantitative as opposed to qualitative performance specification (Bowerman, 
1998; Broadbent et al, 2003a). This thesis has shown that the specification of 
qualitative performance outcomes associated with NPP were ineffectively specified in 
the original pre-2000 prison contracts, and that the Department appears to have had 
difficulty in rectifying this weakness. This finding supports similar conclusions in 
relation to performance specification in Australia’s detention centres (ANAO, 2004; 
2005), suggesting that Australian governments continue to struggle with how to 
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specify performance standards relating to the treatment of prisoners (for instance) that 
meet changing community expectations. 
 
The field-based ‘alternative’ contracting literature reviewed in Chapter 5 suggests that 
long-term contracting requires the development of goodwill trust to support desired 
outcomes, and that the role of accounting and management technologies embedded in 
contracts is to facilitate negotiated understandings of their meaning and achievement. 
This thesis has provided evidence that a network approach may provide similar 
outcomes within a broader top-down NIE-based regime that establishes the broad 
parameters of political as opposed to project objectives. The 2001 reducing re-
offending reforms appear to have been more successfully implemented than the non-
financial VFM aspects of the NPP reforms that were initially incorporated into the 
pre-2000 prison contracts. The evidence cited in Chapter 5 seems to suggest that 
network governance may be more effective than a NIE-based contracting regime in 
achieving behavioural change. This is the case because the network model is premised 
on the notion of engaging stakeholders to reach consensual negotiated solutions 
supported by mechanisms to facilitate their achievement at the individual or 
community level. Accordingly, it would seem appropriate for Australian governments 
to investigate establishing frameworks to support a network governance approach 
where, for instance, desired change involves qualitatively improving standards 
relating to the treatment of vulnerable sectors of the community. 
 
 
7.5.2 Closing the disclosure gap 
Independent researchers face significant problems in investigating PPPs in the 
Australian context. Governments’ propensity to rely on commercial-in-confidence as 
a reason to restrict access to information about PPP contracts, processes, procedures 
and outcomes (Watson, 2004) has even blocked parliamentary scrutiny of these 
arrangements in Victoria (VPAEC, 2006). In addition, as was illustrated in this thesis 
by the difficulties encountered in determining the number, type and cost of PPP 
projects in Australia (see Chapter 4), the diffusion of PPP disclosure (Watson, 2003) 
further hinders independent scrutiny.   
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English and Guthrie (2003) concluded that departments of treasury are the main PPP 
agenda-setters and evaluators. However, Kirby (2000) and Audit Review (2000a; b) 
support a contrary view that some evaluation of PPPs has taken place at central 
government level in Victoria. However, in contradiction to the English and Guthrie 
(2003) finding, this thesis has provided evidence that the Victorian Department of 
Justice has undertaken a number of measures (such as continuous OCSC monitoring 
and the commissioning of reports by external consultants) to evaluate various 
elements of the implementation of the modernisation reforms associated with PPPs34. 
Access to these documents is not straightforward, however. As noted earlier, the 
Victorian OCSC reports (with the exception of OCSC (2000)) are not publicly 
available35. Locating the evaluation reports cited in this thesis on the Department’s 
website is also difficult because they are not cross-referenced according to topic, 
which makes finding them a rather hit and miss affair. In addition, it was found (see 
Chapter 5) that website maintenance processes have removed older (and possibly 
controversial) reports from public scrutiny. 
 
Researchers into Victorian PPPs have access to PPP contracts and, more recently, to 
other PPP documentation (PV, 2007). However, the commitment to disclosure in 
Victoria may be more apparent than real (VPAEC, 2006). For instance, Dunckley 
(2007), reporting on the release of 1000 pages of documents detailing the PPP 
arrangements to build and operate the Melbourne Convention Centre, noted that the 
government claimed that the documents showed that the community was getting 
VFM. However, Dunckley (2007, p. 14) stated that: 
[The government] blanked out every figure from the payment provisions 
section as well as removing other crucial numbers … relating to interest, 
payment disputes and shares in savings or refinancing gains. It also deleted 
numbers detailing compensation and the triggers and penalties for service 
failures.  [The] Major Projects Minister … did reveal a $93 million payment to 
the government by the successful consortium. … [The Minister] said the 
money was paid to secure development rights for a new office and residential 
building, hotel, shops, cafes and a homemaker centre. … Greens MP … said 
the documents released yesterday did not provide any indication of the value 
to taxpayers of the PPP.  
 
                                                 
34 Additional research is required to determine whether other agencies are as committed as the 
Victorian Department of Justice in evaluating programs. 
35 This is in contrast to the situation in WA. The equivalent prison monitoring body in WA, the Office 
of The Inspector of Custodial Services, is statutorily independent from government, and reports directly 
(and in public) to the WA parliament (Robinson et al, 2007). 
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The continuing reluctance of governments to disclose information adds to suspicions 
that PPPs fail to deliver VFM (Quiggin, 2004; Stanley and Hensher, 2004), and that 
governments have not been held sufficiently accountable for their economic and 
social repercussions (Andrew, 2007; Watson, 2003; 2004).  Interestingly, the matters 
raised by Dunckley (2007) have been the subject of a performance audit (VAGO, 
2007b), which concluded that, on the whole, the Melbourne Convention Centre did 
provide VFM, and that the Department had managed the project appropriately. 
 
However, this thesis challenges the notion that a lack of disclosure indicates a failure 
to achieve objectives per se. The paucity of publicly-available information and 
difficulties associated with locating it certainly impedes independent investigation of 
PPPs. Research efforts (and the accountability of governments) would be greatly 
enhanced if Australian governments provided more information about all aspects of 
PPPs, including information about projects and their costs to government; contracts 
(in addition to contract summaries); and internally commissioned evaluations. To 
facilitate independent evaluation of PPPs, excisions to PPP contracts and other 
publicly-disclosed material should be minimal. Also, information about PPPs from 
various government sources should be available in one place (Watson, 2003), for 
instance, in the case of Victoria, on the Partnerships Victoria website. 
 
 
7.5.3 Harmonising the approach to PPP use and implementation 
This thesis has confirmed that PPP models change over time and are context- specific. 
This makes it difficult to establish generalised PPP policies and models that are 
capable of anticipating the requirements of future projects. Victoria is the only 
Australian jurisdiction to have invested considerable time and money in developing a 
comprehensive suite of PPP policies (albeit based on UK experiences). As noted 
above, in Victoria, all stages of PPP implementation are overseen and controlled by 
the Department of Treasury and Finance, which also retains ultimate control of PPP 
decision-making at agency level through its PV policies, and requirements that PPP 
projects receive Cabinet approval at three different stages during the pre-contracting 
stage (PV, 2006). The Victorian Department of Treasury and Finance also receives 
briefings from agencies on PPP projects in the execution stage.  
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In other jurisdictions there may be less central management and control of PPP 
decision-making than in Victoria. For instance, although the NSW government has 
adopted a number of the Victorian policies (as have other Australian states (English 
and Guthrie, 2003), Chapter 6 noted that recent parliamentary inquiries into the 
Sydney Cross City Tunnel (NSWPAC, 2006; NSW Joint Select Committee on the 
Cross City Tunnel, 2006a; b) stressed that the lack of a coherent PPP policy in NSW 
and undisciplined decision-making by the relevant agency resulted in less than 
optimal public interest outcomes. 
 
The findings of the NSW inquiries suggest that Australian governments and auditors-
general need to put considerable additional effort into overseeing the implementation 
of their (borrowed) PPP policies to guide, aid (and discipline) decision-making in line 
agencies if they intend to continue to use PPPs to deliver infrastructure-based 
services.  Indeed, a harmonised national approach to PPP implementation could 
reduce costs and improve outcomes. 
 
 
7.6 Limitations and future research directions 
Lapsley (2001d, p. 107) contends that the observed failure of modernisation reforms 
in the literature (see, for instance, Olson et al, 1998; Guthrie et al, 2005) could be 
related to the propensity of researchers to take a snapshot approach (Pettigrew, 1989) 
in investigating what is essentially an iterative and ongoing transformation process. 
Lapsley (2001d, p. 88) writes that longitudinal research overcomes: 
…the distinct problem of examining the gap between strategic intent and 
operational implementation in this large, complex industry [the UK National 
Health Service]. In examining changes, Pettigrew advocates the longitudinal 
perspective as essential to understanding the processes of change and cautions 
against snapshots of reforms: ‘episodic views of change not only treat 
innovations as if they had a clear beginning and a clear end but also, where 
they limit themselves to snapshot(s) … fail to provide data on the mechanisms 
and processes through which changes are created (p. 26)’. 
 
 
While one of the strengths of this thesis is its longitudinal perspective, it is also a 
potential limitation for the following reasons. First, this is a documentary-based study 
that does not include field-based interviews which could have provided richer 
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understandings of the use of PPPs as a procurement technology and also of changing 
auditor-general perspectives on the conduct of PPP performance audit. Second, the 
majority of the documents examined are either official government documents (such 
as the PPP policies and the 2000 OCSC report) or are government-commissioned 
reports (Audit Review 2000a; b; Graffam et al, 2005; Kirby, 2000; Birgden and 
McLachlan, 2004). As there has been relatively little substantive performance audit 
examination of PPP projects that investigate achievements in the execution stage in 
light of benefits anticipated in the pre-contracting stage, the work of Australian 
auditors-general is insufficient to enable a comprehensive evaluation of PPPs. The 
lack of field research means that the findings in this thesis have not been corroborated 
by parties actually involved in PPP practices. Third, this thesis has focused on one 
particular PPP category (PPP prisons and hospitals) in one site in Australia. 
Accordingly, the findings may not be representative of other PPP arrangements in 
Victoria, or elsewhere in Australia and other nations. Fourth, the pre-2000 PPP model 
appears to have been abandoned in Australia (except for a PPP prison commissioned 
in 2001 in WA (see Robinson et al, 2007)), perhaps rendering the bulk of the findings 
of historical relevance only because the pre-2000 model has been replaced by the 
post-2000 model, which has significantly reduced project risk for the government and 
contractors. Fifth, the findings in relation to the apparent increase in systems-based 
audit in the post-2000 period need to be investigated further.  
 
In outlining the limitations of this research, this section has alluded to opportunities 
for future research. Clearly, there is a need for longitudinal field-based and 
documentary-based research to be conducted into Australian PPPs and their oversight 
by auditors-general. One of the contributions of this research is that it has provided 
for others an outline map of the PPP territory in Victoria. Victoria is Australia’s 
leading proponent of PPPs and has developed the PPP policies that have been adopted 
in all other Australian jurisdictions with few substantive amendments (English and 
Guthrie, 2003). Accordingly, this study has done much to flesh out the institutional 
and policy context in which PPPs have been developed and implemented in this 
country. However, this thesis has also noted that jurisdictional differences require 
scholars to take care when examining jurisdictional-based initiatives as there may be 
unique features that affect objectives and outcomes. Nevertheless, others can build on 
the findings in this thesis.  
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Importantly, very little field research into PPPs has taken place internationally, and 
none has occurred in Australia. Field research provides opportunities for the 
collection of rich empirical data, which cannot be replicated in documentary-based 
studies (Laughlin, 1995; 2004). Field-based research is time consuming for 
researchers and subjects. More crucially, field-based research into PPP practices 
would require the consent and active participation of departments of treasury and 
finance, and of line agencies. Given the reluctance of governments to make contracts 
and other PPP related material publicly available, there may be considerable obstacles 
to undertaking field research into PPPs and their achievements. This is unfortunate.  
Field-based research could make a valuable contribution to governments’ 
understanding of PPP implementation and strategies to improve outcomes. 
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